

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

VOLUME SEVENTY-TWO

NO. 227

JANUARY 1954

PRINTED FOR
DOWNSIDE ABBEY, BATH
AT THE CATHOLIC RECORDS PRESS
EXETER

Contributions should be addressed to THE EDITOR and business communications to THE SECRETARY, THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW, Downside Abbey, Stratton on the Fosse, near Bath. The annual subscription is sixteen shillings and eightpence (single copies, four shillings and twopence), or two dollars forty cents (single copies, sixty cents), post free.

We have to indicate an important omission in the last number. Fr Abbot's article, *Schism and Unity*, was a review, but the initial footnote giving title and details of the book in question did not appear. The book is *Schism in the Early Church* by S. L. Greenslade, pp. 248 (S.C.M. Press). We apologize to Dr Greenslade, his publishers and our readers for this oversight.

DANIÉLOU ON HISTORY

by

ERIC JOHN

THE occasion of this article is the appearance of a new book by P. Daniélou.¹ The title of the book is seriously misleading, it is not a treatise on the theology of history — an impossible theme. What could possibly be irrelevant, what could be reasonably left out? It is rather a collection of odd studies on the kind of topics people usually have in mind when they talk about history. P. Daniélou has divided his book into three parts: the first under the heading of *Problems*, deals amongst other things, with marxism and comparative religion. The second, *Mysteries*, is taken up with a series of typological studies which serve as an admirable introduction to P. Daniélou's more advanced writings in this field.² Finally, there is *Decisions*, a series of excellent sermons on the familiar and the not-so-familiar virtues, on hope for example, but also on *l'audace*. The preface suggests that many of the chapters were originally given as conferences and inspection shows that some part of the text has been printed before, mainly in review form. It is a pity that P. Daniélou chose to give his book a title which so effectively obscures the character of a valuable collection of occasional papers on a multiplicity of topics. In view of this the reviewer may perhaps be excused for once, if he takes a walk around the subject on his own account, choosing to praise and to carp at a little only of the *embarras de richesses* which this book provides.

When people talk about history what do they mean? To be exact they ought to mean the sum total of past human activity, which of course is to mean what it is impossible for humans to know. By far the greatest part of this activity was purely private

¹ *Essai sur le Mystère de l'histoire*. J. Daniélou. Seuil, pp. 341.

² Perhaps it may not be amiss here to remind English readers of A. G. Hebert's two pioneer works in this field, which are still in many ways unsurpassed: *The Authority of the Old Testament* and *The Throne of David*.

to the agent concerned and not even accessible to his contemporaries, let alone to a later generation. Even if we take a 'great man', a man whose relationship to his fellow-men, both his contemporaries and his posterity, is such that what he *did* affects what they *do*, to a greater or a lesser degree and whether they realize it or not, even if we take such a man, much of him escapes us. What was Napoleon like? What did it feel like to have been in that skin in those situations? One might as well ask how will Napoleon appear at the Last Judgement and indeed short of that knowledge, our understanding of Napoleon will necessarily be incomplete. Even if we take a classical example of self-knowledge and self-revelation, say St Augustine's *Confessions*, how much of St Augustine, of his relation to God, of the quality of his prayers can we hope to know? In most cases the evidence from which we have knowledge of past human activity is far less than in the two exceptional cases I have quoted. I am not denying that we can have genuine and valuable knowledge of the past, but I am urging that from the nature of the case it is limited knowledge, incomplete in all sorts of ways. History is like a barrage balloon, what is there but invisible is so much more important than what is there and visible.

This is all no doubt obvious and common-place: we all take this incompleteness for granted and adopt, without thinking about it, a more limited notion of history, as the occasion arises. Unfortunately, we do not as a rule stick to what we have decided to define that we intend to mean. We mean different things at different times and we shift the boundaries of our definitions to and fro in an entirely arbitrary manner. We talk of history as though it were split up into 'culture', 'tradition', 'catholic history', 'protestant history', 'economic history', 'constitutional history'; as though they were separate, distantly related and competing systems of thought. When we try then to talk about history in general we tend to speak as though we were a naive sort of Kantian, ignoring the concreteness of the past in favour of our own artificial categories. Thus as a propaedeutic to an attempt to say something about history in the round and the relevance of faith to that attempt, it is important to follow up a little the consequences of the necessarily limited nature of historical knowledge and also to reflect a little on how that knowledge is obtained.

It seems to me that historical knowledge is knowledge about relationships of which we ourselves are one of the terms. Because of this nearly all historical knowledge is about public activity, by which I mean what men have done that has altered the shape of their common life with their fellow-men and which is part of the pattern of life inherited by each succeeding generation. This is the sort of relationship I mean, obviously we are involved and obviously the other term in the relationship is another person whose quondam activity created the relationship. Historical knowledge is thus a knowledge of personal relationships but of course not personal in the sense of relations between friends; what is in question are relations of which we may not be aware and which have to be shown, although they may be terribly important and the knowledge of them change our whole life.³

This sort of public activity will vary enormously in its initial character and it may well have been far from obviously public at the time. One can imagine Eadfrith, the compiler of the Lindisfarne Gospels, looking blank if he had found himself accused, as he often is in modern books, of being a foundation-stone of Western culture. (How would one say Western culture in Anglo-Saxon or medieval Latin for that matter?) He might eventually gather that his interlocutor was referring to the miniatures and the rubrication, and he would no doubt say that this was his share of the praise of his community. And so it was. But a personal contribution to the common worship of an early monastic community is also a landmark in the history of art. The man who planned and constructed the first factory no doubt thought of little but his own financial gain, but his work has nevertheless radically altered our society. It is the function of historical study to trace these consequences backwards, to find origins from an examination of surviving traces. This necessary working-backwards inverts the proper order of the relationship and it is easy to slip into thinking that what is of primary importance is the consequence, in other words what matters is the effect on us. But the very existence of what we are investigating demands that the proper order of the relationship shall be preserved. It is what was originally done that matters and

³ A good illustration of this would be Newman's patristic studies, especially his work on St Athanasius.

the primary importance must go to what were the agent's motives and how did he do what he did. The consequences for us are important, but they are secondary, the probably uncovenanted overflow from the original deed. Is not this confusion at the heart of much of our talk of Western culture? Even Catholics sometimes seem to think that the main purpose of the medieval Church was to fill twentieth century museums with *objets d'art*. But who could really suppose that Giotto could have painted the murals in the Arena Chapel if he had supposed that his real function was to provide a 'draw' for the tourist trade, to decorate a shrine for *Kunstgeschichte*.⁴ If we could see the Catholic religion in the way that Giotto did, combining that kind of competence with that kind of faith, there would be no need to go to Padua, we could create such works for ourselves.

What matters for historical knowledge then is to get back to the original work: knowledgeable admiration and refined connoisseurship are no part of the task of the historian. He must put himself under the past, subject his mind to the evidence, lend his intelligence to his predecessors in a mighty effort to retrace the course of their activity, to show what was done, why it was done and how it was done. This special and curious relationship has moreover something in common with all personal relationships, it carries the obligation to give the other his due, which is an especially heavy obligation when the other is no longer there to protest if justice is not done.

I have said then, that historical knowledge is incomplete, that relative values in any final sense can only be assigned by God, that our knowledge of the past is therefore lop-sided and fragmentary and that it is knowledge about ourselves and our situation. If this be admitted it will not do to speak, as P. Daniélou does, of 'deux grand problèmes de notre temps, celui de l'histoire et celui de l'existence'. Such a distinction hardly makes sense, history and existence are the same thing—we might distinguish them so far as to say that history is the shape of human existence, but no further.

The special problems raised by history then, are problems of understanding past existence correctly. From what has already

⁴ Cf. Marxists who used to believe that the sufferings of many past generations had taken place simply to let *them* into the earthly paradise.

been said this knowledge is in some ways quantitative because in some ways measurable, and because measurable it can to some extent be reduced to a technique and be taught and learnt as a method. But it is not measurable in the way that the fabulous scientist is supposed to measure 'nature' in his laboratory. Perhaps demonstrable is a better word than measurable, it is a way of illuminating relationships, of demonstrating truth about them. This demonstration can only be done by the calculus of the working historian, examining, dissecting and criticizing his evidence. Sometimes, as in the case of the Lindisfarne Gospels, it is a question of a 'marvel only wonderment can measure' and the vital things may escape the calculus altogether. Of course this kind of study is humble enough and only of the most limited value in any attempt to seek out the mysteries of divine providence, but to know these limitations and to accept them is in itself a great gain.

Consequently, I must again disagree with P. Daniélou, when he divides historical study into an academic history which establishes the reality of events and a sort of theological history which interprets them. These theological historians, P. Daniélou concedes, do not always get their facts right. The distinction simply will not do. All historical knowledge must begin with what happened, an interpretation which gets its facts wrong is not a special kind of history but an ordinary kind of lying. Further, in spite of the common opinion to the contrary (the present reviewer has himself subscribed to it in print), there is no division of labour between fact-finding and interpretation, the process of fact-finding is interpretative from the beginning. History done in academies can often be criticized for lack of imagination and sympathy but when this happens the product is again not a special, inferior brand of history but as before, mere error and confusion. In fact almost all the great advances in our knowledge of the past made during the last fifty years have come from the academies. New and brilliant interpretations, especially, of medieval history, have been produced by the dozen, one has only to mention the names of Pirenne, and Marc Bloch amongst those writing in P. Daniélou's own language. The only legitimate qualification for a piece of historical work is that it shall be true history, a requirement easier to demand in theory than to fulfil in practice. Historical facts are only marketable

with an effort: the difference between the amateur with a passion for large views and the professional historian, is like that between the politician who stands at the pit-head and expounds the importance of coal for production and the miner who works at the coal-face. It is the miner who produces the coal: it is the professional historian who produces the history.

A great deal of what passes for Christian history is simply an uncritical homage to reputation. So-called Christian interpretations are so frequently a mere singling-out of those events with a Christian smell, e.g. the Crusades. But historical reputation is wild knowledge entirely dependent on the quality of the sources which are often untruthful. The canons of popularity are fickle and frequently trivial, they cannot be accepted without serious examination as contributions to wise understanding and fair judgement. Reputation, even reputation which has accrued over several generations, does not usually bear much relation to the deserts of its owner. Most of what most of us believe was the course of events in both ecclesiastical and secular politics in the thirteenth century is in fact nothing more than a shadow of the truth which has been distorted by the shameless prejudices of a couple of St Alban's monks. Has not Father Dvornik recently restored reputations encrusted with a millenium of calumny? Slowly, as historical knowledge progresses, we are beginning to get behind the prejudices and untruths of the sources. And the first requirement for an approach to history, mysterious or otherwise, is a determination to submit to the truth whether it be palatable or not, and a readiness to submit to the historical discipline which experience has taught us is the only means of arriving at the truth about the past.

So far no problem special to the Christian historian has been raised. Although no doubt a non-Christian historian would not want to use some of the language I have used, it should I think be possible to obtain substantial agreement as to the substance of my argument so far. But what special problems does history raise for the Christian, i.e. what bearing have the doctrines we subscribe to on the study of the past?

The specifically Christian approach to the past seems to me to involve a discrimination between those events which the Christian knows no more about than his unbelieving colleague, and those

which faith requires to be given a special significance. Certain events reveal, because they contain, the presence of God in a quite literal sense — if what we believe is true. Obviously then the centre of the Christian approach to history will be those events of sacred history, those direct interventions of God into human affairs, recounted in Scripture. Not only are the events in a literal sense direct actions of God but the recording of them is guaranteed by the spirit of Truth himself. The obvious beginning for the Christian enquirer into the 'mystery of history' is to turn to the Bible and study the special problems raised by the use of human, natural language to point to and in some degree explain, the intentions of God in so far as he has chosen to reveal them. P. Daniélou is especially illuminating here. He treats very ably the special character of Christian symbolism, pointing out the way in which it contains natural symbolism and yet is independent of and distinct from it at the same time. Both kinds of symbolism stand for, figure, represent something other than themselves. But natural symbols are pictures and words whilst Christian symbols are pictures and words of real men and real events:

'La croix du Christ est le gibet misérable où il a été suspendu un jour et ne doit rien dans son origine à la symbolique de la croix. Mais les Pères . . . ont vu dans la croix du Christ les quatre dimensions du cosmos, symbolisant ainsi l'universalité de la rédemption . . . le contenu théologique original de la symbolique chrétienne. Elle repose sur la symbolique naturelle, sur les hiérophanies cosmiques. Et par là elle est accessible à tout homme. Mais elle est chargée, ensuite de toute une symbolique historique, de tous les éléments dont les symboles se sont chargés tout au long de l'histoire sainte. Par ce double aspect les symboles chrétiens ont une exceptionnelle richesse. Et par ailleurs, à leur niveau, apparaît mieux que partout ailleurs, l'articulation de la connaissance surnaturelle de Dieu.'

This seems to me to make very well the point that the supernatural is not something that starts where the natural leaves off, but is rather something perfectly natural and yet something other than the natural at the same time. It is the special character of the relation of natural and supernatural which is at the bottom of all the problems raised by a Christian understanding of history.

In addition to the events recorded in the Scriptures, there are other human actions which we know lead to the intervention and presence of God. In prayer for example and in the ritual actions which are the human side of the sacraments. Here of course the relation of natural and supernatural ceases to be a problem for speculation at all. What is wanted here is a simple participation in the mystery, which is the only source of any relevant knowledge about the mystery and is a very odd kind of knowledge indeed. In so far as any question of study is involved here, that is a matter for the theologian and is better described as contemplation of the divine mysteries than a study in the ordinary sense. But this leaves a vast area of human activity on which revelation has shed no direct light.

It is this area which is the special province of the historian in the ordinary sense of the word ; is there anything involved here especially Christian and requiring special things to be said by the Christian? It seems to me that there is. Perhaps the easiest and clearest way of making my meaning clear is to point to what I think is the wrong sort of comment to make and develop my argument from a denial of this. It seems both easy and common to make a simple division in our lives between the practice of the presence of God which we very reasonably call our spiritual lives and the rest which we frequently most unreasonably dismiss as our secular or merely worldly lives. P. Daniélou, it seems to me, makes this kind of distinction in a peculiarly invidious form:

‘Pour saint Augustin, l’histoire de la cité de Dieu qui coïncide avec celle de l’Eglise, et celle de la cité de Satan, qui correspond aux puissances politiques, sont tout à fait distinctes et même opposées.’

No one is going to dispute that the cities of God and Satan are at war with one another: the *même opposées* was hardly necessary. But I cannot agree that St Augustine thought the city of Satan coincides with the *puissances politiques*. Part of the point of his book was to refute just that charge. I am sure the equation is false, and so, to be fair, does P. Daniélou, sometimes. It is perhaps here no more than a careless turn of speech, but it is one which betrays something of a bias in his thinking and which is likely to prove a barrier to getting to the bottom of the problems of Christian history. If we could partition human activity in this way, *a priori*, between

sacred and secular there would be no problem at all. But outside those activities which we know by faith to be sacred, a terrible problem of discrimination between God's work and the Devil's remains. It is especially facile to pick on the 'political', a category in any case with very vague and misty limits, as the definition of the profane.

If we look closely at the kind of human activity which for the present purposes is *sub judice*, we shall see that the process of separation into sacred and secular is complicated and delicate. First we have actions which by any standards are political, and yet because of their closeness to the supernatural must also be called sacred. We know that it is the duty of the Church to plant itself in the four corners of the world. The Gospel is to be preached to all nations: it is to be preached everywhere. But everywhere is least of all a geographical location — getting to the right latitude and longitude is the easiest part of the task. What is difficult is planting the Church in a new place in the social sense: preaching in a new language, in a language perhaps without the words necessary for the fundamental doctrinal vocabulary: planting the Church in a context of family life and novel political arrangements, this is vital if the Church is to stick. And sometimes it is done so well that Christian thinkers of a later generation will dismiss as secular, institutions it cost martyrs' blood to put there in the first place. There is then in the context of a discussion of Christian history no excuse for a special treatment of the political, the category is not especially relevant.

There are certain other kinds of action which again are obviously sacred as well as natural. Mysterious activities which the plain man would like to condemn as daft if only they obviously weren't: the sort of things St Francis did: or St Ignatius going to school with small children although he was adult and ex-service into the bargain. But even here we cannot make any sharp distinction, we cannot say ah, the actions of a saint quite different from secular actions. Even from the purely natural standpoint, the actions by which we think we can recognize sanctity had an object. St Ignatius wanted to learn to read and write and if St Francis begged in order to embrace lady poverty, he also begged to obtain the necessities of life. The Church encourages rather than forbids us to pray for spiritual

DANIÉLOU ON HISTORY

aid in any of the problems which vex us. Activities that are not *a priori* spiritual cannot then be dismissed as profane. God has bid us pray, he has instituted the sacraments, so we always know where we can find him, but he has also threatened to confront us at any point in our lives, 'that which you do to the least of these, you do to me'. Did not God in person confront Pilate in the judgement seat, from the dock? What will be the answer given to the magistrate who says: yes I imprisoned the innocent but I prayed for them afterwards? The categories into which we chop up our activities, public and private, inner and outer life, are terms of convenience, terms of art for natural living, they are not relevant theological categories. This is one reason why all history is mysterious, the sacred, that is the presence of God, cuts across all our ordinary living and will confront us at any time.

We can now become more theological about history. The temptation expressed in the *a priori* labelling of secular activity, if generalized, becomes the sort of theology which because it knows that God is perpetually at war with Satan goes on to see the war as a perpetual football match, in which the two sides can be identified by the colour of their shirts. But the war is only partly a visible war and in any case the visibility depends to a great extent on the possession of eyesight sharpened by the light of faith. Mostly it is unseen warfare. It is a question of allegiance for which the two cities compete, our acceptance or rejection of the invitation is shown not by signing a form or waving a flag but by our conduct before God: the issue is reserved for the end, when each gets his passport for the city for which he has worked his passage. There is a hierarchy of actions, the greatest are those which bring us nearer to God, especially those in which God plays the greatest part, which we call sacraments, our titles to grace, to use P. Daniélou's happy phrase. But activities cannot be classified further with much confidence, certainly not by an *a priori* classification. Only what revelation tells us are sacred actions are certainly so, for the rest we have to find out by trial and error. The fundamental mystery of history then can only be plumbed in experience, it is an existential mystery to use current jargon.

But there is one question so important and so disturbing that if not the fundamental problem of the Christian understanding of

history, it is certainly one which must always be raised when that understanding is sought. That is the number of obviously diabolical events of which history seems to be full.

P. Daniélou attempted an answer to this question, posed in his case by M. Camus. He answers very fairly that we cannot judge God's justice by the standards of human justice but only by the standards of his own justice, which is the same as saying by the way in which he keeps his promises. I am not sure whether M. Camus found this answer satisfactory.⁵ It does not seem very satisfactory to me. One remembers Jonah who thought God unjust because he did not keep his promise to destroy Ninevah, nor do I like P. Daniélou's suggestion, it is no more than that, that human justice is utterly unlike divine justice. Unlike, yes, but we ought to be able to recognize it when we see it, how are we to distinguish between God and the Devil, which I take it was the point of M. Camus' original question ?

The answer, it seems to me, can only be by turning to the Catholic doctrine of predestination, without which this side of the problems raised by a faithful approach to history, cannot be answered. Unfortunately, the place of predestination in the Catholic tradition has been obscured by the reformers' use of the doctrine in the elaboration of their own theology. This is a pity, the doctrine ought not to be *used* at all, but it is essential to an understanding of Christian history.

Clearly predestination must always be the most elusive and mysterious of doctrines just because it ' . . . must needs be infinitely above man's apprehension. So that a cocklefish may as soon crowd the ocean into its narrow shell, as vain man comprehend the decrees of God.' Perhaps without presumption we may say a little. I am a free, responsible person and I shall incur any blame or deserve any merit which shall accrue from what I do. In the purely natural sphere, predestination is of no relevance, we have *here* perfect free-will (in the theological sense, obviously psychological and social considerations limit this somewhat in practice), but when we are trying to look at the workings of the supernatural beyond the natural *here*, then our actions, once done, remain responsible actions and justly praiseworthy or blameworthy, but are now also determined

⁵ M. Camus has himself suggested what seems to me a better answer, in his novel, *La Peste*, in the two sermons preached by the Jesuit to the plague-stricken townspeople.

in the sense that they are part of the divine plan flowing from divine wisdom out of divine omnipotence. Our actions, on this level, are determined actions, but as Leibniz put it in his letter to Arnauld, they are actions determined freely and they will remain free actions for ever. The intellectual or rather imaginative difficulty here is again due I think to the linguistic impossibility of finding precise words to express a relation between natural and supernatural. It is here a matter of relating natural freedom and supernatural determination. We can for some purposes treat them as two entirely distinct categories, but obviously not for all, it is the same action in both cases. If we do, as at other times we must, point to the way in which the supernatural contains whilst spreading beyond the natural, it seems as though the supernatural predestination annihilates the natural freedom. But again although an adequate enough metaphor for some aspects of the relationship of natural and supernatural it is not entirely so, and clearly the natural retains its own characteristics. We have in the end to talk a little paradoxically about actions which are determined freely, but we are not offending reason but expressing obscurely a truth which it is not within reason's capacity quite to express in the round.

When applied to our personal lives, the problems arising here can up to a point be solved in experience. If we choose an evil course, perhaps that course may be atoned for, perhaps, to use Kierkegaard's beautiful phrase, God will forget it, and thus the fact that what has happened has happened and cannot be undone, can be faced with equanimity. The experience of grace prevents us from charging God with injustice here, we experienced our freedom and in a curious way we can experience predestination too, from the way 'reality becomes a slap in the face' and wonderfully consistent but entirely unexpected consequences follow from our actions. We cannot understand and work out the problems of evil, freedom and predestination but we can experience, if obscurely, their bearing on one another. We cannot say what the answer is but we can sometimes show it by what we do.

But if we go beyond our most intimate experience, the problems get entirely beyond our capacity for experience. Not even if we suppose that everyone has the same experience here as ourselves can we feel at ease. Predestination must mean that there are no ifs

in history, no interesting possibilities:⁶ but we cannot say, as it seems logically we ought, that everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. Not only are there terrible personal misfortunes but lacerations on the body of Christ itself, which is our hope against the power of the evil one. We must, I think, contemplate predestination along with the two cities. History in the fullest sense is like an elaborate game. One player is supreme and is bound to win because he makes the rules. But he is perfectly fair and once he has made a rule he will abide by it, and perfectly good so that the rule itself will be the best possible rule. One of the rules is the free and responsible participation of all the players in the game, they must play the game but how they play it is up to them. The *must* here may seem to contradict the freedom but this is not so, freedom is not absence of restraint but it is a word of power: to have power one must have existence first, to exist one must have a context, the context is the game and the freedom is the power to participate. It is only because one great player cheated that the game is in any way competitive at all, that it is a game and not a glorious ritual. Part of the contest is to be fought out in the world of men. Each man is not only a player in the game but also a prize for which the evil player will go on cheating in order to win, that is that he may drag down others to the same miserable condition as himself. He is clever, he has great powers which once given to him will not be taken away. He will win triumphant successes but they will always be pyrrhic, they will cost more than they are worth. When God became man, the Devil achieved his utter humiliation and his expulsion from the world by contriving his crucifixion, but at the cost of expelling all those who chose to go with him from the Devil's world to God's heaven. Finally, there will be no 'world': only Heaven, and Hell where the Devil is. Because freedom is power, and power is not simply either constrained or unconstrained, but tested by its ability to create and by what it does create, we can see how and why the Devil's freedom is entirely illusory, although God has not cheated him. He is free in that he is responsible and has a real will but his power because wholly evil is wholly without power to create. That is perhaps why the Devil is so eager to seek out men who will sin in the flesh on his behalf. The burden of power without expression must be terrible beyond all understanding, an illusion of relief may be found in the persuading of mortals to misuse

⁶ Quod praeterita non fuerint . . . non subjacet divina potestati. *S.T.* ia, xxv, 4.

their powers of creation. But it is an illusion because creative activity is by nature good, human sin as diabolical is achieved by a sort of negative reduction of that power which is our freedom. The sins of the flesh can give Satan little satisfaction.

But in terms of human suffering the victories of the Devil are real enough: the range of his skill is fortunately unknown to us but we can feel it and see it around us, in terms of things going horribly wrong.⁷ But by faith we can say that when the mass of human misery seems too impossibly great, or when our misfortunes seem impossible to bear, we are right to remember that God's justice although not our justice is not our injustice either. When and if we are permitted to stand in God's presence, we shall see that the victory was his in each and every case, whatever the issue as it was in the world. But we can only know this by faith, it is our trust in God, perhaps at its farthest limit, that entitles us to say so. It is not natural knowledge, it must seem to contradict experience and it will not do for any glib answer to the problem of evil. In the end, we may say, because we believe that God has conquered death and is conquering the Devil, then everything will be for the best even although it may be in what is almost the worst of all possible worlds.

These very personal reflections on 'le mystère de l'histoire' have been offered anent a reading of P. Daniélou's book, but in fairness to P. Daniélou something ought to be said of the book as a whole. I have in fact taken odd remarks from the book as pegs upon which to hang an argument, I should not wish to leave the impression that they are all there is to the book. The book as a whole is a work of *vulgarisation* in the best sense — what better conference could one have than the homily on hospitality which occurs under Problems? If it hardly tackles the fundamental problems indicated by the title, I can think of no better introduction to the problems and excellences of that brilliant school of French theologians of which P. Daniélou himself is such a distinguished member.

P. Daniélou's publishers have not done him any kind of justice. They have printed and published him in a style which is in England reserved for the adventures of Sexton Blake. My copy disintegrated under review.

⁷ Even if we are unbelievers. v. Baudelaire.

'O douleur! ô douleur! Le Temps mange la vie,
Et l'obscur Ennemi qui nous ronge le cœur
Du sang que nous perdons croît et se fortifie.'

THE WILL OF GOD¹

WITH A POSTSCRIPT ON OBEDIENCE

by

DOM ILLTYD TRETHOWAN

THERE are, I believe, problems about the will of God which are usually evaded. Dr Mascall's *Existence and Analogy* (Longmans 1949) provides a recent example of this, and I shall use most of my space for an examination of certain passages from it. But I ought first to make clear that this article is in no sense a review of Dr Mascall's book (Mr Stubbs has already reviewed it in these pages,² and I should like to take this opportunity of endorsing his conclusions). There is very much in the book for which we ought to be most grateful and I choose these passages from it for criticism because I wish to illustrate a certain point of view in a way which will do justice to it.

To show what the central problem is will necessitate a quotation covering nearly two pages (126-128) of *Existence and Analogy*:

'Is it not the root weakness of the traditional Christian theism that it finds itself forced to assert that God could be perfectly good without having any object on which to bestow his goodness? And if we reply that God has always himself on whom to pour out his bounty and that, in his unqualified perfection, he is altogether worthy to receive it, are we not turning God's love into that self-love whose true name is selfishness? Is not our God in fact like a millionaire entirely wrapped up in the enjoyment of his riches, who may — or equally well may not — toss a penny, capriciously and more or less unconsciously, to a beggar in the gutter as he passes by? It is, I think, relevant to reply that, since the act of creation does not confer any benefits upon beings who already exist but gives them their very existence, if God had not created finite beings there would be no finite beings to suffer

¹ The substance of this article is taken from an Appendix to *An Essay in Christian Philosophy*, to be published by Longmans in a few months' time. It appears here by courtesy of Mr T. M. Longman.

² Winter, 1949-50, pp. 90f.

THE WILL OF GOD

from not being created. This is not, however, a complete answer, for the objection arises not merely from the alleged unkindness towards the creatures, but from a sense that not to have created a world when he could have done so would argue some sort of self-centredness and so an imperfection in the nature of God. It must, I think, be admitted at this point that if natural theology were left to its own devices it could not do much more than say that there must be a solution to the difficulty somewhere but it could not see where; it would no doubt add that it had no right to expect to see it anyhow. St Thomas brings the point out clearly in two statements which a hasty reader could easily take to be mutually contradictory. "It pertains", he writes, "to the nature of the will to communicate to others the good possessed in so far as it is possible; and specially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its good to others, as much as is possible." Yet, he goes on to say, "since the goodness of God is perfect and can exist without other things, while no perfection can accrue to him from them, it follows that his willing things apart from himself is not necessary absolutely".³ The nearest thing that we get to a solution of this antinomy is a brilliant reply which the Angelic Doctor gives to an opponent who has urged that, since God's knowledge and will are both identical with his essence and since whatever he knows he knows necessarily, it must follow that whatever he wills he wills necessarily too. The rejoinder points out an important difference between intellect and will. "As the divine existence is necessary to itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the things known, not the divine will to the things willed. *The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves.* Since, then, all other things have necessary existence in so far as they exist in God [i.e. in the ideas which God possesses of them in the manifold imitability of the divine perfection] but no absolute necessity so as to be necessary

³ *S. Theol.*, I, xix, 2c, 3c. Cf. *S.c.G.*, I, lxxvi, lxxxii.

in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves it follows that God knows necessarily whatever he knows, but does not will necessarily he wills.”⁴ In other words, although God’s intellect and his will are really identical, for a creature to be an object of his knowledge and for it to be an object of his will are *not* identical, since these two characteristics arise from two different features of its creaturely being; its knowability from its necessary existence as an idea in the mind of God, and its willability from its contingent existence as an actual creature. This is, I think, as far as purely philosophical argumentation takes us; it is not so much a solution of the problem as an explanation why no solution is possible. And with such an explanation we have no right to be dissatisfied; *si enim comprehenderis, non est Deus.*⁵

The Encyclical *Humani Generis* of 1950 laid it down that we must not argue from the divine liberality, conceived of as necessary, to the necessity of creation. And theories about such a necessity have been constantly repudiated by ecclesiastical authority, for example, by the Vatican Council. The difficulty is to avoid conceiving of the divine liberality as necessary. All God’s acts are identical with God himself; how, then, can we conceive of him as *without* his creative act? This is the difficulty faced by St Thomas in *S. Theol.*, I, xix, 3 *ad* 6, quoted by Dr Mascall in the passage set out above (it is not quite clear to me whether Dr Mascall regards it as the really important question). Does St Thomas provide an answer or ‘an explanation why no solution is possible’? I cannot see that he does either of these things. The difference between intellect and will which he proposes to us, even if it were unobjectionable in itself (and the point about the existence of things in the knower as opposed to their existence in themselves is surely not free from difficulty), would not be of any use. We may say that the richness of God’s simplicity includes intellect and will in the divine, infinite, mode and that creatures might therefore be, so far as we can tell by considering the matter simply from their end, in one sort of relation to God’s intellect and in another sort of relation to his will. But it has still to be shown how anything *unnecessary* can be found in God himself. Instead of doing this St Thomas (at any rate as

⁴ *S. Theol.*, I, xix, 3 *ad* 6.

⁵ Augustine, *Serm. cxvii de Script. N.T.*, iii, 5.

interpreted by Dr Mascall) provokes a further objection by suggesting that God's knowledge of things is necessary because his knowledge of himself as imitable is necessary and contrasting this with God's will to create. But for God to know himself as *imitable* is not the same as for him to know himself as *imitated*. And if his will to create is to be declared unnecessary, his knowledge of creatures must surely be declared unnecessary also. Nor does it seem in any way to follow that, because created things have 'no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in themselves', God does not necessarily will them, unless we can say that what God necessarily wills is necessary 'in itself'. But what justification have we for saying this? Only God, it would seem, is necessary 'in himself'; created things would still be utterly dependent on him, and so presumably unnecessary in themselves, even if we said that God necessarily created them. We may say that to be created and to be contingent mean the same, but if we do we must use 'contingent' only in the sense of 'dependence'; we have no right to say that 'to be created', 'to be contingent', 'to be willed by God in such a sort that he might have willed otherwise' are simply synonymous. To say, as Dr Mascall does on p. 129 of *Existence and Analogy*, 'Creation cannot be *necessary* for God's self-expression and self-fulfilment just because it is not *sufficient* for them' is not to produce any further answer to the difficulty. Here Dr Mascall distinguishes between the way in which God the Father expresses himself in God the Son and the way in which the Godhead is expressed in creation — the distinction makes it no easier to understand what could be meant by saying that the Godhead could *lack* any kind of expressing activity which in fact it possesses.

To argue that we have to conceive of God anyway as able to be deprived of something, on the ground that his knowledge of our free acts might have differed from what it is, would be to suggest that 'two black riddles make a white answer'. But it may be worth while to say a few words about this suggested parallel. Without going into the whole question of predestination, of God's predetermining decrees, *scientia media* and the rest of it, we must admit that God would have known me as choosing what I chose *not* to do yesterday if instead I had in fact chosen to do it. The difficulty is not that God's knowledge seems to *change*, for he knows

eternally what is chosen, just as our difficulty about his will to create is not that it seems subject to change, for he eternally wills to create (and might have eternally willed not to create, according to the doctrine which we are examining). The difficulty about his knowledge is that it *would have been (eternally) different* if human choices had been different; the difficulty about his will is that it *would have been (eternally) different* if he had chosen otherwise. But is the first difficulty as formidable as the second? Both indeed are formidable. But it does not seem so plainly a contradiction for God's knowledge of the working out of his plan for the world to be restricted by the free actions of his creatures (who *produce* nothing of themselves, but exercise a merely 'negative' control) as for his will to create, a positive activity which cannot suffer interference from anybody, to be taken away from him, to be *unnecessary*. The usual answer to this — that God and the world do not add up, that God cannot be affected in any way by its presence or absence — does not seem satisfactory. The statement is manifestly true in so far as it means that God is the source of all being and that nothing therefore can be added to him (all that is positive in our free actions comes from him; but we have the mysterious 'negative' power to *refuse* his empowering). But how can we say that God's knowledge would remain the same whether there were a created world or not? How could we say that his will would remain the same whether he willed to create or not? Clearly we have immense difficulties to face at this point whatever we say. Ought we perhaps to take up the agnostic line suggested by the last words of the passages quoted from Dr Mascall, and maintain that the questions which we have been asking are improper questions? Before committing ourselves further, let us examine another passage from Dr Mascall's book. He has just mentioned the difficulty that 'God would seem at any rate to be modified by his knowledge of the world, even if not by his creation of it'. And he goes on:

'I will put this last point in another way, following substantially Dr Evgeny Lampert's recent work *The Divine Realm*. We are told by St Thomas that God does not necessarily will anything other than himself and yet that, in willing himself, he wills, by the one act of his will, both himself and all other beings.⁶ Now we can

⁶ *S. Theol.*, I, xix, 1-4.

perhaps admit that the ideas of all possible things are included in the idea which God has of himself in the manifold and infinite imitability of his all-embracing unity; but how, in the simplicity of the one necessary act by which God knows and wills himself, is there found the distinction between those possibilities on which God (unnecessarily) confers actual existence and those other possibilities which are never actualized? Dr Lampert's own reply is that in fact everything possible *is* actualized and that God necessarily wills its actualization. This seems to me to cut away the very ground of rational theism, namely the contingency of the finite world; it leaves us only the *character* of the world from which to infer God's existence and, if carried through consistently, will tend, in the way upon which I have commented elsewhere,⁷ to a doctrine of unbalanced immanence. I hope I shall not be suspected of bigoted Latinism if I say that I discern in Dr Lampert's book traces of the pantheizing tendency which much Eastern Christian theology has manifested. The position I am criticizing seems also to imply that the actualization of one possible being can never exclude the actualization of another; in other words that all things that are possible of actualization separately are possible of actualization together. In effect the distinction between the possible and the actual vanishes. This world becomes not only the best of all possible worlds but the only possible world. It seems impossible any longer to maintain even a notional distinction between God's unnecessary willing of the world and his necessary willing of himself. But if this is not maintained we shall be landed quite openly in either pantheism or absolutist monism. The fundamental question remains, how the unnecessitated willing of the created world is included in the necessary act by which God wills himself. Does the willing and knowing of the finite world by God add anything to God's willing and knowing of himself? If we answer No, we have apparently denied that the world is really distinct from God. But if we answer Yes, we have apparently denied the divine self-sufficiency. That is the dilemma with which we are faced. Can we do anything to ease it ?' (pp. 130-32).

⁷ *He Who Is*, p. 177.

It seems to me that Dr Lampert could defend himself by saying that the 'ground of natural theism' is the discovery that the objects of our immediate knowledge are finite, that they do not contain within themselves the reason for their existence, that they reveal themselves to us as deriving from God, without its being a logical consequence that their creation by God must be thought of as an act of *choice* on God's part between alternative possibilities, creation or no creation. And it would be open to him to insist that to call God's act of willing *necessary* does not mean that any constraint is put upon him by any purpose which demands to be fulfilled (whatever this could mean) but simply that it arises from the perfect spontaneity of his own nature. Why should this lead to an 'unbalanced immanence'? Thus for God to express himself externally would be something which flows from the divine nature, an aspect of the divine generosity. And for this generosity there is no reason to be assigned, since it is really identical with the divine nature. It might even be possible to come to terms with the Encyclical *Humani Generis* by admitting that the word 'necessary' is liable to be misleading in the present state of philosophical thinking and substituting some other which would in the same way avoid the introduction of the unnecessary into God's activity. It will be seen that Dr Mascall (towards the end of the passage just quoted) lays it down that unless we maintain a 'distinction between God's unnecessary willing of the world and his necessary willing of himself . . . we shall be landed quite openly in pantheism or absolutist monism'. To this Dr Lampert would seem entitled to reply that for God to will both himself and the world necessarily need not mean that he is identical with the world; it does not follow that, if the willing is identical with God's nature, and therefore necessary, both *terms* of his willing are so identical. All parties to the debate must admit that in God there is infinite simplicity which 'contains' (we have to use the metaphor) the values to which we refer by assigning to him an intellect, a will and so forth. All have to face the mysterious truth that God's will bears not only on himself but on other things. The questions are: how can we preserve its simplicity if we divide it into a necessary will and an unnecessary one? Would it be a contradiction to say that God's simple will 'includes' the willing of an external, dependent, expression of himself? Dr Mascall decides that such an 'inclusion' is possible only

THE WILL OF GOD

if we make the division. He sees the difficulty with which he is faced and continues:

'The simplest way of circumventing the difficulty is to point out that the objection itself rests upon the assumption that God's concern with himself and his concern with the world can be added together, and that a significant statement can be made about their sum. This assumption could be justified only if God and the world were of the same order of being, whereas the fundamental conviction of Christian theism is that they are not. If we denote God's willing (or knowing) of himself by G and his willing (or knowing) of the world by W, the question which has been raised is whether $G + W$ is greater than G. But to talk about $G + W$ at all is to assume that G and W can be added together. And they can be so added only if they are of the same order of being, and this is manifestly false' (p. 132).

This does not seem to me at all satisfactory. It is perfectly true that the creation of the world does not add an existence to God's existence so as to increase a total sum of existence. But can we therefore say that God's knowledge of the world and his knowledge of himself are incomparable and cannot be united together? Shouldn't we be simply rejecting the data of our problem? To say that God knows himself and that he knows the world, but that these two activities of knowledge belong to different orders of being, would surely be to introduce finitude into God. This is not the same as saying that God and the world belong to different orders of being. As before, it seems at least less obviously disastrous to say that God's knowledge of the world is 'included' in his nature, and Dr Mascall has still to show, so far as I can see, that this involves identifying the world and God's nature.

Let us now return to the suggestion that we might avoid all these embarrassments by simply denying that the questions which we have been asking are legitimate questions. There is a line of thought in *Existence and Analogy* which might seem to lead us in this direction; in any case it will not be a waste of time, I think, to take notice of it: I mean Dr Mascall's opening thesis about *Existence*. According to Dr Mascall, who here follows M. Gilson, thinkers previous to St Thomas, and in particular St Augustine, had tended to reduce the existence of a thing to its essence (p. 46), whereas the

essence of a thing 'is nothing but the mode of its existence' (p. 48). '... *existing*, not being an essence, cannot be reached in the first act of the intellect, the abstraction of the concept, but only in the second act, the affirmation of the judgement...' (p. 50). Dr Mascall seems to think that most of us need to be weaned from attachment to essences and to be introduced to existence; for my own part, I must confess that my difficulty is to understand how one *can* have a concept of an essence, *prescinding* from existence; existence for me is an all-embracing word. But obviously this cannot be talked out here. The point which I wish to make at the moment is that this distinction between the concept and judgement seems to lead Dr Mascall into a view about the judgement which gives our affirmation of existence an *ineffable* quality. Since we are concerned here with our affirmation of God and since God is strictly ineffable, this might not seem likely to lead to any difficulty for us. But although God is strictly ineffable, we can properly refer to him as 'containing' the positive qualities of all created things, as Dr Mascall brings out so well in his discussion of analogy later on in the book. What we affirm is a richness, not a blank. We do know not only *that* God is but, in a manner, *who* he is. And it is this which Dr Mascall, in certain passages, might seem to deny. For example:

'We can define God only in terms of his self-existence; and existence, as we have just said, is not conceptualizable. We have not claimed, as it were, to understand the mechanism by which God exists, or by which he creates the world; we have claimed only that unless God existed and did create the world, the world's existence would itself be unintelligible' (p. 88).

It may be carping criticism to suggest that this implies an excessive 'agnosticism'. But I cannot help feeling that, when Dr Mascall rebukes 'essentialists' for claiming to have an insight into the nature of God, he is using his doctrine of existence to reject problems about God—and especially about the perfection, simplicity and necessity of *Actus Purus*—which do really arise. If his 'Thomist agnosticism' is of this kind, then it will not give us our solution. In passing I venture to suggest that Dr Mascall, by thus maintaining the transcendence of God in an *excessive* manner, at the same time topples over into an 'unbalanced immanence' by suggesting that the word 'existence' can be directly applied to God:

THE WILL OF GOD

'The point, as I see it, of the assertion that, while the proofs of God are analogical realities, they do not fall under the jurisdiction of analogy is that, while any *mode of existing* can only be predicated analogically of God and creatures (since mode of existence is essence and falls under the concept), the act of existing, which is not conceptualizable, can be affirmed without any analogical reservation. There is thus no concession to the doctrine of univocity of being' (p. 96n.).

Isn't the expression 'act of existing' used here univocally?

From Dr Mascall's discussion of 'essentialist' metaphysicians, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, I gather that he deprecates speculation about God's plan for the world. It is, indeed, a commonplace to say that God does not make plans at all, and if we take the words in their direct sense this is obviously true. 'Planning' refers directly to a human activity. Yet can we avoid the conclusion that God creates with a purpose? Could we think of God at all if we tried to think of him as creating without a purpose? And, if not, what can be the purpose of his expressing himself externally save the happiness of his creatures? Furthermore, why should we have to say that there must always be possible worlds which God has not created? Why should we not say that this world is, not the best possible world, but simply *the* world, God's one world, which therefore simply reflects him, not in one of various possible ways, but in his own way? And why should we have to say that a world in which the Incarnation has happened is not as good as it could be, so far as God's plan is concerned? These questions are highly unusual nowadays, because the usual answers, which Dr Mascall accepts, are thought to be sufficient; he has not persuaded me that they are sufficient, and I cannot use the sort of 'agnosticism' on which they are based as a means of dealing with problems about God's will to create. We do seem to know him well enough to say that he is *superlatively generous*.

Could we find another kind of agnosticism which will help us? Can we hold that it is equally meaningless to say 'God could have abstained from creating' as to say 'God could not have abstained'? Can we say that we cannot even use the word 'generous' of God in a strict sense? On the basis of what has been already said about God's 'containing' all positive values, we must surely say that

what we mean by 'generosity' is true of God as far as it goes, but that in him it is caught up into an infinitely rich simplicity which we can only faintly descry — but we must insist that we *do* descry it, however faintly, because we should not otherwise know anything about it; analogy is a state of affairs which we find only when we find God (this is the conclusion which Dr Mascall reaches, if Mr Stubbs and I are not mistaken, but in a rather hesitant matter — I would again refer to Mr Stubbs's review of *Existence and Analogy*). Can we then say that God could have been less generous than he has been? It would seem not, if we ask ourselves *who* God is. And it does not help, to my mind, to say at this point that God's power is limitless and cannot therefore be exhausted by creation. To say this, suggests, I think, that God uses up his powers to some extent, but that they are so great that he could never use them up altogether. And the truth must be that God *is* his power (and is thus unaffected by the 'use' of it). To say that he cannot use it more, or better, than he does is not to restrict him but just the opposite; it is only a way of saying that what God does is perfect — the use of negative language should not mislead us. But if somebody says (as people actually say) 'God could love us more than he does', then, in order to deny what seems to be an alleged *imperfection* in him, we have to say 'he couldn't'.

So the sort of 'agnosticism' which results from our realizing that human language can never be more than a 'pointer' to God has not helped us to understand the traditional formulae about God's freedom. Perhaps we must fall back on the consideration that to say that God's will to create is *necessary*, however we meant this to be understood, would be so inevitably interpreted in a pantheistic sense (*in view of the present state of philosophical thinking*) that it must be discountenanced.

A POSTSCRIPT ON OBEDIENCE

By way of appendix to this article it may be in order to consider a certain way of speaking about God's will in connexion with the religious life.

This way of speaking could be illustrated by a vast number of texts dealing with the religious life. The passage which follows has been selected almost at random; it comes from Dom Hesbert's

THE WILL OF GOD

Preface to his recent edition of Dom Claude Martin's *Perfection du Chef* (Editions Alasatia, 1952):

Now it is to give man the opportunity of showing his faith that God has subjected him to other men; to men who are themselves imperfect, but who give orders in his name; to men who are weak and sinful — sometimes even more than their subjects — but who are nevertheless his official representatives, clothed with his divine authority, and who, as such, have the right to the same obedience which would be rendered to God himself; or rather to the complete and wholehearted submission which we should want to show him if he appeared to give his orders in person. Such is the procedure planned (*imaginé*) by God in his infallible wisdom to transmit something of his thought and his heart to human beings. Such is the device (*plan*) which he has adopted in his infinite mercy (*tendresse*) to incite his elect to really supernatural acts of faith of confidence and of love, which otherwise they would doubtless never have made.

“To obey a visible God would be after all only a natural virtue, so irresistibly does his incomparable greatness demand respect and adoration. To obey God in a man — and that not for a time or at one's pleasure, but for ever and in everything — is impossible for human nature without faith, hope and charity, virtues which are essentially supernatural and, what is more, theological (p. xliv). Dom Hesbert writes a little later (p. xlv), introducing us to Dom Martin's thought:

Be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect! This truly sublime ideal, uttered by God himself, is proposed, indeed, to all the baptized. But no one can approach it in its entirety as can the religious superior. For if there is no perfection to which man can aspire which is not found eminently in God, there is at least one to which all are not called, the perfection of government in the quasi-divine exercise of power.

On the previous page Dom Hesbert has pointed out that the hierarchical principle does not operate merely in the ecclesiastical sphere; nor would anybody suspect him of holding either that religious superiors are infallible, or that the will of God operates through no other channels — indeed, secondary causes ‘and even man's obduracy’ have been referred to ‘as most authentic expressions

of God's will' (p. xxiii), and that will prove to be a part of the puzzle. But we must start with the question: what are the implications of the paragraph quoted above? Don't they suggest that the will of God is manifested by the orders of religious superiors in a way which is different *in kind* from that in which it is manifested by the orders of other legitimate authorities? Does the religious life exist so that there may be acts of obedience? Or are there acts of obedience in order that there may be a religious life? When St Benedict lays such enormous stress upon obedience, is it in order to emphasize an all-important means, or is it for him identical with that union with God which must be, on any showing, the end? Is obedience to superiors a peculiar *ascesis*, a sort of sacrament in which God is found in some quite special way, or is it just the supreme instance of a general law?

Let us see how far we can get on the latter supposition. Authority, in that case, will be, first and foremost, I suppose, a practical necessity. If communities of human beings are to attain their ends, they must have some means of deciding their differences; they must have a leader or a group of leaders. And so long as this leader or this group of leaders does not manifestly repudiate the principles on which all government is based the subject is obliged to obey all explicit orders. There is no need to consider any of the casuistry to which this elementary law of political philosophy inevitably leads. It is enough to remind ourselves of what seems to be the basis of human authority. The obedience which we owe to it we owe to God, just as our obedience to the moral law in general is owed to him. We see him in legitimately constituted authorities just as we see him in everything else which we recognize as *natural*. Our obedience to ecclesiastical superiors is particularly important in that the benefits which ecclesiastical authority is designed to promote are particularly important and the consequences of disobedience proportionately grave. But the *raison d'être* of ecclesiastical authority is fundamentally the same as that of any other. We may add that the burden of obedience to ecclesiastical authority, when it conflicts with our own idea of how things ought to be done, may have great value if patiently borne — like toothache.

But is this account sufficient? The paragraphs quoted from Dom Hesbert — which, I may be allowed to repeat, only illustrate common

THE WILL OF GOD

doctrine — suggest that there is much more to it. The suggestion might seem to be that God has made a special arrangement, one which is essentially repugnant to nature, in order that man might exercise supernatural virtues. It is no longer a matter which could recommend itself to reflective commonsense. It is a matter of peculiar sanctions, invisible save to the eye of faith. What can there be for faith to see? The legal aspect of the matter requires no supernatural perspicacity. The point cannot be merely that this obedience presupposes faith in general, faith in Christ and in his Church. Or is all this only a way of saying that the temptations to disobedience are sometimes very great? Even when we consider the special obligations entailed by religious vows, the language used about religious authority would still cause a puzzle. If religious obedience, in cases where suffering — mental or physical — results for the subjects, were thought to be in some mysterious way an end in itself, then it would be the duty of religious superiors to arrange such obediences, to pile them on as much as possible. Nowadays, at least, the professed policy of superiors is normally to prevent such suffering as far as possible, and to encourage their subjects to accept it, if it comes, as the will of God — as it is certain to do if they are really seeking God.

And in what sense is any suffering the will of God? Here is another aspect of the puzzle. What is quite clear is that God will *use* everything for our sanctification, if we allow him to do so. But it is not God's will that there should be sin in the world. And it is difficult to see how there could be any suffering except as the result of somebody's sin. That 'all things work together for good for them that love God' does not mean that God acts in any special way through the mistakes of superiors, however admirably their subjects may face up to them, or that their normal effects are miraculously prevented. The 'will of God' is no more *guaranteed* in a monastery than in a military barracks. The soldier is called, although not vowed, to a perfection of obedience no less than the monk. He is left free to manage his own affairs in certain fields where the monk is not free; but what is the purpose of this relative lack of freedom? Is it primarily a mortification, an ascetic *mystique*, or is it in aid of prayer, a release from distractions? A closer examination of what we ought to mean by 'God's will' seems desirable, then, for more than one reason.

ENGLISH AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND THE PAPACY

by

DOM RALPH RUSSELL

‘**B**Y my standards, which are those of liberal democracy, the institution of an authoritarian papacy is necessarily bad. Most Americans . . . believe that the future of . . . the world depends on the vigorous re-affirmation of democratic principles. If that is true, an authoritarian papacy . . . must more and more display itself an anachronism. For it is by definition traditionalist, and hence inhibitory of all that Western liberal thought (however confused and renegade at the moment) has deemed good and dear.’¹ The somewhat remarkable book from which we quote has the Papacy as villain, and as hero Pope Pius XII, ‘a modern man set down in a dank maze of dusty dogma . . . (who) may very well have done all that one man can do to let in light and air’ (p. 332). The author, an American Protestant descended from Scotch-Irish forebears, has been the correspondent of the Associated Press in Rome. His theme deserves attention, because it expresses a widely disseminated view.

As the Catholic Church is seen to stand forth as the only great spiritual bulwark against Communism, Protestant thought is stressing the contention that she is only the ‘other Totalitarian’, the ‘Spiritual Dictatorship’.² The notion, of which Professor Paul Blanshard is a leading American exponent, is likely to become the chief stock-in-trade of twentieth century Protestantism, and to have a considerable influence beyond the sects upon Englishmen and Americans in the Protestant tradition. Such a man, valuing his independence, fears to be ‘caught’ in either of what are said to be two rigid systems which do not allow him to ‘think for himself’.

¹ *The Papacy. A New Appraisal* by John P. McKnight. Pp. 400. (McGraw-Hill) 21s., p. 331. With this review, offered to our sister democracy, we shall now couple remarks on two recently published pamphlets: *Infallible Fallacies* by Some Priests of the Anglican Communion. Pp. 32 (S.P.C.K.) 1s., and the much more respectable *The Pope's Men* by Nathaniel Micklem. Pp. 24. (Independent Press) 1s.

² *Infallible Fallacies* uses the phrases; Dr Micklem says ‘those who love freedom cannot share the political ideals of the Vatican or those of the Communists’, p. 17.

DEMOCRACY AND THE PAPACY

Protestantism has taught him that to 'think for oneself' is not to decide, and not to want to decide. Perhaps a very proper modesty, a regard for his own inadequacy, fears to be violated by definiteness. A training concentrated on the physical sciences or spent amid agnostic surroundings may have led him to suppose that all thought is only relative and hypothetical. He regards becoming a Catholic as a surrender of integrity, an 'easy way out' for those who will not think. In moral matters, he may be more or less a natural Christian, but he judges bad and good behaviour as what he thinks will or will not do harm to others. Sometimes he wonders if morality should not be founded on more than public health. But then Catholic moral demands seem an infringement of his liberty. Finally, however little Protestant Christianity is left in him, he retains its prejudices, and so he is full of ingrained suspicions of the Papacy, and also of that emphasis upon politics which goes with the nationalist origins of Protestantism, or else with its confusion of politics and religion.³ So if Catholic democrats find no opposition between their faith and their politics, there must be some catch.⁴ If Leo XIII in his Encyclicals kept telling French Catholic monarchists that the Church did not condemn any form of government, and that they should share in the life of their democracy, he was just an astute diplomat.⁵ When Pius XII shows warm appreciation of democratic institutions,⁶ this cannot coincide with the policy of the Vatican, which we know better than the Pope, whose power 'within his own Church is strictly circumscribed'.⁷ For are not some dictatorial

³ This is recurrent with Mr McKnight; Dr Micklem, perspicacious and honest, scents the defect in himself: 'I seem to have written much about politics and little about doctrine (p. 19), and he tries to remedy this in his concluding pages; *Infallible Fallacies*, defending a State Church, devotes a third of its length to explaining away the highly totalitarian, Spiritual Dictatorship of Henry VIII, and forgets the martyrdoms of St John Fisher and St Thomas More, who testified in their blood that this was a real change from what had gone before.'

⁴ Millions of American Catholics, living happily under the Constitution of the United States, have now been told by Professor Blanshard that they should not be happy. This has given rise to considerable discussion among American theologians. We leave the matter in their safe hands.

⁵ Cf. especially *Immortale Dei*, the Encyclical on *The Christian Constitution of States*.

⁶ E.g. in his Christmas Broadcast, 1944, published in English as *Democracy and Peace* (C.T.S.).

⁷ Dr Micklem, p. 18 — an amusing remark to anyone who knows the definite ways of the present Pope. But it has now become a common trick to say that so holy a Pope cannot really represent the Vatican. The Pope's power is not circumscribed — but he may see much further than his officials. Of course in another sense the Pope's power is circumscribed by the law of Christ. He is a member in Christ's Mystical Body.

régimes Catholic too? And Communism flourishes — surely by affinity — in some Catholic countries.⁸ And so he talks of 'Spiritual Dictatorship' and 'opposition to democratic principles'.

We do not want to belittle difficulties felt by honest, independent minds. They can only be met by showing frankly and sympathetically that (in spite of the human defects and narrowness of some Catholics), intellectual, moral and political integrity is not violated, and the values which democrats hold dear are not lost but preserved and enhanced in Catholicism. For free will is an essential tenet of Catholic doctrine, upheld against determinists and fatalists, as against Calvinists and Jansenists. Again, it is the solemn teaching of the Church and the Popes that no one may be compelled to embrace the Catholic faith against his will.⁹ It follows immediately — whatever the aberrations in history — that toleration of the individual's conscience is a necessary part of Catholic doctrine and practice. But what of the Church's condemnation of so-called 'Liberalism'? If 'Liberalism' means that every man is a law to himself and morally free to think and act as he pleases under all circumstances, then its only foundation is agnosticism. Once you are certain of a truth, you are not morally free to reject it — though in another sense 'the truth has set you free'. In practice, every honest man acts on this. Error cannot have the same rights as truth. Nor can its expression be on the same plane of rights. This does not mean that men have no right to express their views on that vast field of subjects which belong to human opinion — on the contrary, this clash of opinions is the way to truth and a preservative of freedom and this is what the democrat really stands for in his demand for minority rights.¹⁰ But one cannot say that downright error — such as materialistic Communism for example — has the same rights of propaganda as truth — though even so its toleration for the sake of the common good may often be a positive duty for the State.

Without such principles,¹¹ on which in fact even democratic states have to act,¹² society cannot be protected against dangerous

⁸ *Infallible Fallacies*, p. 30. We deal with this in a moment.

⁹ Vatican Council, const. de fide catholica, cap. 3; Leo XIII, *Immortale Dei*, A.S.S., xviii, pp. 174-51; *Codex Iuris Canonici*, canon 1351, 'ad amplectendam fidem catholicam nemo invitus cogatur'; Pius XII, *Mystici Corporis*, §103.

¹⁰ 'In a people worthy of the name', declared Pius XII (*Democracy and Peace*, § 16), 'the citizen is conscious of being a person with his own duties and rights; while he is conscious of his own freedom, he respects the liberty and dignity of his fellows.'

¹¹ Set out with clarity in Leo XIII's encyclical *Libertas*.

¹² 'A democratic government has not only the right but the duty to prevent Communism from being "voted" into power. For their very doctrine . . . means the total abolition of democratic rights'. Letter in the *Times*, 28th October 1953.

DEMOCRACY AND THE PAPACY

men. But without *principles* there will be emotional reactions which give opportunities to scoundrelly witch-hunters,¹³ so that democracy itself, as J. S. Mill and Plato saw, degenerates into tyranny.¹⁴ It is precisely this unprincipled agnostic liberalism, which sought to abolish all moral restraint, and therefore left no moral law binding the will of the government of the moment, which led to the Dictatorships in some countries, and in others, after a period of anti-Christian education and moral anarchy, to the growth of Communism. Nothing can be more absurd than to blame these consequences upon the Catholic Church, which stood up to this Liberalism in its fashionable heyday, just as now and in the past she has championed the rights of liberty and truth against the Absolutist, Totalitarian régimes.¹⁵ And here (as witness her efforts for the Jews) she is found maintaining not only the rights of Catholics, but, in the words of Pius XII, 'the demands and perennial laws of humanity'. This is to stand for all that is true and good in Liberal Democracy.

Tolerance has recently been the subject of a very important study: *Tolérance et Communauté Humaine* (Cahiers de l'Actualité Religieuse, Casterman, Paris) by a group of distinguished theologians, which we hope will be translated as soon as possible into English.¹⁶ It shows that the pronouncements of nineteenth century Popes, which even when seen in their context (as of course the *Syllabus* of Pius IX must be), seem so intransigent, are concerned with the atheist State, not the State which is simply respectful of consciences mistaken but in good faith. They are not therefore incompatible (though the tone has changed so much for the better) with the great, liberal declarations of Pius XI and Pius XII. Père Léonard, O.P.,

¹³ Douglas Hyde, writing 6th November 1953, in the *Catholic Herald*, records the view of the more thoughtful McCarthyites and anti-McCarthyites in the United States: 'A danger lies in the fact that precisely because the frontiers are so poorly defined between Marxist materialism and liberal agnosticism, the security campaign can easily go too far'.

¹⁴ When speaking of the Liberalism which denied all divine authority and proclaimed that every man is a law to himself, Leo XIII in *Libertas* remarked with prescience: 'the law determining what it is right to do and avoid doing is at the mercy of a majority. Now this is simply a road leading straight to tyranny.'

¹⁵ With the names of Cardinals Mindzenty, Stepinac—and now Wyszyński—go those of St John Fisher and St Thomas More. Mr McKnight misses the significance, p. 379, n. 54. And he does far less than justice to Pius XI's opposition to Fascism and Nazism.

¹⁶ There is an excellent review by Fr Gerald Vann, O.P., in *Blackfriars*, November 1953.

in a fine theological study, shows that the duty of tolerating other cults is not just a matter of accepting a lesser evil. Tolerance is something good and directed to a good. It is a duty to God, for the act of faith is essentially free, and to attempt to put constraint upon it, is to frustrate God's own work. Further, a man has a right and duty to follow his conscience, even if it is in error, and this implies a corresponding duty on the part of society to allow him to do so, provided that his conscience does not prescribe conduct contrary to the natural law, and rights of others — for this would be to contravene a still higher principle. This duty of tolerance is not a doctrine of theologians only but is expressed by Pius XII himself: 'There is a political, civil and social tolerance towards the followers of other confessions, which in such circumstances is a moral duty for Catholics also' (A.A.S., XXXVIII, 1946, p. 393).

This may have suggested some answers to the ancient (and current¹⁷) Protestant assertion that since Catholics hold that error, as such, has no rights, the coming of Catholics to political power, must mean political pressure upon Protestantism. They realize that it has not done so, e.g. in Southern Ireland.¹⁸ They should further be reassured by the declarations of Cardinal Manning in 1875, that if Catholics should come to political power: 'We should not shut a church, a college, a school. Our adversaries would have the same liberties which we enjoy as a minority'; and by that of Mgr Nicholas in 1948 on the American Constitution: 'If to-morrow Catholics constituted a majority in our country, they would defend the Constitution and all its articles as they do to-day, for they would recognize the moral obligation imposed on all Catholics to observe and defend the Constitution'.¹⁹ Moreover, progressive Catholic thought, as exemplified for example by M. Maritain — and eminently by recent Popes — is emphasizing that the important thing is not that there should be a merely materially privileged Church in a State, but the Church should be free to imbue the whole structure of society with the Christian spirit. This, and not the gaining of political power, is the objective of Catholic Action, and a major principle of this action is that society should be accepted loyally as it stands, and not put under the dominion of clericalism. That there are Catholics who sin by applying pressure-politics

¹⁷ Dr Micklem, p. 15.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Quoted from *Tolérance*, p. 148, n. 46.

DEMOCRACY AND THE PAPACY

without regard to Christian principles, and others who conceive society only in terms of clerical dominance, we are the first to admit and deplore. But they are anti-papal, rather than pro-papal.²⁰

However, Mr McKnight considers that the Papacy is necessarily bad by the 'standards of liberal democracy' because it is 'authoritarian' and 'traditionalist'. Now Sir Henry Maine remarked that to make democracy safe for the world, it needs some such institution as the Supreme Court of the United States. That, surely, is an eminently traditionalist authority, and it would be interesting to ask Mr McKnight if he approves of it. Again, Englishmen do not think their traditional Monarchy cramps their democracy, and there is the constitutional (and so traditional), temporary, but great authority of the President of the United States and of the British Prime Minister. It is true that the people choose and change their rulers (and Pius XII has remarked how reasonably²¹ modern democrats cling to this safeguard of their liberties). But for good reasons they do not elect their judges, and while their rulers are in office, their authority is very real, even though the people will have

²⁰ Mr McKnight has a curious notion that it has been declared that the Church consists of the clergy alone. Pius XII's Encyclical *Mystici Corporis* is enough answer, but one may also cite his address, 14th October 1951, to the first World Congress of the Lay Apostolate: 'All the faithful, without exception, are members of the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ . . . In the kingdom of grace, all men are looked upon as adults. That is the important point.' How necessary, for the winning of souls conscious of their personal responsibilities, that this Papal doctrine should be emphasized, in all seminaries ! Grown-up sons are responsible members of the family, and have a right to express their views to their father with due respect. The great Cardinal Suhard used to ask a member of Y.C.W. to come to him every week to tell him what was wrong with his government of the diocese. 'Self-criticism', writes Mr McKnight (p. 116), 'is less likely in Catholicism, which tends to close the mouths of communicants and clergy to its failings', and in a note, he adds 'oddly enough, this appears to be more true of American than of European Catholics.' Should he have said 'continental European'? There is a danger of so literal a pursuit of the great virtue of loyalty that we will not use that open partnership of laymen with priest which Pius XII so insists upon in the same address, and which is so very necessary in a free, democratic society. Loyalty also means facing facts and acquainting Authority with them. The Easter Vigil, evening Masses, the great emancipation of Biblical studies, etc., have come from free, filial representations. English-speaking Catholics, laymen and priests, have here a great task to fulfil, and such a book as Mr McKnight's show how essential it is in order to gain the respect of frank, liberty-loving citizens. And it is a Catholic duty!

²¹ 'So far reaching and decisive has the activity of the State become in modern times that a democratic form of government is considered by many to-day to be a natural postulate of reason itself. Therefore the demand for 'more democracy and better democracy' can mean only the demand that the citizen shall be increasingly in the position to hold his own personal opinion, express it, and give effect to it in a manner consistent with the common good'. *Democracy and Peace*, § 12.

the opportunity to approve or disapprove of the way it was exercised. The old 'Liberal' theory that the sole, moral source of this authority is the will of the people, meets the insuperable difficulty that this gives the people the right to play tyrant. Catholic doctrine (while not pronouncing for or against any form of government) proclaims that the authority of rulers, however chosen, derives from the moral law and so ultimately from God, its author, and must be administered according to that law. This is why the servants of the State — soldiers, diplomats and so on — have a duty to obey the just instructions of the existing government. And this is why the Church recognizes the authority of the State as supreme in its own sphere, but subject to the moral law. Here is the true Catholic doctrine which so ennobles politics and public service and safeguards human freedom from the irresponsible acts of tyranny. To understand it, is to shake oneself free from most of the suspicions — some of them very unworthy²² — in the works under review, and to accept the solemn declaration of Pius XII in the Encyclical *Summi Pontificatus* that in preaching the doctrine of Christ the King the Popes have no ulterior political aims and are not scheming to dominate the civil life of states. He makes the further point that the exact contrary is true, for the Church teaches that to obey the ruling powers is a duty of Christian life, since it is from God that they too derive their mission (A.A.S., XXXI, 447-8).

However, it is time to go deeper. Is authority contrary to liberty? Then what of Christ's authority? For he 'spoke as one having authority, and not as the scribes' (Matt. vii, 29; Mark i, 22). Did those who accepted his authority lose their intellectual or moral integrity? Or find a great increase of liberty, for 'the truth shall make you free'? John viii, 32. When Christ said to his disciples 'he that heareth you, heareth me' (Luke x, 16), and sent his Apostles to make disciples of all nations, teaching them to keep all that he had commanded, and promised to be with them till the end of the

²² 'Thinking no evil', which is characteristic of charity (I Cor. xiii, 5), does not mean being a fool; but it does mean not giving way to uncharity. But Protestantism was founded upon an exaltation of criticism as such — a criticism which, whether its content was true or false, had to justify schism. Hence suspicion is endemic, even in the best Protestants. It is rampant in Mr McKnight, and even in Dr Micklem it leads to a really underhand attack (McCarthyism and pressure-politics at their worst) on loyal and distinguished Catholics at the Foreign Office (pp. 17-18). *Infallible Fallacies* makes unsubstantiated attacks on the honour of Catholic priests, to which its authors do not append their own names. So much had to be said.

DEMOCRACY AND THE PAPACY

world — did he give them a share in his own authority? (Matt. xxviii, 16-20; cf., Mark xvi, 15-16; John xx, 20-21). If he did, and if this means that he instituted a Society to teach in his name and live with his life, then those who listen to its voice and obey its commands, are listening to and obeying him. They will no more be deprived of their integrity and freedom than those who originally took upon themselves his sweet yoke and light burden (Matt. xi, 29-30). The authority, being Christ's, will be a light to their minds and a strength to their freedom. It will be an authority as real as his (because his), but no more opposed to the authority of the State or the freedom of its citizens than his was. But we shall not be surprised if his followers, like their Master, are persecuted or traduced in every age by those who, misunderstand the nature of his kingdom and declare: 'Whosoever makes himself a king, speaks against Cæsar'.

In short, Mr McKnight has put the question wrongly. It is foolish to become so enamoured of the idea of equality as to forget the authority of God. This is to put the democratic state in the place of God. Whenever the Hebrews ceased to acknowledge God's authority they enslaved and degraded one another. To acknowledge it is not to destroy but to preserve liberty. And this is always so. The real question is whether Christ is God and has given some share of his authority to men, or whether he has not. 'The truth will set you free' and only the truth. But the way to truth is beset by bogies, and the fear to lose his freedom can prevent a man ever examining the credentials of the Catholic Church.²³ It is time to look at some of the bogies, and here Mr McKnight's book will serve us very well.

This straightforward and likeable man anticipates criticism by his self-analysis: 'A writer immersed in the life of his century who

²³ Dr Micklem urges another consideration which would preclude any investigation: 'Christ left no plenipotentiary on earth; He needs no plenipotentiary, for He is not an absent Christ, but present with His people to guide and to forgive' (p. 23). The dichotomy is false. Christ is indeed present, but may nevertheless act through men. The finest exposition of this in modern times is Pius XII's Encyclical *Mystici Corporis* (*The Mystical Body of Jesus Christ*, C.T.S.), e.g. 'The Spirit of Christ . . . with his heavenly breath of life, is the source from which proceeds every single vital and effectively salutary action in all the parts of the Body. It is He himself who is present in all the members and divinely acts in each, though He also acts in the lower members through the ministry of the higher' § 55. We must then 'search the Scriptures' — which for all his mention of them Dr Micklem never does in the pamphlet before us — to find out whether Christ did or did not delegate an office to Peter and his successors — and not object *a priori* that he could not have done so.

pretends to regard the Catholic Church with *complete* detachment deceives himself or his readers or both . . . I freely confess some anti-Catholic bias. I inherit the anti-Catholicism of my Presbyterian forebears . . . But all my caveats are softened by my tenderness for the feelings of many dear Catholic friends.' He expects that Protestants, too, will call him biased, because of his liking and admiration for Pius XII (pp. 4-5). Another weighty factor in forming his judgments — and here again he is representative of his kind — is his choice of books. He seems to have done no original research outside the contemporary scene. He calls himself a 'journalist-historian', and is at his best when reporting interviews and gallup-polls. He has 'not hesitated to use secondary and tertiary sources where these appear reliable . . . the synthesist who aims at *haute vulgarization* . . . cannot well do anything else' (p. 7). True, but it does not make for clear judgements, and in spite of his desire to be fair, he has read very few Catholic books except about modern times. On Christian and Papal origins — where he is wildest — he seems to have read nothing Catholic except Fr Philip Hughes' abbreviated *Popular History of the Catholic Church* (not even his three volume *History*).

A further trouble is his contempt for theology — expressed frequently and with vigour. This is incongruous (but typical) from someone who claims to uphold rational and scientific thinking. To neglect the Queen of the Sciences is to turn down accurate, clear, scientific thinking about Christian doctrine, and that leads to muddle after muddle.²⁴ Let us take one example. 'I hold the doctrine of papal infallibility to be palpably absurd, on the evidence of the history written by the Church's own historians. That some Catholic commentators secretly share my doubts may be demonstrated in their half-hearted defence of it' (p. 5, etc.). Why do not people who write on matters about which they are ignorant consult a friendly expert? Any theologian, and most Catholics who know their catechism, could have shown Mr McKnight that the limits of the definition (which he elsewhere mentions without saying what they are) are such that it is not touched by the historical difficulties which were duly considered at the Vatican Council. Unfortunately,

²⁴ Mr McKnight had wished to limit his enquiry to the 'temporal role and influence of the modern papacy' (p. 232), but found, as he says, that he could not avoid doctrine.

DEMOCRACY AND THE PAPACY

Mr McKnight never tells us what the 'evidence' of 'the Church's own historians' against infallibility is, unless in the statement that at the Council scholars presented 'evidence' that the belief was not held universally from the earliest times, but that this was 'ignored or suppressed' (p. 193). In fact, there was wide discussion at the Council, and satisfactory proofs from the early ages were furnished. One may recall how Newman saw that the historical objections had been met by the moderation of the Decree. Elsewhere Mr McKnight shows traces of knowing something of this, and what he seems really to object to is 'the superstition in the popular mind that infallibility extends to all things' (p. 332, etc.). Protestants often think that; Catholics are taught the contrary, so if they are mistaken, they are just badly instructed Catholics. Nor do Catholics go in much for 'secret doubt-sharing'. We are not enabled to identify the Commentators who do so, unless on p. 169, where we are given a quotation from the *Enc. Americana*²⁵ followed by a wholly orthodox theory of development. However, Mr McKnight flies higher yet, for he suspects that Pius XII himself 'is secretly somewhat embarrassed at the requirement of infallibility' (p. 331). And so, of course, he defined the Assumption.²⁶

²⁵ 'It is not now maintained that the full significance of the Petrine Primacy was manifest from the first in the life of Christianity.' This is unexceptionable.

²⁶ Dr Micklem: 'There are many theological and historical objections to the doctrine of papal infallibility; most serious of all is the objection that the Pope claims in matters of faith and morals to take the place of Christ *vis-à-vis* the individual believer' (p. 23). This is ambiguous. The Pope never claims to give the grace of faith. But did Christ mean nothing when he told his Apostles 'he that heareth you, heareth me'? And could he have attached the sanction of salvation or damnation to acceptance of their word (Mark xvi, 15) unless it was true? The Catholic claim is that the Church is infallible, and that when acting as Peter's successor, the Pope has that infallibility with which Christ endowed his Church.

Infallible Fallacies calls the doctrine 'obviously unscriptural and erroneous . . . really nonsense', which is a rash statement since 'it is believed by some highly intelligent men' (p. 28). 'It makes nonsense of the Christian belief that God the Holy Spirit works on men's minds not by compulsion but by love.' This looks like the old confusion of infallibility with inspiration; infallibility is what it says — a negative gift, to enable the teaching of Christ to be handed on without error — just what one would expect if Christ was to continue to teach through men. 'It implies that any Pope . . . about to make an official utterance . . . which was false would somehow be prevented by God. But this is to deny the freedom of the Pope's will, which is nonsense.' The account is correct, but the conclusion drawn is nonsense, because it supposes that God cannot influence our free will while leaving it free. 'If the Pope really has infallibility, it is surely remiss of him not to use it more frequently.' Here is the old trick of trying to make the Pope into a W.G. Ward. The ordinary *Magisterium* is there to meet ordinary needs. And it is that which is used to give guidance on human conduct, about which the pamphlet affects to ask for infallible utterances.

So Mr McKnight, like many another, brings to his subject a strong bias, a good heart, little historical knowledge outside this century (and that nearly all from anti-Catholic sources), a contempt for theology and a cheery confidence. But about modern tendencies he has read widely. There is a breadth in his canvas which is non-sectarian. His theme is interesting and instructive. He opens with an attempt to describe the origins of religious faith: 'ignorance, fear, awe, wonder, mental fatigue, egocentrism and pride' are not enough to account for 'something in human consciousness that eludes definition, something called "religious feeling" against which the waves of science beat in vain' (p. 22). Science, however, has challenged faith and especially the Catholic Church which by 'the grim inner logic of traditionalism' must be 'anti-science' and suspicious of its findings. Since relativism is basic to the scientific method, the scientists must also reject the papal claims to 'speak authoritatively in the name of unchanging truth' and Mr McKnight fears that faith 'will subordinate candid thinking to the alleged but factitious needs of some special set of convictions' (pp. 53-4). We are, of course, given Galileo and a few other cases in which scientists have been treated badly, but there is no mention of the great Catholic scientists, such as St Albert the Great, Pasteur, Mendel, and many Jesuits,²⁷ or of the Vatican's fruitful encouragement of scientists, and the famous work of the Vatican Observatory. We are left with the impression that Catholic scientists are either foolish or dishonest, and that the scientific method is the only one for attaining truth, though Mr McKnight is aware of the Aquinas 'postulate that there is no need to fear scientific truth, since it is all part of one truth'.²⁸ He seems unaware of the assurance of the Vatican Council — whose great work in this matter is often forgotten — that 'there can never be true dissension between faith and reason' and that the Church acknowledges the 'just liberty' of the sciences in their own sphere (Denzinger, 1797, 1799). But there is also the complaint of the 'practical' scientists that when the Church maintains

²⁷ Unfortunately, Mr McKnight, who wants to be fair, is never once fair to the Society of Jesus. He should have studied their saints and their achievements in education and science, and not gone by prejudice.

²⁸ 'The scientist cannot see why Catholics do not give more than lip service to' (this postulate). Many Catholic scientists live by it all their scientific lives. But this book does useful service in showing how imperative it is that they do so, and how timidity is a betrayal of Catholic faith. There is such timidity, and it is greatly damaging to souls. Mr McKnight implies mistakenly that Catholics may not now hold the evolution by the human body (p. 47).

DEMOCRACY AND THE PAPACY

that the scientist must not come outside his domain and invade the province of faith and morals, this is to hinder their liberty over problems of population, genetics, etc. Briefly to touch on an immense subject, morals do have the right to control the *application* of the discoveries of pure science, as we now see very well by the need to control 'economic laws' and the use of the atom bomb in the interests of mankind ; and further there are dignities of the human person and human love which must control experiments on human beings — or the end is Buchenwald; finally there are other scientific answers to population problems besides race suicide.²⁹

We have confined ourselves to mention of Catholicism, but without forgetting the criticism and praise given also to Protestantism. Now the author passes from a very interesting chapter about the crisis of Christianity under the assaults of rationalism to a documented account of its recovery in a world disillusioned of 'progress' and frightened by the atom bomb. Valuable comments are mixed with mistakes, but the main points we wish to take up are that this turn of events is a 'flight from reason to faith', that this faith is contradictory of science, and that its victory involves a depression of intellect. That disillusionment and trouble may humble human pride and lead men to turn again to God is a constant theme of the Old Testament, recurring in the parable of the Prodigal Son, and there is no reason to think that human nature has changed in this respect. That some people have been frightened back to religion is likely enough.³⁰ But were there not also good rational grounds? The view that with science as the all-sufficient philosophy of life nothing could halt the progress of the human race, was shattered. Men discovered that while science could do noble work in saving lives, it could not help in the ultimate fact of death, and that unless the application of its researches was directed by higher principles, it might end in world-destruction. *Tantum scientia potuit suadere malorum!* Were these reasonings irrational and anti-scientific, or simply the recovery of a balanced view on life and science, which saw that there must be room for God in his world?

²⁹ The scientific treatment of world food-production is one of these, cf. the excellent booklet *Is the World Heading for Starvation* by A. G. Donnithorne (Catholic Social Guild, Oxford) 1s.

³⁰ " ' Frankly, I am scared to death. I wish I had a direct line to the Almighty to ask Him for guidance' — Nuclear Physicist Harold Urey' (p. 79).

But was there also a flight from reason? Mr McKnight thinks so, because he holds that reason and faith must be in opposition. This seems to be an axiom with him, but it is not Catholic doctrine (though it is that of some forms of Protestantism) which offers faith as 'an anodyne for the vexing intellect' (p. 135). Catholicism, which requires two years study of philosophy from its candidates for the priesthood, has a way of stimulating the intellect. It also requires four years of theology, wherein more of the 'vexing' problems are discussed by the despised theologians. Again, what of the Catholic Universities, and the distinguished Catholics in other Universities? Probably at the root of Mr McKnight's notion is the idea that reason must involve 'relativism' whereas faith affirms absolute truth (p. 287). Too briefly — one needs a book — our knowledge is 'conditioned by the nature and limitations of our human faculties' but it can affirm some things with certainty, including the existence of God, the possibility of a revelation, and the convincingness of the criteria offered for the truth of Christianity. In practice, the would-be convert to Catholicism, even if his first step came from emotional dissatisfaction at the barrenness of a world without God, normally has quite a long period of instruction during which he must use his reason more than before to discern the signposts to his Father's house. Nor can he be received into the Church until any difficulties are sufficiently resolved for him to believe with honesty. What is true, is that prayer is more important than reasoning, and that the act of faith is God-given, transcends reason and concerns objects such as the Holy Trinity knowable only by revelation. But far from being opposed to reason, faith is found to be a light and guide to it. No one ever has to surrender his integrity. To this we should like to add that we share Mr McKnight's pleasure in a new and highly necessary spirit of self-criticism among believers, which recognizes the justice of rationalist criticism of real bigotries, and we hold with him that among the most fearless exponents of this spirit is Pius XII (pp. 77-8; 114-15).

The chief beneficiary of the return to religion is the Catholic Church, Protestantism being generally 'on the defensive'. Why? Mr McKnight has much to say on the reasons for 'The Allure of Catholicism'. 'The Roman Church is in high degree syncretist'

having 'borrowed freely over the centuries from philosophy. She is the residuary legatee of many ancient, vanished faiths' and borrows 'the trappings and tenets of contemporary rivals' (p. 137). 'She co-opts men by co-opting their treasured beliefs' (p. 143). One wonders how she has managed to do it unless she possesses central, transcendent Truth, which because it is God's truth, embraces all that is in his world. For Mr McKnight has forgotten that at the same time the Church is and always has been intolerant (not of persons but) of what she regards as error, as something which could contaminate the purity of the Gospel which she has received, cf. Gal. i, 9. That is why she condemned Gnosticism in the earliest times and Modernism in our own — both of which were *really* syncretist. But she is open to everything human, because she is the religion of the Incarnation. We may remember how Pope St Gregory the Great told St Augustine the Apostle of England not to destroy the places of worship and the festivals of the Anglo-Saxons but to turn them into Christian ones. Mr McKnight quotes part of a magnificent passage from Pius XII: 'The Church bending over man with a constant attention, listening to all the beatings of his heart, knows all its riches, perceives all its aspirations with that clear intuition and fine penetration which can come only from the supernatural light of the doctrine of Christ and the supernatural warmth of his divine charity. So the Church in her progress follows without pause and without collision the providential road of times and circumstances. This is the deep meaning of her vital law of continuous adaptation, which some, incapable of rising to this magnificent conception, have interpreted and described as opportunism.³¹ No! The magnificent all-embracingness of the Church has nothing which resembles the narrowness of a sect, or of the exclusiveness of an imperialism, prisoner of its own tradition' (A.A.S. XXXVII 1946, p. 146). What is also true is that the human individuals who compose the Church may take time to realize just what values are to be assimilated, even as it took time before Aristotelianism was seen to be freeable from its medieval errors and capable of being 'baptized'. We are inclined to think that the positive contribution

³¹ Mr McKnight sometimes lapses into thinking it opportunism, uses the word 'duplexity' (p. 143) and takes up Huxley's language about esoteric teaching for the few and exoteric for the many. The Church has always indignantly repudiated such a charge. Her doctrine is open for all, and she will not connive at error.

of Mr McKnight's book is to bring out the way in which this has happened for the democratic ideal. Pius XII may be said to have brought to completion developments in this respect which started with the great Encyclicals of Leo XIII.

Mr McKnight himself realizes that the doctrines about the Mother of God are 'logically and theologically requisite to the Church's teaching about Jesus's nature as God and man' (p. 145). But he has not fully seen how they are drawn from the very vitals of Christianity, and even though they answer a deep craving of the human heart (which will express itself in various ways in different nationalities), are not a countenancing of pagan belief in the Mother goddess.³² Again, he rather admires the way that the Church 'provides' saints, and so 'by highly practical polytheism . . . seeks to satisfy the time-old desire of humble men for *lares* and *penates*' (pp. 146, 149). That is a good human desire, but to produce saints, human beings have first to 'provide' heroic virtue (let alone miracles) which must be strictly proved for beatification or canonization, and that is not at all easy.³³ Another allurements of Catholicism is that 'its quiet monasteries and nunneries are tempting to many weary of the troubled world' (p. 151). Doubtless, but such people do not survive novitiates. Finally, if anyone should think that to 'fall back upon religious faith' is 'to sink into the feather bed of supernatural revelation' (p. 20), he had better realize that a Catholic practising his religion in the modern world, finds that his faith does indeed

³² Here is perhaps the finest thing on Dr Micklem's eirenic side: 'In their prayers and praises Protestants very rarely make reference to Mary, the Mother of our Lord. Many are the sermons preached about Peter and John and Paul, but where in our churches will you hear a sermon on the theme: "Hail Mary, thou that art highly favoured; the Lord is with thee; blessed art thou amongst women"? This negligence is in part due, no doubt, to reaction from Roman extravagances; it is perhaps in part due to an unwillingness to think through to its ultimate consequences the mystery of the Incarnation. We should do well to suspect here a serious failure in our thought and imagination' (p. 22). Oh for more serious thinking of this kind! He then, indeed, gives examples of 'an intolerable extreme in Romanism'. But such phrases as 'Co-mediator' (whether wisely used or not) are always completely dependent on the Mediatorship of Christ. He says that 'the doctrine of the Assumption was no part of the Apostolic witness'. I too 'have written elsewhere on this'. The second century doctrine that Mary is the Second Eve has its roots in Scripture, and the doctrine of the Assumption draws out its consequences. The question is what is implicit in the witness.

³³ It takes much for a case to reach the Congregation of Rites, and then most do not get through its rigid testing. Mr McKnight is most unfair (p. 148) to the eleven-year old St Maria Goretti, omitting — besides other proofs of heroic virtue — that she chose death rather than sin. For a good analysis by a modern psychiatrist, cf. *St Maria Goretti* by E. B. Strauss, in *The Month*, September 1952.

give peace, certainty and joy to the depths of his soul, but that it means emphatically a taking up of the Cross, cf. Matt. x, 38; xvi, 24; xi, 28, 29; John xiv, 27; Rom. xiv, 17.

We must reluctantly leave these allurements³⁴ and pass on to the key question: the origin of the Papacy. Is it a human or a divine institution? Mr McKnight never entertains the latter possibility, or he might have seen how it would account for what he finds so 'perplexing' (p. 157). Unfortunately also, he seems never to have given Christian origins the most elementary serious investigation. Maybe he was influenced by the highly dishonest and outdated statement of Gibbon with which he starts: 'The scanty and suspicious materials of ecclesiastical history seldom enable us to dispel the dark cloud that hangs over the first age of the Church'. Besides, he thinks that 'confident of an early judgment day, the first Christians saw little need to write down Church history and doctrine . . . Not until this anticipation was defrauded and the tenet unostentatiously discarded, did the need to reduce the tradition to writing appear. And "by then the founding fathers were dead" (p. 160). Serious modern scholars know this is nonsense, and accumulated evidence (such as that of the papyri) has led them to bring the date of the composition of Gospels, and Acts well within the lifetime of the 'founder fathers'. Besides, St Paul's epistles are full of history and doctrine, and the genuineness of most of them is now admitted by non-Christian critics. Incidentally, he rebuked his converts for thinking the Last Day was upon them (II Thess. ii, 3), and added that the Jews must be converted first, Rom. xi. Then what of the authentic documents of sub-apostolic times — the First Epistle of Clement, the Letters of Ignatius, the works of Irenaeus and Justin? To suggest that 'the few early records that survived are of their nature suspect' is monstrous, and modern scholarship, while detecting forgeries, upholds the genuineness of these other documents, and the general reliability of Eusebius.³⁵

³⁴ In speaking of the charm of Catholic Liturgy, Mr McKnight says that 'elements of Orphism, Mithraism and many an older cult' mingle in it. He does not seem to know that reputable non-Catholic scholars now acknowledge that the Mass and sacraments do not derive from the 'mystery religions' but must have been present in the primitive Jerusalem community under conditions of strict monotheism — which really means that they go back to Christ's institution.

³⁵ May I be allowed to refer for confirmation to articles in the recently published *A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture* (Nelsons), including the article *Christianity in Apostolic Times* by Fr M. Bévenot, S.J., and myself? For a serious study on early non-Scriptural sources, cf. *Documents Illustrating Papal Authority*, A.D. 96-454, by the Anglican, E. Giles (S.P.C.K., 1952).

However, Mr McKnight does offer an historical sketch: 'There is Biblical evidence that early Christianity was communal: believers had 'all things in common' (Acts ii, 44-6; iv, 32-37). The rule of the Churches was democratic; decisions were the will of the majority, the sense of the assembly. There was no clergy: members spoke as the spirit moved them. And the churches were at first autonomous: the only bond linking them was fellowship. This pristine state did not long endure. Pure democracy verges on anarchy . . . As the Church grew, democracy yielded to republicanism; republicanism . . . to autocracy; autocracy at last to monarchy' (p. 161). All political analogies are misleading if we would understand the essential features given by Jesus to the Church which he founded. We shall better understand those features — evident enough in Scripture — if we realize that the Son of God who became man willed to transmit his divine teaching and transfuse his divine life through a Society of men. Christianity was indeed communal, but with a Communion of all things in heaven and earth which all the faithful shared. This One, Undivided 'Body of Christ', inspired by his Spirit, was not an amorphous mass, but all the members had their own graces and offices, e.g. I Cor. chap. i-iii, esp. iii, 21-23; Rom. xii; Eph. iv, 1-15; I John i, 3. But it was to the Apostles that Christ had entrusted the continuation of his own mission; it was upon them and not upon the converts that the structure was built, and the Church was from the first taught and ruled by them, e.g. Matt. xxviii, 18-20; John xx, 21-23; Acts ii, 42; iv, 34-37; Gal. i, 1. They are conscious of themselves as forming a College (Acts i, 15-26), they are the chosen witnesses and teachers (ii, 42), with power of binding and losing (i.e. of making authoritative decisions binding in conscience Matt. xviii, 18), they appoint presbyters (Acts xiv, 22) and control affairs in the churches they have founded, including even 'speaking by the spirit', cf. I Cor. *passim*; Acts xv, 22-29.³⁶

The exercise of this authority in New Testament times points to its having been instituted by the will of Christ, and that is what we find if we search the Gospels without political or sectarian preconceptions. We also find that Christ set one man over the Church which he founded, and this is full in the line of God's dealings with men. In the Old Testament, God is Shepherd, King and Strong

³⁶ Art. cit.

DEMOCRACY AND THE PAPACY

Refuge-Rock of his people. In the New, Christ, God made man, is Shepherd, King, Foundation-Rock, e.g. John x, 1-30; xviii, 33-37; I Cor. iii, 12. Before visibly leaving the earth, Christ gave his sheep into Peter's care, entrusted to him the keys of his Kingdom, and made him the rock-foundation upon which he builds his Church against which Satan's assaults cannot prevail, John xxi, 15-17; Matt. xvi, 18, 19; Luke xxii, 31, 32. In other words, Peter is to take Christ's visible place, and no amount of quibbles — freely and fully discussed in Catholic commentaries — avail to shake the massive fact.³⁷ To suppose that the place of him who was Rock, Keybearer and Feeder of the flock of Christ was later taken by, e.g. St Paul, is to forget St Paul's own doctrine of the diversity of functions in the Body of Christ, cf. I Cor. iii, 22. But was Peter to have a successor? The fact is that Christ founded a Society, an Institution, which would naturally continue in the same way. But he made no explicit mention of succession for Peter or the Apostles — doubtless because he would not betray his Father's secret about the time of the end of the world. But Rabbinic parallels involved succession, the early Church accepted it as expressing Christ's will, and anyhow, who ever heard of building a house and then taking away the foundation? Besides, Peter's office was not simply a passive one (just to-be-built-on), but to give active support (Luke xxii, 31, 32), to exercise the power of the Keys, to feed the flock. After many irrelevancies, Mr

³⁷ The trouble is that people will not face it. Mr McKnight never attempts to. *Infallible Fallacies* almost incredibly omits Matt. xvi, 18 — the Rock and the giving of the keys of the kingdom which belong to Peter alone — and cites Matt. xvi, 19 with xviii, 18 — where the power of binding and loosing given to Peter is extended to the other Apostles; it then parallels John xxi, 15-17, where Peter in the singular is given charge of the Flock with xx, 23, where all the Apostles are given the power to remit sins; and it concludes 'the authority which Christ gave to St Peter was also given to all the Apostles'! (p. 16). There is also no mention of Luke xxii, 31, 32, where Peter in the singular is made the object of Christ's prayer, and is then to confirm his brethren. It goes on to say that there is no mention of any authority passing to Peter's successor. But then neither is there of successors to the Apostles, and so what of the Anglican doctrine of episcopal succession?

Dr Micklem really says (p. 23) that Christ could not have delegated such power to a man — which is to put private judgement before Christ's action. Again (p. 12): 'Men have gone to Rome seeking authority because they have not found authority with us; they have sought the kind of authority which man on this earth is not meant to have; but they would not have left us had we given them a true and evangelical doctrine of authority such as is relevant to faith and insight'. But the 'evangelical doctrine', i.e. what the Gospels say, is that Christ did delegate his authority to men. A doctrine 'relevant to faith and insight' will see that authority in the ordinary human beings to whom Christ has given it. Dr Micklem is really falsifying the word of the Gospel in favour of Protestant individualism. We heartily wish the Protestant would 'search the Scriptures' (p. 32).

McKnight agrees that the tradition that Peter and Paul founded the Roman Church is 'by and large now but little disputed' (p. 167), and in fact all ancient evidence without exception witnesses to it. He cites a number of instances showing that Rome 'soon became the referee of inter-church disputes' (pp. 196-70), but ascribes this to 'the inexorable course of political and ecclesiastical events in the disintegrating empire'. Antiquity acknowledged, while Rome was still a hostile, pagan city, that the primacy of the See of Peter followed from the Christ-given constitution of the Church.³⁸

We have reached the vital point. Is the Papacy a man-made, largely political institution, which has somehow survived for nearly two thousand years, but is a menace in the modern world? Or is it the institution of a Divine Master, who became fully man amongst men, and chose in his great love for men, to work through them — but guaranteeing the inerrancy of the frail human beings who were to take his visible place? If so, then the Papacy is what Catholics find it to be — a light shining in the modern world with Christ's own light. In the pages of history, the record of the Popes has on the whole been a glorious one. Its chequered side (much emphasized in this book) need not surprise us. Instances of wordliness, sins, blunders, narrownesses, human preferences and scandal-giving all find their parallels in the life of that very human man whom Christ loved and chose to be the first to bear the office, cf. Matt. xvi, 23; xxvi, 34; John xxi, 20-22; Acts x, 13-15; Gal. ii, 22-15.

The chief of these scandals — real enough though disproportionately exaggerated by Protestantism — came about through the Temporal Power. Mr McKnight, with proper pleasure, cites (though incorrectly), the address of Pius XII to the new cardinals on 20th February 1946: 'It is not the office of the Church to include and in a manner embrace, like a gigantic world empire, all human society. This concept of the Church as earthly Empire and worldly domination is fundamentally false. She follows in her progress and her expansion an opposite path to that of modern imperialism. She progresses before all else in depth, then in extension. She seeks primarily man himself . . . Her work is completed in the depth of each man's heart, but it has its own repercussions on all the duration

³⁸ Cf. Giles, *op. cit.* It also appears from the sources he quotes that the great Eastern Councils acknowledge Rome's real primacy, not a vague precedence.

DEMOCRACY AND THE PAPACY

of life, on all the fields of activity of each one. With men so formed the Church prepares for human society a base on which it can rest with security' (A.A.S., XXXVIII 1946, p. 143). It does not follow, as Mr McKnight thinks, that Pius XII is contradicting his predecessors, and saying that the very existence of the Temporal Power (that is of the Papal State) was wrong (p. 371). In the circumstances of the times, it was the only way to preserve the Papacy from dependence on a particular nation, and even to-day the Vatican State is needed for this, particularly in time of war, though Pius XI wisely confined it to forty-eight acres. But it follows that the effort of the Popes to renew all life by the Spirit of Christ, is no threat of political domination. The Church starts from the life of Christ in the soul. But she knows that everything in life matters for the cause of Christ: that unless politics and economics are in accord with Christian morality, they make it difficult for people to live as Christians. It was therefore no subtle diplomacy, but a simple statement of fact, which led Pius XII, in his letter to President Roosevelt of 22nd August 1940, to speak of 'our unceasing search for . . . a golden era of Christian concord dedicated to the spiritual and material improvement of humanity' (p. 204). 'If I say the truth, why do you not believe me?' And the Church of Christ, looking out upon the world with the universality of the mind of Christ, recognizes as belonging to him and to herself every good action done by sincere Protestants, yes, and pagans too, who through no fault of their own are outside her visible communion.³⁹ The words of Lincoln are hers too: 'With charity towards all, with malice towards none'.

³⁹ This in answer to Dr Micklem's statement: 'The Roman Church has identified the cause of Christ with the prosperity and power of the Roman Church as an institution' (p. 14).

UMMYTHOLOGISIERUNG

by

A. H. N. GREEN-ARMYTAGE

THERE was broadcast in the Third Programme last February (and more recent broadcasts have revived the discussion) a series of talks, led by Professor Rudolf Bultmann, on the subject of 'de-mythologizing' the Bible, and perhaps because they were given by four different men whose views did not quite coincide, the impression left with the listener was one of some bewilderment. It was claimed, for example, most emphatically, that *entmythologisierung* is not a process of subtraction but of interpretation, a redelivery of what the Bible has to say in language intelligible to the modern world, yet it was also claimed that this process has nothing in common with what, say, Philo or St Basil or St Augustine did in their own time and for their own contemporaries. Most of the four speakers were alike in adopting an existentialist approach and in repudiating utterly the suggestion that they were merely 'rationalizing' Scripture, yet they claimed that what rendered their task necessary was the fact that modern man has ceased to think mythologically and now thinks in terms of science and scientific method — which surely implies that any attempted 'de-mythologizing' must be along rationalist and 'essentialist' rather than existentialist lines. If, however, these speakers tended to provoke more questions than they answered it can still be said that such provocation is itself a mental stimulus which sets the listener a task of finding some of the answers for himself.

To start with, what is a myth or a mythology? The time has gone by when one could have answered that a myth is a naive and childish fiction. The tabloid versions of some of the world's great myths which we find in the pages of Sir James Frazer do perhaps tend to give that impression, but if we turn from such bald summaries to the texts of the myths themselves it is immediately plain that here is something of vastly more dignity and importance than any mere

fable or fairy-tale. The myth of Ptah, for example, in the Memphis inscription, is strangely reminiscent of the prologue to St John's Gospel. But mythology arose in that archaic age before our present-day pigeon-holes were invented. Men's response to the universe about them was then a much more unified and 'synthetized' one than ours. Their work and their worship, their liturgy, dancing, amusement and song, their science and philosophy and poetry and history and imaginative fiction and theology were all mixed up together in an interlocking system which we call folklore and mythology but which they themselves had not yet sorted out into components. Thus, to go no further back than Homer, we find in his poems history and theology and fiction and geography inextricably interwoven with one another, and any attempt to 'de-mythologize' Homer by sorting out, say, the history from the fiction would not only be very difficult but would wholly destroy all those things which we most value in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. In fact, to represent mythology as a primitive substitute for science is rather like saying that the paintings of Giotto were a primitive substitute for photography, or those of Constable a praiseworthy step in the direction of the Ordnance Survey. Myth is not a substitute for anything. It exists in its own right, and to apply to it scientific criteria of truth would be almost as foolish as to approach the author of *Canticles* with 'My dear Sir or Madam, how can you possibly be both the rose of Sharon and the lily of the valley? Come to that, how can you be either?' It is to the credit of the existentialist school that they are in no danger of such ineptitude as this.

Nevertheless, although the ancients themselves made no distinctions between science and philosophy and poetry, it is not wholly impossible for us to make them for ourselves. I mean, that just as in studying Dante we can refer back to Aristotle and St Thomas, so in studying, say, Hesiod we can reconstruct an imaginary philosopher or theologian who might have stood in the same relation to Hesiod as the scholastic philosophers stood to Dante. Such a process might well be called a 'de-mythologizing' of Hesiod in the sense which (I imagine) is intended by Bultmann, and the question arises whether, in the case of the Bible, such a process is intrinsically possible and, if it were possible, whether it would be an enterprise worth undertaking.

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

If, for the sake of argument, we treat the Bible as a system of mythology and compare it with others of its kind, the first thing that we notice about it is that it is upside down — a tree with its roots in the air. Most mythologies begin with a war in heaven. We find a war in heaven in the Bible also, but right at the end, in *Revelation*. Other mythologies have at or near their roots a virgin-mother with a child-god. These too are found in the Bible, but again, near the end, and in the full blaze of a high and sophisticated civilization. It is the same with the dying god who rises from the dead. Elsewhere this figure is primordial, belonging to a remote past. In the Bible he belongs to the fullness of time. So far as these mythologems are present in the Old Testament at all they belong to the future. Behold, a virgin *shall* conceive. Other mythologies, again, tend to deify the first ancestor of the race. Not so the Jews. Abraham is a much-revered but utterly human figure — not even, in some ways, a very admirable one; and as for Adam and Eve, the great father and mother of all living, so far from being gods they are the first and deadliest of sinners. The Jews, in fact, were starved of a mythology as they were starved of iconography. They made no graven images, even in writing.

The man, therefore, who sets out to de-mythologize all this is faced with a formidable difficulty at the start. Those parts of the Bible which, by their content, are most thoroughly 'mythological' are precisely those parts which are, or claim to be, most prosaically historical. Even Tacitus supports the statement that the person whom Christians worship as their God was in sober fact a 'dying god'. And almost everyone, I suppose, who claims the name of Christian at all, would admit that the Gospels were intended by their authors to be, and for the most part actually are, plain historical documents. For the dilemma is surely inescapable that, if the Gospels are unreliable as history, then we really know hardly anything about Jesus of Nazareth at all; in which case it is surely foolish to accord him any special reverence, and merely superstitious to build churches in his honour. One of these broadcast speakers tended to brush aside this historical question as irrelevant. 'Do you still ask me', he said, 'whether the tomb was really empty?' Well, frankly, yes, I do.

The Gospels, then, and most of the Old Testament as well, profess to be genuine history, and history (I mean written history) itself resembles mythology in this, that it can never be decisively labelled as either 'science' or as 'art'. The facts related may all be perfectly true in a rational, scientific sense, but the book in which they are collected may yet be as false as hell. It is the historian who selects, arranges and emphasizes, and whether his narrative as a whole deserves the name of truth is something which we cannot determine by purely scientific criteria. It is a thing we *feel*, much as we feel the truth of a work of poetry or art. The question can be argued almost indefinitely which of two biographies of a given historical character, each of them equally accurate in matters of fact, gives the truer portrait of the man concerned, and books are continually being written for the purpose of reassessing some historical character like Cæsar or Cromwell, or some great historical event like the reformation or the French revolution. If this process can be called 'de-mythologizing' the work of a former historian, then it is perfectly possible to de-mythologize any work of history.

A particularly instructive example is F. M. Cornford's *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, for it is a conscious attempt (as its title implies) to de-mythologize Thucydides. Cornford maintained, not that Thucydides was a liar, but that his forms of thought, the inbred mental processes of the man, were dominated by conceptions which were fundamentally mythological. In order to find out what really happened, therefore, and to discover the true causes of the origin, course and outcome of the Peloponnesian war, we have to melt the book down and recast in a modern mould. Only so shall we be able to convert it into genuine history. But nearly fifty years have passed since Cornford attempted that task, and it is this lapse of time which renders the example an instructive one. For the 'modern' mould into which he poured his melted-down Thucydides is to-day no longer modern, and two great wars, comparable in importance to that between Athens and Sparta, have intervened. The result is that, from the vantage-point of 1953, we can perceive that what he called de-mythologizing was in reality mere trans-mythologizing. The mould he used was the nineteenth century conception of history, dominated by mighty, impersonal abstractions like Pressure of Population, Search for Markets, National Aspirations and the

like — in short, by the concepts of historical determinism, by the mythology of the nineteenth century.

It is for this reason that I have coined, as a title for this essay, the cumbersome word *Ummythologisierung*, formed by analogy with the word *umsteigen*, to change trains. For it seems to me that this is a more accurate description of what Prof. Bultmann is setting out to do. The fundamental error which he makes, I think, is to suppose that 'modern man has ceased to think mythologically'. Modern man has done nothing of the sort; but modern man, like his ancestors (and presumably his descendants), inevitably believes that this own mythological thought-forms are the truth. I do not mean that there is no valid distinction to be drawn between rational science and mythology. There is, I know, a tendency to-day to think along these lines, and C-G. Jung is not the only man to say that 'science itself is myth'. We are, perhaps, in danger of going too far in this direction, as a very natural reaction from the contrary tendency among our grand-parents. But it is certainly true that the broad assumptions in men's minds, the beaten tracks along which their thoughts move, are in any generation provisional and to a large extent irrational, destined to be extensively revised or even reversed in the next.

How does all this apply to the Bible? It is easy enough to say that when our Lord expelled an unclean spirit he was removing a psychosis, or that the paralytic was cured by faith-healing, just as it is easy to say that it is not Artemis but instinct which tells the cuckoo where to lay her eggs. But is one set of terms so very much more intelligible than the other? We tend to think so because the words psychosis and faith-healing and instinct are cosy and familiar ones. We see them in the papers. But what do they really *mean*? Prof. Bultmann cited a very elementary example. When the Bible speaks of God dwelling in heaven, he said, it is speaking mythologically. It does not mean that God lives in the sky but that He is transcendent. Fair enough. But for anyone to whom the word 'transcendent' is familiar the information is superfluous, and for anybody else it is meaningless.

We are now, perhaps, in a better position to answer the question raised a little while back, whether a de-mythologizing or trans-mythologizing (as I would call it) of the Bible is possible. In one

sense the answer must be, No, because the Bible is not, in the ordinary sense, a mythological work. The parts of it which matter most are history. That is to say, their secular counterparts are not the world's dramatic or epic poems nor any works of what we call the creative imagination. Their counterparts are the historical writings of Tacitus or Plutarch, a point very rightly emphasized (in these broadcasts) by the Rev. G. W. Anderson. There can thus be no question of reconstructing a rational theology which has inspired a fictitious narrative as the scholastic theology inspired Dante. If the Gospels are fictitious they are worthless. But in some other senses the answer to our question must be Yes, it is certainly possible to reinterpret the Bible in modern terms.

In the historical sense, for instance, we can translate what St Luke called history into what we call history. We can construct a chronology for the Gospels and Acts or for the life of St Paul. We can reinterpret the facts in a modern way and describe them in modern terminology. I would still maintain that such a process does not 'purge the Bible of mythological elements'; it is merely a changing of mythological trains. The prefix is still *um*, not *ent*; for our own ideas about the truth of history are not final ones. The ancients, for example, whether pagan or Christian, would have considered (and our descendants may well agree with them) that our intense pre-occupation with dates and with chronology is excessive, a by-product of our Evolution-myth. Questions of growth and development absorb our attention to an unusual, and perhaps to an irrational and hypertrophied degree which later generations may ridicule. Nevertheless, a trans-mythologizing of the historical books of the Bible along these lines is evidently possible and, with due regard to its limitations, desirable.

The other sort of trans-mythologizing is the type represented by such equations as 'in the heavens = transcendent', 'miraculous healing = psycho-therapy', 'St Luke's daemons = Freud's psychoses' and the like. And here, even in its most seemingly-innocuous forms, we are handling something decidedly dangerous. So far from 'de-mythologizing' we are more likely to do the reverse, by translating truth into myth — or (since 'myth' and 'truth' are not necessarily opposites nor even mutually exclusive) translating a true mythology into a false one.

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

To take a secular example of what I mean, one might say that the story of Lord Nelson has become a legend in the Royal Navy and the man himself a legendary figure. But this does not imply that Nelson has become a person who never existed nor that the facts of his career have become fictions. It merely implies a certain attitude of mind and emotion towards the man and his achievements. But translate that story into the language of 'scientific' history, speak not of men and ships and captains but of Sea-Power and Nationalism and Economic Forces and all the other impersonalia which nineteenth (and some twentieth) century historians delight in, and the story has indeed become a myth, using imaginary entities instead of real ones. Indeed, one could sometimes imagine, when reading books or articles about modern history, that there are no such things as living men and women in existence. All is abstract. One reads that Nazism has been defeated, that Communism is expanding, that Democracy is on the defensive, and so forth. These statements may be true, but they are expressed mythologically. A purely factual historian would speak not of Nazism but of Adolf Hitler and his armies.

In like manner, in dealing with the Bible, if instead of speaking about Moses and David and Solomon and Hezekiah we speak of the Evolution of Judaism or the Development of Prophetic Thought or the Triumph of Jahvism we are replacing living men by imaginary, man-made abstractions, and although the genuine scientist or philosopher might admit, if pressed, that all these entities are bogus — merely verbal and largely anthropomorphic conveniences — the man in the street does tend to treat them as real. He imagines a psychosis as something that can be pulled out like a tooth. He pictures Evolution as a Being which rules the world with an irresistible will of its own. He thinks of economic or social 'Forces' as he does of gravitation or the conservation of energy — impersonal, irresistible, mighty gods. These principalities and powers, moreover, serve much the same useful purpose for modern man as did their counterparts for the ancient Greeks. They relieve him of responsibility for his actions. 'Not I, but some God, did this deed', is ever the cry of the criminal in Greek tragedy; and its modern counterpart is, 'Not I, but some impersonal force — neurosis, complex, collective Unconscious, historical necessity.'

evolutionary trend or what-not — did this deed'. The 'scientific' interpreter of history is, in fact (if I may use such a dreadful word), an escapist.

Now one danger of attempting to reconcile the Bible with any particular *Weltanschauung* along these (or any other) lines is this, that the sacred character of the Bible is 'catching'. It affects all that it touches. Men who have accommodated (let us say) the Ptolemaic hypothesis and the content of revelation in a single harmonious Universe will come to believe that the Ptolemaic cosmology has been divinely revealed — and they will denounce Galileo. Men who have become convinced that what is primitive is always best (that the Church of the second century, for instance, was far purer and nobler than that of the sixteenth) will come to think of our first parents as paragons of wisdom and classical beauty — and they will denounce Charles Darwin.

'Save us', in fact, 'from our friends.' It is not the outspoken opponents of the Church whom we need most fear. The scriptural interpretations of the most learned and saintly men may give rise to minor 'legendary accretions' in the poetic or in the popular mind. We do not need to suppose that Dante himself, if provided with modern travel-facilities, would rush off to the South Pacific in search of Monte Purgatorio, nor that Milton really believed gun-powder to have been invented by Lucifer for the purpose of defeating Michael; but their imaginative world-pictures, their *myths*, did give rise to notions about heaven, earth, hell and the garden of Eden which were in every pejorative sense of the word mythical, and many intelligent and honest men must have revolted against Christianity because they could not stomach the pious legends with which it had become encrusted.

There is, however, another and more serious objection to this fitting of the Bible into a scientific frame or of pretending to dig out from it the 'real' truth which it contains. It comes dangerously close to idolatry. Professor Bultmann said, very truly, that the biblical myths of which he spoke (such as the location of God in the heavens) are modes of talking about God in terms of this world. He did not add, however, that his own or any other imaginable de-mythologization must necessarily be tarred with the same brush. The word 'transcendent' is a man-made word just as much as the word

'heaven', and of course neither of them comes within a thousand miles of adequately conveying the truth. None knew this better than the scholastic theologians. Indeed, they might be called the founders of the philosophy *des Als Ob*. For they were especially careful to point out that no attachment of predicates to a subject can ever be at all an adequate way of talking about God. The terms we use (they say) are not univocal nor equivocal but analogous. When we say 'God is powerful' we mean something like: 'God is such that, if we were speaking about a man, we would express it by saying that he is powerful'. Now the Bible does talk about God, and it does so, inevitably, in human language — that is, it expresses God in terms of this world. Any commentary or interpretation of the Bible must do the same; and the substitution of abstract nouns for the Bible's common nouns or proper names (transcendence for heaven, compassion for bowels, Judaism for Israel, etc.) does not in the least degree modify this state of affairs. Man's language remains Man's, not God's.

This is one reason why the Church must, at all costs, affirm the divine authorship of Scripture. None but God Himself has licence to bring God down to earth. All other 'sacred books' — of Egypt, India, Babylonia or China — however wise and discerning they may be, must be to this extent pronounced idolatrous, that they talk of Deity in the language of men. If the Bible were a compilation of this sort it too would have to be pronounced idolatrous. Only the doctrine of divine authorship can save it.

This does not imply any condemnation or disapproval of the work of commentators and scholars and exegetes. We must all try to understand God's word so far as we can. But that 'so far' is always and inevitably a very little way indeed, and it might be a good thing if all such works of exegesis could be clearly labelled 'Caution: temporary and provisional. Not to be taken without salt'. Otherwise we may lay up for ourselves disillusionment and even rebellion, for all such commentaries are temples made with hands. Doubtless there are many styles and many masterpieces of ecclesiastical architecture, but there is only one Church; and it was to the latter, not the former, that Christ promised immortality. In the same way it is only the word of the Lord which endureth forever, not the exegesis of any fallible human being.

VALID SIGNS

by

JOHN M. TODD

A consideration of the two books, *In Parenthesis* and *The Anathemata*, of David Jones, in the light of the author's prefaces.

FOR his first book, in 1937, David Jones wrote of his memories of the 1914-1918 war. As a painter, and from his own confession in the prefaces, we know that he is concerned to raise valid signs. It is obviously of significance that, to find such a set of signs, he had to go back to the early days of his war experiences. It seems that his daily life since then had added nothing further patient of receiving a universal orientation.

The preface to the first book begins: 'This writing has to do with some things I saw, felt and was part of. The period covered begins in December 1915 and ends in early July 1916. The first date corresponds to my going to France. The latter roughly marks a change in the character of our lives in the infantry on the West Front. From then onward things hardened into a more relentless, mechanical affair, took on a more sinister aspect.' After that things were different, there was a change; and further down this same opening page, the author writes: 'Just as now there are glimpses in our ways of another England — yet we know the truth. Even while we watch the boatman mending his sail, the petroleum is hurting the sea.' So, although he searches for valid symbols, Jones has to admit a dangerous factor of nostalgia into this search; he has to return to those early halcyon days of comradeship at the beginning of the war to find the symbols. With lovely artistry he immediately deepens the nostalgia, grafting it onto the essential nostalgia of our human condition, expressed in lasting human and Christian modes of thought and experience. But it remains that the place and the time he cites were, in 1937, a matter for nostalgia emotionally, and in superficial aspect 'out-of-date'. Yet, being the very carefully composed record of human experience, lit by faith and understanding and love, it made a particularly fine book.

Further on in the preface to this book Jones explains in more detail why he chose the war days. He says clearly that since the end of the war he had not known peace; the twenty post-war years were no years of peace. 'I did not intend this as a "War Book"—it happens to be concerned with war. I should prefer it to be about a good kind of peace—but as Mandeville says, "Of Paradys ne can I not speken properly I was not there; it is fer beyond and that for thinketh me. And also I was not worthy". We find ourselves privates in foot regiments. We search how we may see formal goodness in a life singularly inimical, hateful, to us.'

Here then is a good reason for the subject of the war. Jones enlarges on this by referring to the instructions given to the Bard of the Household in the Welsh Codes of Court Procedure: he was to sing to the Queen when she goes to her chamber to rest, first, 'a song in honour of God. He must then sing the song of the Battle of Camlann—the song of treachery and of the undoing of all things; and afterwards he must sing any song she may choose to hear.' Jones adds: 'I have tried, to so make this writing for anyone who would care to play Welsh Queen'.

But there is a flaw, to which the author draws attention on the next page of his preface. And it is the flaw we have already mentioned. The point of the Bard's song was surely to warn men of the truth, the truth of God, and the truth of men. Jones never really gets across the full horror of the truth of man 'the song of treachery and of the undoing of all things', in fact he deliberately avoids the latter days when 'things were different'. And so it is also that the truth of God comes through only as through an ancient sign, not a contemporary prophetic sign, but a placid past sign. His work is mythological in the good and the bad sense. The echoes of Homer, and of Cæsar are somehow stilled, petrified as the laughter on the curves of the Grecian vase.

All this implies high praise, though it seems damning in its faintness. There is virility, there is mystical depth, there is an artist's care. But we are concerned here simply with the 'validity' of the signs for men when he wrote. We said that the author himself drew attention to the flaw. He writes: 'It is not easy in considering a trench-mortar barrage to give praise for the action proper to chemicals—full though it may be of beauty. We feel a rubicon ha

VALID SIGNS

been passed between striking with a hand weapon as men used to do and loosing poison from the sky as we do ourselves. We doubt the decency of our own inventions, and are certainly in terror of their possibilities . . . We who are of the same world of sense with hairy ass and furry wolf and who presume to other and more radiant affinities, are finding it difficult, as yet, to recognize these creatures of chemicals as true extensions of ourselves, that we may feel for them a native affection, which alone can make them magical for us. It would be interesting to know how we shall ennoble our new media as we have already ennobled and made significant our old — candle-light, fire-light, Cups, Wands and Swords, to choose at random.

‘Some of us ask ourselves if Mr X adjusting his respirator can be equated with what the poet envisaged, in

“I saw young Harry with his beaver on.”

We are in no doubt at all but what Bardolph’s marching kiss for Pistol’s “quondam Quickly” is an experience substantially the same as you and I suffered on Victoria platform . . . There is no need to labour the point, nor enquire into the causes here. I only wish to record that for me such a dilemma exists, and that I have been particularly conscious of it during the making of this writing.’

In Jones’s new book *The Anathemata*, the dilemma is now absolutely *en face*. He admits it openly in the preface from which I shall quote later; the nostalgia of the first book has now been developed and has gone right through to the deepest needs of the human soul — this is the ‘song in honour of God’ where his first book was, in its content, about ‘the battle’ — and this new book is presented in a knowledge-and-love of Europe and of his own native piece of it which is exceedingly moving, and rides in the central contemporary European tradition ; yet, because of this, it is intelligible only to an élite. At a first reading, only an élite of Catholic intellectuals can understand it; on a second reading the whole party of European intellectuals will grasp its drift and find its beauty; but for the reading public at large it will be as Joyce, as Eliot, as Pound. For that public, their symbols are to be found in other crude places; and at the furthest desperate point they are found not at all; without interpreter or inspirer, preacher or prophet, they cease to be able to live intelligibly at all, retiring to the

psycho-analyst who is driven to finding symbols for them in their own dreams, a kind of self-pollination.

In a recent review in this journal Desmond Chute revealed many of the good things in *The Anathemata*. It is, indeed, a work without a rival. And because its subject is The Mass, its central signs are the simple artefacts, bread and wine. But, in the natural order, in England, these are no longer valid signs. The liturgy is something esoteric to the industrial worker. Unleavened bread in wafer form, and wine — these are something to do with priests; they are made by nuns, or come from other countries. One thing they are certainly not is the everyday sustenance, the vulgar artefacts, the produce of the fields they till. And so also, *a fortiori*, with every other more complicated Christian sign.

We touch here on a functional liturgical problem; it is not the author's fault that unleavened bread and wine are now something esoteric. He has helped to raise them again into valid signs. Through the order of providence these signs are valid for ever. And Jones's poem is founded on the primal simplicities. It echoes with the simple shouts of the liturgy — *Sitio*; and his illustration of this is an engraving of the words and notes of this part of the Passion according to St John as sung on Good Friday. It is a tremendous *tour-de-force* to have produced a poem in which these things live under their elemental forms, wood, bread, wine, ships. Mr Chute has illustrated all this better than I can hope to do. But he does claim, too, that the signs used in the poem are 'absolutely contemporary'.

This cannot be maintained. It is no fault of David Jones that the signs of the Mass are now a mystery in the wrong sense, to most human beings, including most Christians and Catholics. But in his book this failure of the Mass is representative also of his failure to produce an authentic contemporary language. Like that of *In Parenthesis* it is one stage removed. It is of another time, a little while past. In itself it is authentic, known and loved by him; its virility and its humanity mirrors those qualities in the contemporary language of the English industrial labourer, but his own actual language it is not. Nor is this the language of the air raids, from which a true symbol might conceivably, though again with danger of a falsely sentimental nostalgia, have been raised.

VALID SIGNS

The slang of *The Anathemata* is certainly a peace-time slang, and so, nicely distinguished artistically from that of *In Parenthesis*, but it is the slang of workaday men, nautical fellows, little affected by wars and governments; and it has again an element of nostalgia, and lacks the binding factors and symbols, which move industrial man to-day. Whether it be in Cardiff, Milan, Bombay or Johannesburg, there is a slang which now binds industrial workers together; it is not always very heartening to hear: but it has a true camaraderie whilst reflecting the sometimes inhuman work to which they are bound.

And Jones has turned away from the hints which he dropped, for himself, in the preface to *In Parenthesis*. There is a beauty in the new world of the jet plane and the hydro-electric power station. He has turned away from these rightly if he has no experience of them; but it is in these terms that valid contemporary symbols can be raised. Turn away with tears in our eyes, or sneers on our lips as we may, it is true. And the converse proof of it is that the images of *The Anathemata*, are unavailable, completely unavailable to the mass of men, Christian or post-Christian or communist, of Cardiff, Milan, Bombay and Johannesburg. Like Joyce, whom he refers to more than once, Jones is unintelligible to all except those who have been brought up in a similar tradition, a tradition which is now by an extraordinary paradox entirely alien to the newly educated industrial workers. This tradition involves an experience of the centrality of the Mass, of its relation to all human myths, and specially to all Judaic, Greek, Latin, European, and near Eastern myths — and for Jones especially to his own best known Welsh myths.

The new and valid signs and symbols in the industrial world, follow on to some extent from other older loyalties which again Jones does not use, but which are sometimes suggested to the mind or adumbrated by the nautical camaraderie of the slang in *The Anathemata*. In the northern industrial areas one still finds an absolute sense of proprietorship over the local factories. There is anger, certainly, when the employer treats the men unjustly, there is even a general sense that the whole economic set-up is essentially unjust. There is an ever watchful attitude; there is suspicion and a hundred other emotions. But there is also quite simply an ordinary

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

human pride in the products of the factories concerned; there is a definite sense of proprietorship and responsibility. There is an awful dignity, all the more pronounced for the little it has to go on, in the men who have worked there all their lives. There is cynicism, but underneath there is a sense that 'We are needed'. The artefacts which they produce are valid signs.

A man cannot write, away from his own experience. It is the supreme virtue of the artist to be true to his experience. David Jones has that virtue. And the result is a work which runs from Latin to Welsh, through the middle term of a staple synthetizing English. It is a work of theological incarnation, of the building of the natural into the supernatural, of the supernatural on the natural, which is a consummation of the best work and thought in contemporary theology and literature. It is not without reason that he mentions Père de la Taille in his list of fifty inspirers of his work. It is a consummation and truly an end, and the pointer to what must come. As I have said Jones expresses the dilemma, as it is to him, in the preface to *The Anathemata*: 'In practice one of his [the artist's] main problems . . . concerns the validity and availability of his images. It is precisely this validity and availability that constitutes his greatest problem in the present culture situation.' Two pages later Jones reveals clearly his own attitude which as I have tried to show means that he cannot claim to be offering 'contemporary' images: 'Normally we should not have far to seek: the flowers for the muse's garland would be gathered from the ancestral burial-mound — always and inevitably fecund ground, yielding perennial and familiar blossoms, watered and, maybe, potted, perhaps "improved", by ourselves. It becomes more difficult when the bulldozers have all but obliterated the mounds, when all that is left of the potting-sheds are the disused hypocausts, and when where was this site and where these foci there is *terra informis*.' Ironically it is true that there was probably never an age in which the ground was more carefully searched in various parts of this country for evidence useful to the archeologist and historian.

Jones's work is the end of an era, and passes the tradition on to the new. We cannot escape from bread — but it must be real bread. The present difficulty is aptly symbolized by the adulterated deformed product now sold as bread — happy target for many a jibe as the

VALID SIGNS

protagonists of whole bread are bound to be ! We cannot escape from myths — but again they must be real myths — and to-day the real myths are suburban and international, only in a lesser way being still provincial (Celtic, as is Jones's) or continental (European, as is Jones's in the tradition of a continental Christendom). We cannot escape from suffering, but it must be salvific, Christian and universal. Asia and Africa groan over this problem, the groanings of the Spirit; for Europe can no longer give the answer unaided; and so it is that European literature, however Catholic it may be, has become the literature of a private world. The body of Christ seeks the whole world for the places and the times of its life.

CURRENT PROJECTS OF BREVIARY REFORM

by

ALASTAIR GUINAN

Summary Outline

I

- A. Introduction: the importance of the Breviary; the present *Breviarium Romanum* and its background.
- B. The new translation of the Psalter an indication of what may be expected in further reform.
- C. A glance at the history of the post-Tridentine Breviary and the changes it has undergone ; the reforms of Pius X and their connexion with the reforms undertaken in France by the bishops of the *ancien régime*.

II

The principal suggestions for breviary reform currently being urged; a brief description and evaluation of these plans as reviewed by D. Guy Mesnard, O.S.B.

- i. Suggestions of Cardinal Nasalli-Rocca da Cornegliano.
- ii. Suggestions of D. Bernard Capelle.
- iii. Suggestions of Canon Pius Parsch.
- iv. Suggestions of D. Casimir Zsilinszky.
- v. Suggestions of M. l'Abbé Rénaud.

III

- A. General criticism; what should be the guiding principles of an attempt to reform the Breviary? Two different views of the nature and purpose of the Breviary — the laudal emphasis and the didactic. 'The principle of *authenticity* in worship'. The value of accommodating the Church's prayer-life to the psychology of the age.

CURRENT PROJECTS OF BREVIARY REFORM

- B. Conclusion: The desirability of an inclusive rather than an exclusive approach to the problem. Is the idea *ad tollendam orandi varietatem*, which animated the revisers of Pius V's day, equally valid now? Is the present permissive use of two different versions of the Psalter to be regarded as indicative of a more generous attitude towards the beauty of diversity in the expression of truth?

I

EVEN when it is insufficiently appreciated, the place of the Breviary is a considerable one in the life of ecclesiastics; while to those for whom the duty *persolvere horas* has become a labour of love as well as the fulfilment of an obligation in law, the idea of the possibility of further changes in the manner of saying the Divine Office as it has been familiar to recent generations is an issue of large significance. This idea raises, too, in the minds of all — cleric and laic alike — who love the Breviary, questions transcending in importance either the matter of the relative length or brevity of the daily task, or those graver theological and canonical questions necessarily bound up with change of such sort.

Despite the aura of permanency which many feel emanates from their breviaries, the entire life of the post-Tridentine book has, ever since its issuance by Pius V in 1568, been a series of projected plans for further reform. Two of these have actually been accomplished within living memory: in November 1911, Pius X imposed upon those bound to the recitation of the *Breviarium Romanum* the obligation, effective on 1st November 1913, to use a new arrangement of the Psalter; and in 1945, H. H. Pius XII accorded to all who wish to avail themselves of it, the permissive use in their office readings (*sive in privata sive in publica recitatione, si libuerit*) of the new Latin translation of the Psalter from the Hebrew and other ancient texts, published in that year as a result of the labours of Fr Augustin Bea, S.J., and his colleagues of the Pontifical Biblical Institute at Rome.

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

The Reverend Edward P. Arbez, s.s., writing of this new translation, remarks:

‘The Psalter approved for liturgical use, and reproduced now in the Breviary, without the critical and exegetical notations, will make its way into general use, even without any formal decision of the Holy See. In the struggle for life the new text is bound to conquer. The older generation which has grown up with the *Gallicanum*, acquainted with the wording of the Psalms in their ancient form, will naturally tend to continue using the old edition of the Breviary. But the new generation will know only the new text, the only one which the liturgical editors can be expected to reproduce in the new editions of the Breviary. Thus in the not distant future the new Psalter will have supplanted the old text completely, and the *Gallicanum* will have only antiquarian interest. The new edition of the Psalter shows that the Church moves on and is willing to make changes for the better in accordance with new circumstances and needs. This encourages us to hope for still other changes in the Breviary and even in the Vulgate.’¹

‘This encourages us to hope’, says Fr Arbez, ‘for still other changes in the Breviary’—these words, to the student of the history of this wonderful book, will epitomize echoingly all the aspirations for reform or correction of the Breviary which have been heard on the lips of many thoughtful men and earnest scholars for the last three centuries, and they may well serve to direct our attention to certain of the current schemes or suggestions for a *breviarium novum* which are now being considered and proposed in various parts of the scholarly world.

The *Breviarium Romanum*, as it presently exists, is substantially the book issued in 1568 by Pius V. Revisions and corrections were made under Urban VIII and under Clement VIII; and certain feasts have been added from time to time, suppressed, and added again, thus necessitating changes in the Kalendar. In the eighteenth century Benedict XIV, himself a scholar of notable ability and achievement, had under consideration for years a scheme of thorough-going reform, while under Pius IX certain ideas were

¹ Edward P. Arbez, s.s.: ‘Recent Publications on the Psalms—Part II’; *American Ecclesiastical Review*; September, 1948; v. 119, p. 192.

CURRENT PROJECTS OF BREVIARY REFORM

advanced which Monseigneur Batiffol once described as not being *secundum scientiam*. (And, considering the general character of that reign, and the state of liturgiological scholarship during the ascendancy of the Romanticists of the mid-nineteenth century, he might have added that they could not be expected to be). Leo XIII left no permanent mark of significance on the structure of the Breviary, and it remained for Pius X to inaugurate a reform which was as radical as it was commendable. Although that Pontiff in 1911, by the Constitution, *Divino afflatu compositos psalmos*, swept into desuetude the disposition of the weekly Psalter which had been traditional in the books, if not (thanks to the expedients of saints' offices, votive offices and the like) in the actual usage of Rome, for about a thousand years, he did so in favour of what must be termed a more rational division of the psalms, one influenced to some extent by the Monastic Psalter of St Benedict, but owing even more to the solution of the problem exemplified by that admirable Parisian Psalter of Mgr Charles-Gaspard de Vintimille du Luc (Archbishop of Paris, 1729-46), which had been in use from 1736 to 1873. This Psalter had exercised a great influence upon French liturgists, being adopted into many dioceses throughout France or serving to inspire other arrangements of the psalms made during the eighteenth century, an era which the Catholic Romanticists have been unwise enough to follow the French Revolutionists in covering with contumelious reproaches, but which was, in reality, a period of intense liturgiological activity and of a rich devotional life. Unfortunately, so little attention has been given either to the true nature and character of these neo-Gallican reforms themselves — of which the arrangement of the Psalter was but one facet — or to the influence which they exercised upon the Pian Commission early in the present century, that one is justified in ascribing to a combination of ignorance and malice the greater part of the disparaging allusions to these liturgies which one finds scattered throughout the literature of our subject. D. Guéranger, it is true, wrote of them rather as a polemicist than as a scholar, and the quite intemperate character of many of his judgements carries its own corrective. In respect to the *monumenta* of the eighteenth century liturgies he was a veritable Baron Haussmann and recklessly tore down what should have been piously preserved. But there is

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

less excuse for those later writers who, lacking the Abbot's controversial compulsion, have followed him, without exercising any discrimination, in charges of heresy and in ascriptions of unworthy motives to some of France's outstanding liturgiologists, writers of true genius whose work offers ample evidence of sincere piety and of a sense of literary values at once assured and delicate.²

However, as may be gathered from the final chapter of Mgr Batiffol's *Histoire du Bréviaire Romain*, and as M. Brémond, with just exultation, openly states, the splendid scholarship and sound sense of the French liturgists who arranged the Parisian Psalter of 1736 and various other French diocesan psalters was vindicated by the Roman reform of 1911. And let anyone who doubts the wisdom of the change then wrought, look into the Roman Breviary in use prior to that reform and (to mention only two points), contrast the eighteen psalms there set forth for Sunday's Matins with the more reasonable number of nine we find to-day, or the unvarying monotony of the self-same psalms at Compline every single day in the year with the present judicious selection of proper psalms for each day of the week.

Among the features characteristic of the French breviaries of the eighteenth century reform which were adopted by the Roman reform of Pius X we may note:

- (1) the cutting up of long psalms into *divisiones*, a solution founded by Mgr de Vintimille's revisers on the practice recommended by the Council of Narbonne, A.D. 689, and also sanctioned by the *Regula Scti. Benedicti* and by the Rite of Milan;
- (2) only nine psalms (or *divisiones*) in Matins of whatever rank,

² The present writer hopes to offer as a contribution towards filling this lacuna a forthcoming critical study of the Missals and Breviaries of the neo-Gallican reform. A preliminary survey of the place assigned to devotion to Our Lady in the liturgical *schemata* of the *ancien régime* will shortly be ready for publication. A comprehensive study of the whole subject is desiderated by the late Abbé Henri Brémond who had, himself, made a notable contribution to it in the vivid picture he gave us of the devotional life of the *ancien régime*, and particularly by his magnificent vindication of the beauty of Franco-Latin hymnody, which he so ably defended from the aspersions cast upon it by such writers as M. l'Abbé Pimont, D. Guéranger, and the Spanish Jesuit, P. Arevalo. Cfr. Henri Brémond: *La prière et les prières de l'ancien régime*; 1.x, of his *Histoire littéraire*; Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1932; *passim*. In this connexion, I may be allowed to refer to some remarks of my own in a study of M. Brémond which is to be published in *The Harvard Theological Review* early in 1954.

CURRENT PROJECTS OF BREVIARY REFORM

- (3) the psalms thus displaced from Matins distributed over the lesser hours of the ferias;
- (4) such division of the psalms as results in offices of reasonably similar length;
- (5) provision for the use of the ferial psalms in the festal office, although to a less extensive degree, unfortunately, than was the French practice which avoided that monotonous repetition which even yet disfigures the Roman office in this regard;
- (6) the separation, in the arrangement of the printed breviaries, of the *Psalterium* from the *Ordinarium*;
- (7) the *Te Deum* no longer called 'Hymnus Ss. Ambrosii et Augustini', but 'Hymnus Ambrosianus'. Many of the French books had sensibly gone further, calling, it simply 'Hymnus'.

It was indicated at the time the present recension of the *Breviarium Romanum* was promulgated, that further changes of a far reaching nature were contemplated; and Cardinal Piacenza, in his *Commentarium in constitutionem 'divino afflatu'*, gave to the world a list of the topics for reform which would occupy the attention of the Commission of which he was President. However, no results have ever been announced, while the Commission of which Monseigneur Duchesne was then President was, when being thanked by Pope Pius X for the plan of reform which it had drawn up, requested to suspend its sessions. Despite the fact that the matter has seemed, so far as official circles are concerned, to rest in abeyance, there has continued among scholars both a consistent interest and some discussion of detailed *schemata* for reform or correction of the Breviary; and the publication, in the first place, of the 1945 Psalter and, then in 1951, of the restored Paschal Vigil, has given a new and lively impetus to suggestions and projects of this kind. Readers of the American liturgical review, *Worship*, will recall that, in its pages, the Revd H. A. Reinhold has, from time to time, referred to some of these projects: in the issue of September 1952 he has, indeed, advanced certain ideas of his own in some detail and in the latest form in which they express his most recent judgement of the matter.³ There have also been similar arguments suggested and similar or divergent *schemata* advanced by writers in *Blackfriars*,

³ Cfr. H. A. R[einhold]: 'The Coming Breviary Reform'; *Worship*; September, 1952; Vol. XXVI, No. 10, pp. 469-75.

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

in *THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW*, in *The Homiletic and Pastoral Review*, in *The Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, and in *The Priest*, among others in English. By far, however, the greater amount of periodical literature on this subject has been appearing on the Continent. It was in France that, not long since, there was published a study by D. Guy Mesnard, O.S.B., of a most interesting and helpful nature, in that it embodied rather detailed descriptions of several of the more noteworthy among current projects of reform, together with some remarks indicative of D. Mesnard's own principles in regard to an attempt to recast or reform the existing breviary.

It may be of interest to readers who have not had access to the French text of this study if an attempt is made here to summarise the descriptions of these various projects which D. Mesnard has given in the *Révue Grégorienne*,⁴ as a prelude to the expression of some general observations for which the present writer is alone responsible, observations suggested by the projects themselves as well as by the distinguished Benedictine's strictures upon them.

II

The projects of reform described by D. Mesnard may be conveniently grouped under five heads.

(i) *Suggestions of Cardinal Nasalli-Rocca da Corneigliano.*

The fact that a definite and detailed plan of reform was published by the late Archbishop of Bologna, Cardinal Nasalli-Rocca, has in itself attracted a good deal of attention. The eminent station and the high administrative position of the author, together with the fact of the publication of his plan being proximate to that of the new Psalter, have served as an encouragement to some minds to seek to establish a definite connexion between the two. The Bolognese archbishop's proposal is called by D. Mesnard the most important and thorough-going among those currently being offered and it seems to be a logical outcome of the new version of the psalms.

⁴ Dom Guy Mesnard: 'Les derniers projets de réforme du Bréviaire Romain' *Révue Grégorienne*; organe de l'École de Solesmes et de l'Institut Grégorien de Paris: janv.-fevr. 1949; année 28, n.1, pp. 13-21.

CURRENT PROJECTS OF BREVIARY REFORM

A clear indication of the tone of this scheme may be drawn from its basic principles:

1. it is postulated that the Breviary of the Roman Church becomes the Breviary of the Universal Church;
2. the historical portions of the book are to be revised in accordance with the rules of sound historical criticism;
3. brevity is considered a desirable quality in a breviary because of the multiplicity of pastoral duties, and because of the fewness of those who actually unite in the choral performance of the office;
4. parts which are definitely choral in character should be adapted to private recitation;
5. liturgical feasts should be celebrations of events only, never of ideas despite the excellence of these latter in themselves.

In the matter of details to implement these principles, some features of the late Cardinal's plan are: the only doubles in the Kalendar would be those of concern to the Universal Church; the classification of *simplex* would be abolished entirely except in the case of days within octaves. Also abolished would be the manner of saying Vespers which we call *a capitulo de sequenti*. Octaves would be reduced in number, that of Pentecost being dispensed with entirely. The translation of transference of feasts would be further restricted than at present. New Commons would be created *pro pluribus confessoribus pontificibus*; *pro pluribus conf. non pontif.*; *pro pluribus virginibus*; and the Commons of Popes and Doctors would be revised. Responsories at Matins would be suppressed; likewise *preces feriales* and the versicles at the end of the Hours. Only Prime would be preceded by the *Pater* and *Ave* now enjoined at the beginning of every hour which does not follow another. The *Athanasian Creed* would be confined to very few days throughout the year. The use of the *Suffragia* would be considerably diminished, and Matins and Lauds of Saturday would be shortened owing to the pressure of pastoral work ordinarily felt on that day, so much of which must be given to time in the confessional. A new Lectionary would be established, readings being selected in this manner: Isaiah in Advent; S. Paul at Christmas; Jeremiah in Lent; the concluding books of the New Testament during Paschal time and, during the time after Pentecost, a selection from Old Testament writings not previously read.

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

D. Mesnard observes of the Kalendar annexed to Mgr Nasalli-Rocca's scheme that it would, in effect, constitute a reform of the Sanctoral.

(ii) *Suggestions of D. Bernard Capelle.*

The plan offered by the Abbot of Mont-César, D. Bernard Capelle, O.S.B., is one not wholly original; it forms rather a series of amendments to the foregoing scheme. It is based upon D. Capelle's governing idea that 'the spiritual strength of the reform will be well founded in fidelity to tradition'.

In order to provide for what is generally conceded to be a desirable shortening of Matins, the Abbot suggests two means:

1. to borrow from the Monastic Breviary the principle that no office lower than a *duplex majus* (excepting Sundays) would have three nocturns;
2. to re-apportion the Psalter so that the recitation of its one hundred and fifty psalms would consume a portion of time longer than the traditional one week.

D. Capelle is of the opinion that it would be 'a grave error' to undertake a wholesale revision of the legends of the second nocturn to accommodate them to the principles of 'the severe critics'.

(iii) *Suggestions of Canon Pius Parsch.*

Canon Pius Parsch of Klosterneuberg, Austria (who is famous for the introduction to the Liturgical Movement of the idea of the leaflet missal), offers a conservative plan of revision, which would retain the accepted scheme of the breviary, the idea of the varying Hours, and the characteristic form of each of these, together with the Psalter so distributed that all the Psalms are read during the course of one week.

He would simplify the Kalendar of Feasts, both in regard to number and to solemnity. All ordinary feasts would be *simples*; only the more solemn days being classified as *doubles*. Easter and Pentecost alone would have octaves. *Preces*, commemorations, and *suffragia* would all be discarded; the Sunday Office would be preferred to any other, and the Lectionary would be completely revised.

CURRENT PROJECTS OF BREVIARY REFORM

(iv) *Suggestions of D. Casimir Zsilinszky.*

With the plan of the Hungarian monk, D. Casimir Zsilinszky of Pannonhalma, we approach a scheme considerably less traditional in nature and tone. He is chiefly concerned with the Mass and the Kalendar; but D. Mesnard has abstracted from his writings the following ideas bearing upon our subject;

1. the greater part of the *corpus festorum* of the *Sanctorale* would be reduced to a succession of *Memoria*; these would be either Major (being commemorations at First Vespers, Lauds, Mass, and Second Vespers), or Minor (at Lauds, Mass, and Second Vespers only). D. Mesnard remarks that this author's idea of a commemoration at Mass would include the Collects, the Epistle, and the Gospel proper to the saint being commemorated or memorialized, in addition to those parts of the Mass which was actually being said;
2. *suffragia* would be discarded;
3. simple offices would begin at Matins (instead of at the Chapter of Vespers), ending at Compline;
4. octaves would be reduced in number; but the octave of Easter would be augmented by being made to consist of eight weeks instead of eight days (!); Easter would be so fixed that it would invariably fall between 10th and 16th April.

(v) *Suggestions of M. l'Abbé Rénaud.*

If some of the proposals of D. Zsilinszky have a touch of the bizarre about them, even more startling is the plan offered by the Curé of St Charles de Monceau of Paris. M. Rénaud frankly states that his interest in the matter is purely 'practical'; and he disavows either archæology or history. He desiderates an office sufficiently short to capture and fix attention and devotion, and sufficiently substantial to offer true nourishment for the soul.

The office is to be always *de tempore*, save on very great feasts. The saints would be celebrated by adding the Collect of the feast to Lauds and Vespers, and by an historical lesson at Matins. *Capitula* and responsories would be discarded, although a possible reservation is made in regard to the responsories of Matins. At Sunday Prime, *Quicumque vult* would replace the psalms, but on solemn feasts *Confitemini* would be said. Prime and Terce would be of obligation

before Mass; Sext and None before the noon repast; and Compline before going to rest at the end of the day. Matins would be appropriated to the close of the afternoon, and would have the character of a spiritual reading preparatory to the Mass of the day following, while Lauds becomes the Mass thanksgiving. Matins would be composed as follows: Psalm 94 and Invitatory; Hymn; three psalms; one lesson from Scripture, equal in length to three of our average pericopes; one historical lesson; the Gospel of the Mass of the ensuing day; and, on great feasts, the *Te Deum*.

An astonishing feature of this plan is the proposal that the psalms be grouped according to season, in such a manner that at the end of one year (!) all of the Psalter would have been read, and at the same time, the Office would have been 'considerably lightened'.

D. Guy Mesnard's evaluation of these Suggestions.

D. Mesnard attempts to sum up these *schemata* by listing the following points upon which all are in substantial accord:

1. the *Sanctorale* to be reduced in favour of the *Temporale*;
2. revision of the historical lessons;
3. a new arrangement of the Lectionary;
4. the modification of choral parts, making them better suited to private recitation;
5. shortening of the Office on days upon which the activities of the pastoral ministry are most urgent and time-consuming.

D. Mesnard remarks that a simple way of solving difficulties, and a direct method of achieving some of the desired ends of a reform is indeed to be found in the simple act of 'chopping-off' pieces of the liturgy, here and there, at will. However, he questions the wisdom of thus, as he says, 'brutally amputating what up to the present time has constituted the authentic prayer of the Church'.

The substitution of the so-called *Athanasian Creed* for the psalms of Prime pleases him not at all; and he thinks that the extinction of the little chapters indicates forgetfulness of 'the chief place which is due to Scripture in our devotions'. He feels, moreover, that the reform must not be a mere capitulation before the onslaught of contemporary criticism but a work undertaken in 'the true liturgical tradition'. D. Mesnard would have the correction be 'a work useful and lasting' in more than a merely local sense; for this reason he

CURRENT PROJECTS OF BREVIARY REFORM

looks with disfavour upon D. Zsilinszky's plan to make a 'fête printanier' of Easter, for he observes that the fixing of its date would give Catholics of the southern hemisphere a just cause of grievance and complaint.

He offers pertinent criticism of other suggestions also; for instance, as he says, the paucity of numbers of those who can make the full choral use of the responsories which, of their nature, they appear to require, is not necessarily a permanent condition. He therefore deprecates an official truncation of the liturgy in this regard and pointedly reminds the reformers that should the future see an increase in the number of choral executants, new legislation would be needed were it desired to resurrect the responsories.

As to the suggestions about 'lightening' the Office in favour of those whose pastoral duties are very heavy, he seems rather unsympathetic, and with a type of spiritual insight which, if characteristically monastic, does not seem, in the present instance, less valid for that, he remarks that the fact that so much time must be spent in the exercise of the active ministry expresses a need for greater, rather than for less, preparation by prayer. He thinks it likely and more desirable that a better way of coping with the increasing pastoral duties and cares which the needs of the time make imperative will be found in new forms of pastoral organization: he suggests the formation of *sacerdotal groups* as well as an extension of Catholic Action in a manner designed to allot a larger share of work to lay assistants. Thus, he believes, might greater time and increased opportunity be given the clergy for fulfilling the obligation of reciting the Breviary and deriving from it necessary spiritual benefit. D. Mesnard might have pointed out in this connexion that it is far from being an idea unknown to moral theology and canon law that pressure of pastoral work is one of the reasons which provide clerics with legitimate release from the obligation of the Office upon specific occasions. Nor is it apparent that this is an insufficient remedy. It has the advantage of preserving the principle of the desirability of frequent prayer while it takes account of the fact that its conventional exercise may at times be supplied by various good works performed in the spirit of prayer. To reduce the time of prayer for *all* because *some*, with legitimate excuse, cannot always fulfil it exactly would seem to be an extreme remedy.

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

In concluding his study of the various proposals he has reviewed, D. Mesnard sums up in outline form the chief points which have been under discussion or which are suggested as requiring change:

A. The Kalendar:

1. the number and solemnity of saints' days;
2. the solemnity of feasts of the temporal cycle (e.g. suppression of octaves);
3. the structure of the temporal cycle (e.g. extension of the Paschal Octave);
4. fixing of the date of Easter.

B. The Text of the Breviary:

1. revision of the Scriptural text;
2. historical revision of the Lectionary;
3. creation of a new Lectionary.

C. The structure of the Office:

1. re-arrangement of the Psalter to cover one or more weeks;
2. substitution of other compositions for the psalms;
3. abandonment of certain elements (e.g. *Capitula*, responsories);
4. abandonment of certain Hours.

It may be recalled that, in 1945, the Revd. H. A. Reinhold advocated certain ideas which seem similar in several respects to some of the plans analysed by D. Mesnard. Like Abbé Rénaud, Fr Reinhold then expressed himself as being in favour of what he termed a *re-vamped* Matins to be said in the afternoon as a preparation for the Mass of the next morning. However, he would insert the *Magnificat* into this Office and call it Vespers. As for the little Hours, the suggestions he made also display parallels with those of M. Rénaud. Another preference indicated by Fr Reinhold would be for the reduction of the *Sanctorale*, and for the substitution of the Monastic practice of *memoria* in place of the full celebration of many existing feasts.⁵ This is a desire common to several of the *schemata* at which we have briefly glanced.

D. Mesnard does not leave us with the impression that he cherishes a notable degree of enthusiasm for any of the plans he has passed

⁵ Cfr. H. A. Reinhold: 'To Recite with a Fuller Understanding'; *Orate Fratres* 29th July 1945; Vol. XIX, No. 9, pp. 385-90.

CURRENT PROJECTS OF BREVIARY REFORM

under review. At the close of his exposition of the five schemes for reform he makes his general attitude felt in the comments upon the whole subject which he there offers.

He thinks that there should be no question in the minds of the revisers of creating a new work, still less of *mutilating* the present Breviary. A reform, he thinks, must be made in the light of, and according to, the principles which have governed the formation of our Breviary. To prune away excrescences which have begun to conceal vital parts of the liturgy, to adapt the whole to the conditions of modern life — this he sees as the difficult task to be accomplished. He thinks that successful accomplishment requires men who have made an attentive study of liturgical tradition and who possess an extensive knowledge of various reforms, not only of the Roman liturgy and other Western Usages, but of Oriental Rites as well. In order to bring this kind of knowledge into effective use in the present age and work, he would have it joined to a sensitive awareness of the actual conditions of modern life as well as to a thorough knowledge of contemporary psychology. He concludes by quoting to those who would essay the rôle of revisers the advice of Canon Pius Parsch who has asked them to remember that they are working as well for the future as for the present, and that it is before the tribunal of the future that their work will be judged.

III

While admitting on the one hand, that certain aspects of the five projects for the reform of the Breviary, as described by D. Mesnard, express a real feeling for desirable ends and, on the other, that D. Mesnard's criticisms of them exhibit a proper and prudent reserve, we may be of value to penetrate into this question a bit further, to seek to discover, for example, what a Breviary, as part of a Catholic liturgy, should be; to determine of how strict a necessity is adherence to the principle of 'authenticity in worship' (of which much seems to have been heard of late); and to enquire in what degree should the psychological needs of the day exert an influence upon the revision of a Breviary.

These are all large questions, and were the present writer conscious of no other limitation than that of space, it is apparent that it would

be foolish to attempt conclusive answers to them. However, what is here intended is only the throwing out, as it were, of certain ideas or notions, leaving the resolution of the problem to be made by those better versed in these high matters than is the writer.

There are, perhaps, not more than two schools of thought, if we speak broadly, on the nature of the breviary: we might term one kind of emphasis *laudal*; the other, *didactic*. Some people wish strongly to emphasize the character of the breviary as a book of the praise of God. This is an opinion which often accompanies the cast of thought characterized by a high degree of 'objectivity' in its attitude toward determining the nature of liturgical worship. Fr Reinhold, for instance, writing in *Orate Fratres* in 1939 and like the Cardinal of Bologna in 1945, expressing a positive desire that the observance be discontinued of all liturgical feasts which are not commemorative of events on the ground that their didactic or 'moralizing character puts them in a category of their own foreign to liturgy, which is the sacramental presence of Christ's redemptive work',⁶ would seem fairly to have represented this position in its best defined and most straightforward form. This cast of thought is part of a tendency — one at least hitherto carrying great weight within the Liturgical Revival — which sees the Divine Office as being principally concerned with the objective content of the liturgical commemoration of this or that event of the Redemption, and not properly occupied at all with any aspect of man's reflexion or sentiment upon the moral content of Christian dogma.⁷

And the late Abbé Leclercq, speaking of the fact that some liturgical reformers have shown, as he believes, insufficient regard

⁶ H. A. Reinhold: 'More or Less Liturgical'; *Orate Fratres*; 16th April 1939; Vol. XIII, No. 6, p. 260.

⁷ I should be glad to think that Fr Reinhold has somewhat modified this attitude as I gather from something he has recently written and which I find much more congenial to my own point of view. In the September 1952 issue of *Worship*, I conclude some interesting remarks on the reform of the breviary with these words: 'For a man of my age to talk like a radical may appear queer and heedless. I grew up in the first dispensation of the liturgical movement: expecting liberation of post-industrialized mankind through the lucid beauty of chant, Latin, and Roman 'timelessness', objectivity, dogma. But I see a new dispensation—as the liturgists in Europe do—only more fundamental. Before my arteries begin to rustle with chalk, I make my plea for *timeliness*!'—H. A. Reinhold: 'The Coming Breviary Reform'; *Worship*, September 1952; Vol. XXVI, No. 10, p. 475.

CURRENT PROJECTS OF BREVIARY REFORM

for what he considered the traditional character of the breviary as a collection of praise and prayer from whatever authorized source, has remarked that to his mind this indicates that they had lost an exact idea of the liturgy. He thinks that it expresses a misunderstanding of what is, to him, a basic truth, viz. that 'the Breviary is something else than an anthology of instructive readings alternating with choice extracts from the Holy Scriptures'. To him, the Breviary is, and ought remain, a book of prayer, 'an end which is best attained in its ancient form'. He deprecates the notion that ecclesiastical compositions should be kept to a minimum in favour of selections from the Bible, and he reminds us that were we to erase from our devotions 'all that is not taken from Holy Writ, the very Canon of the Mass would have to be abandoned'.⁸

There is, of course, much to be said in favour of this view; and the last statement is undeniably true. However, what this citation does not emphasize is equally important: the Canon of the Mass is older than many parts of the New Testament; it has been zealously guarded and preserved by the same agency which has preserved the New Testament, with which it can be said to be equally sacred; and, most important to recall in regard to the present subject, no reviser of the Missal ever touched the sacred Eucharistic prayer.

The French liturgiologists of the *ancien régime* were much concerned with the matter of *timeliness*. In consequence, the didactic character of the diocesan Missals and Breviaries of eighteenth century France has often been the subject of remark — remark by no means always favourable. The eminent Church of England writer, Dr John Mason Neale, who has written with knowledge and spirit of these liturgies as well as with a very discernible bias in favour of the Roman books, noted it as one of their chief characteristics in an informative essay published about a century ago.⁹ For that matter,

DACL; t. ix (2); col. 1703; s.v. 'Liturgies Néo-Gallicanes'.

J. M. Neale: 'The Breviary: Roman and Gallican'; in his *Essays on Liturgy and Church History*; 2nd ed. London: Saunders, Otley and Co., 1867; pp. 1-46. It is, I suppose, scarcely necessary to underline the distinction between the Gallican Psalter (which is the name given to the second version of the Psalms made by old St. Jerome), and the Gallican (as Dr Neale terms them) or neo-Gallican (as they are more exactly known to modern liturgiologists by way of distinguishing them from the ancient Gallican Liturgy of the days before Charlemagne) Rites or Uses. These latter were diocesan variants authorized by the French Bishops of the *ancien régime* and remained always within the broad framework of the Roman Liturgy.

this character cannot have escaped the notice of anyone familiar with the French diocesan books, although it is to be feared that, at the present time, there are not very many, even among otherwise deep students of liturgy, who know or seem to care much about them.¹⁰ However, one literary historian who proves himself to have been actually well versed in these breviaries and who was not content to copy without investigation the remarks of previous writers, M. l'Abbé Brémond, unquestionably the leading modern authority on the devotional life of the *ancien régime*, put the matter very nicely when, a few years back he wrote:

'It ought be recalled that, according to these revisers, the Breviary is to be regarded as a sort of encyclopædia — Biblical, theological, historical, mystical and parenetical — whence the generality of the clergy and the élite of the laity are to learn or to review the essentials of religion; it is a sort of *memento* or catechism of perseverance'.¹¹

Now, it must in fairness be admitted that although the conception that the Breviary should be chiefly laudal is one which excludes any other conception, the contrasting idea that it is a sort of encyclopædia, Biblical, theological, and the rest, does not by any means betray the same exclusivism: a book may very well be all these things and, at the same time, be a book of prayer and praise. This inclusive idea, which perhaps essentially expresses a desire for that *timeliness* which Fr Reinhold now tells us he sees in the forefront of the *new dispensation* of the Liturgical Revival, this inclusive idea which exercised so much influence upon the seventeenth and eighteenth century French scholars, causing them to give to their breviaries that strongly didactic character which Dr Neale rather

¹⁰ The author of the present paper feels that he may venture to press a claim to some knowledge of the subject, a claim which is based not alone on careful study of the texts of various French eighteenth century Missals and Breviaries, but also on the fact that he has actually *used* one of these books, the *Breviarium Versaliense* (Versailles: N. Angé; Paris: Poussielgue-Rusand, 1828), daily for a number of years. This book, given during the Restoration, to his diocese by Mgr Étienne-Jean-François de Borderies, second Bishop of Versailles, is a veritable *summa* of the most admirable features of the liturgical reforms and revisions undertaken by the scholarly bishops of the *ancien régime*. Although Versailles is in the Province of Paris, the distribution of the Psalter in this book is not that of the Paris Breviary of 1736, but rather the distribution—in my opinion, a superior one—of the *Breviarium Bituricense* (Bourges: 1734).

¹¹ Henri Brémond: 'La Prière de l'Ancien Régime'; tome x of his *Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux en France*; Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1932; p. 79.

CURRENT PROJECTS OF BREVIARY REFORM

deplored, was thought by D. Guéranger to be so unsound as to be laughable, and he seems never to have tired of making a mock of it except when he was moved to angry denunciation. However, as M. Brémond tellingly remarks: 'je ne crois pas que Rome la trouve si ridicule'.¹¹ And to speak dispassionately, if we leave aside for the moment those rather narrow conceptions of the severe school as to what the Roman Breviary should be (and, as they would suggest, *was* in some vague state of early 'perfection'), and consider the *Breviarium Romanum* as it actually exists in itself, we shall have to admit that all that is said by Abbé Brémond in the description cited above may, not unfairly, be applied to that book too, although admittedly in a sense less markedly obvious than is true of many French diocesan books, for they did not, like the Roman, gradually grow over a long period of years but were carefully compiled under the influence and direction of certain central ideas.

Indeed, added point is given to this thought by the issuance of the new Latin version of the Psalter and, more especially, by its permissive insertion in our breviary. Whatever may be one's personal opinion of the new text in the sense of a subjective reaction to it (i.e. prescinding from considerations of pure scholarship about which, it would seem, so complicated is the matter, only specialists are justly qualified to form an opinion), whether one regret the supplanting of a text often obscure but grown dear by association, by personal use, and by the consciousness of it as an almost tangible link binding the present day worshipper with his fellow Christians gone before, it cannot but be admitted that the promulgation of the new Psalter (even in the limited sense in which it is presently authorized for liturgical use), leaves in a somewhat equivocal position the hitherto highly-regarded theory which laid so much stress upon 'authenticity in worship', a notion which to many of its protagonists seems to have meant faithfulness in as strict and literal a sense as possible to what they believe to be 'pure' *models* in worship (i.e. imitations of conditions prevailing in some arbitrarily selected 'golden age'), and to 'pure and correct' *theories* of worship (i.e. ideas re-constructed from a consideration of the past as seen through the spectacles of some particular school of thought).

¹¹ Ibid.

It would seem, as a matter of fact, that a model is indeed held up as being an authentic one; but that this authenticity is rather to be tested by its correspondence to the ideal of truth and of appropriateness to its function instead of being chiefly concerned with establishing that the present is to be a mirror of the past. In the mind of anyone willing to think this whole matter through to some of its logical conclusions, the idea is ineluctably engendered that much will have to be altered in certain theories of music and ceremonial which have, mistakenly as some of us have ventured to think and to say, been urged upon us during the past thirty or forty years as though they were authorized additions to the *Symbolum*. It would appear that we may be at the dawn of a more general recognition of the beauty of diversity, of a realization of the imperishable truth that, given agreement upon essential dogmatic concepts, a very wide variety and divergence is desirable as well as being possible in ceremonial expression, and that the liberty which leads to this diversity is wisely granted. In other words, we may see in this action of the Holy See approval of a dynamic rather than a static conception of the liturgy.

Here, too, is revealed (nor could its importance justly be overlooked in relation to the question of reforming the Breviary), the necessity of having regard, within large limits of propriety, for the science of psychology, a recognition that we take into account the needs, temper, and characteristics of the human beings for whose salvation the liturgy exists — *sacramenta propter homines*; or, as a greater One reminded us, *the Sabbath was made for man* . . .

The reception accorded to the new Psalter has been varied, as might surely be deduced from the strange quality of unexpectedness with which it made its appearance. Not all have greeted it with the almost ecstatic enthusiasm which marks Fr Reinhold's pæan of tribute.¹² The more critically-restrained but also wholeheartedly approving tone of Fr Arbez's essay from which a citation was made early in the present paper,¹³ represents another viewpoint; while an attitude of far greater reserve is revealed by Fr Reginald Ginns, O.P. in a thought-provoking article occasioned by Fr Bea's apologia for

¹² H. A. Reinhold: 'To Recite with a Fuller Understanding'; *Orate Frates*; 29th July 1945; Vol. XIX, No. 9, pp. 385-90.

¹³ Edward P. Arbez, S.S.: 'Recent Publications on the Psalter—Part II'; *American Ecclesiastical Review*; September 1948; v. 119, p. 192.

CURRENT PROJECTS OF BREVIARY REFORM

the work of his Commission, published as *Le nouveau Psautier Latin*. Of the permissive use of the new Psalter Fr Ginns remarks:

‘It may be concluded, I imagine, that this permission was intended to provide what may be called a trial run of the new translation in order to test its value and workableness. The ultimate intention seems to be that it should supersede the Latin Psalter in present use, should it prove satisfactory from the viewpoint of erudition and liturgical requirement. But as the old Psalter has held almost undisputed sway for so many centuries, whatever its merits or defects, it seems hardly likely that ecclesiastical authority will be over-precipitate in imposing the new one’.¹⁴

He reminds us, too, that the old Psalter has considerable merit: ‘no one can say that the Gallican Psalter we use is completely unintelligible or altogether wrong’. Experts alone, indeed, are qualified to pass judgement on the merits of the new version as a *translation*; but in a work of this character and use there are other considerations from the liturgical aspect. Only a fair-minded trial of the new Psalter can determine whether it have that ‘music in its words which renders it easy and pleasant to recite’, music which, as Fr Ginns justly observes, is eminently characteristic of the old Psalter.

This Dominican writer recalls that a *restored version* of the Psalter is being prepared by the Pontifical Commission of Benedictine Scholars who were entrusted — it is now over forty-five years ago — with the task of determining the original text of the Hieronymian Vulgate. This Psalter was expected to appear in 1952, but a series of unforeseen difficulties has apparently temporarily retarded the anticipated progress of the Commission’s work. It is interesting to speculate if their version will, like the result of Fr Bea’s work, be given a period of trial for liturgical use, or if it be the intention that it serve simply as a version for study. After all, the official view that has prevailed for several centuries and which gives so peculiar a position to the Vulgate is only as old as the Council of Trent, and it has been in fact at least theoretically controverted by the continuing presence in both Missal and Breviary of texts from an older version

¹⁴ R. Ginns, O.P.: Review of *Le nouveau Psautier Latin*, par Augustin Bea, S.J.; *Blackfriars*; April 1948; Vol. XXIX, No. 337, p. 189.

of the Psalter. Yet, even these considerations are not to be regarded as justifying the expectation that the Vulgate is hurriedly to pass into the obscurity of libraries: it would be a mistake to expect too rigid a degree of consistency in such matters, particularly as they affect the liturgy.

Those who like to think of themselves as purists *in rebus liturgicis* are prone to look back to some particular period of their choice as exemplifying the ideal: it seems to me that they waste a good deal of enthusiasm and expend a tremendous amount of energy in exhorting the Church — or such segments of it as will hear them — to return to this period of 'liturgical authenticity'. Practices, offices, books, music, ceremonies, architecture, vestments, become 'liturgical' or 'not liturgical' in the eyes of these good people according as they fit or fail to fit into the pattern which is constructed on a theory formed after a more or less careful consideration of the archæologist's revivification of the beloved period.

In the sober light of good sense, however, all this is clearly beside the point: there is no liturgical idea to which we must return. If anything should be apparent to the reader of the Encyclical *Mediator Dei* it should be the idea that some things in liturgy are of divine institution, others of ecclesiastical and very human origin. And anyone who thinks even briefly about it will readily agree that all the causes which this or that group of enthusiasts for liturgical propriety are ready to defend to the death are matters which depend upon ecclesiastical legislation. In this sense the liturgy has changed, does change, and will change, throughout varying ages, in accordance with the Church's answer to the dominant psychological needs of the time. If this gentry would have us mount the barricades, it is much to be desired that they would unfurl banners more ultimate in implication than are those now carried by embattled bands of enthusiasts.

Fr Reinhold's sentiment that the liturgy 'is the sacramental presence of Christ's redemptive work',¹⁵ is, I believe, quite true, and I should say the same for words which I, myself, wrote in the pages of the *American Ecclesiastical Review* over fifteen years ago: 'the liturgy [is] the expression in text, and music, and ceremonial of

¹⁵ H. A. Reinhold: 'More or Less Liturgical'; *Orate Fratres*; 16th April 1939; Vol. XIII, No. 6, p. 260.

CURRENT PROJECTS OF BREVIARY REFORM

Divine Life within the soul'.¹⁶ However, neither of these descriptions helps us very much in the present connexion, in regard to which it is well to remember that the liturgy is the public or official worship of the Church. In practical language this means that the liturgy is whatever the Church says it is. Thus, if by ecclesiastical authority the Rosary were to be substituted for Vespers during the month of May, it would thereby become the afternoon or rather evening liturgy for the period specified.

A consideration like this makes much of the discussion of 'liturgical' and 'unliturgical' rather pointless: there is no absolute in the matter. Of course, a competent person may have an opinion about the desirability of this or that practice, about even its consonance with this or that *concept of the liturgy* (i.e. not with the idea of *liturgy* itself, which is simply what the authority of the Church in any given age sets forth as her public worship).

It is, in other words, quite unhistorical (and, incidentally, not comprehended within the scope of the dogmatic notion expressed for example in a document like *Mediator Dei*) to consider the liturgical expression proper to any particular age as being, in any absolute sense, a binding pattern and prescription *per cuncta saeculorum saecula*. And this way of looking at things works no circumscription upon study and discussion, upon the exercise of what the late Dr Adrian Fortescue was fond of insisting upon as the right of competent persons to desire, discuss, and advocate such changes as may seem to them necessary or warranted. It does, however, serve to keep them from misconstruing their position, from transforming themselves into dogmatic teachers instead of resting content with the office of student and critic. A temper of mind which recognizes all this would do away with the attitude which ignores the real issues in any discussion of liturgical matters, and strives to carry the day by accusing of heresy the holder of the opposing view.

Actually, dogmatic ideas, in themselves, are rarely in question in these discussions. Therefore, as the Revd Humphrey J. T. Johnson has reminded us in another connexion, 'Catholics should show themselves ready to distinguish between the right of the Roman

¹⁶ Alastair Guinan: 'The Catholic Choir'; *American Ecclesiastical Review*; March 1936; Vol. XCIV, No. 3, p. 257.

Church to rule other churches, which is a matter of dogma, and the question how far Rome has exercised this right wisely and how far unwisely, which is a matter of history'.¹⁷

This consideration brings me quite naturally to a broader and more fundamental aspect of the whole subject, one which I would express by saying that what seems to me chiefly desirable is that careful thought be given to determining whether the needs of souls will not be better served by an *inclusive* than by an *exclusive* approach to the question of reforming the Breviary in particular and the whole liturgy in general.

We know that the chief idea in the mind of Pius V's revisers was *ad tollendam orandi varietatem*. We know, too, how this served the needs and suited the purpose of the great architects of the Counter-Reformation. And it was an exactly similar idea which spurred D. Guéranger, about a century ago, in his effort to annihilate what he regarded as 'the liturgical deviation' of the *ancien régime*.

On the other hand, we may legitimately enquire, is this principle equally valid now? Does it seem likely to serve the necessities of the time in which we are placed?

The present officially authorized usage of two quite different versions of the Psalter, several recent concessions in regard to the use of the vernacular in the liturgy, notably in France and in Germany, might be construed as justification for the opinion that the authorities of the Church no longer think so.

It is sometimes said that we have entered upon a corporate age, that the day of the individualist is quite over. Whatever basis there may be for such a statement in the view of the totalitarian communist, I cannot think it valid when the touchstone of judgement is in a broad and comprehensive understanding of the Christian view of life. Our notion of *personality* is sometimes contrasted with the notion of *individuality*; but this is really an academic distinction, and for practical purposes and when we are confronted with the soul-lacking automaton of materialistic philosophy, I am thoroughly well persuaded that the attempt to distinguish between individualism and personalism is nothing but a rational exercise: it results in a distinction without a difference.

¹⁷ H. J. T. Johnson, *Congr. Orat.: Anglicanism in Transition*; London: Longmans, Green, 1937; p. 175.

CURRENT PROJECTS OF BREVIARY REFORM

In its proper and legitimate sense, and in opposition to materialistic uniformity, individualism is a characteristic eminently appropriate to Christianity, and in our consideration particularly of the psychological aspects of breviary reform we shall be well advised if we offer as inclusive as possible an answer to the problem concerning to what extent welcome ought be given to the contribution, and response made to the needs, of as many individuals as possible. This does not mean, needless to say, anything so nonsensical as *everyman his own breviary writer*: it does mean that serious thought may most suitably be given to a solution of the current difficulty which will, in preference to enforcing a dead-level of uniformity and, ever more and more widely, spreading a monotonous sameness on the superficies of things, rather encourage, increase, and even revive, the wondrous richness of diverse usages within the broad framework of the Breviary of the Roman Rite. Our present office book contains much that is venerable, beautiful, true, and of good report. It is likewise with the so-called neo-Gallican books, as with many other monuments of local use. Less than a return to the bareness of a *primitive* Roman office, stripped of all that we associate with the Breviary save psalms, canticles, and Scripture lessons,¹⁸ what is to be desired in a new recension of our office book is that a broad and knowledgeable catholicity of spirit will show itself in having made tributary the whole field of that literature which has been a flowering taking place when God breathes — as he does anew to every generation — into the heart of man an insight into, and a yearning for, divine things. That an anthology from so vast a source be manageable and practical there will be required in the revisers, in addition to learning, both sensitivity of taste and precision of literary judgement.

M. Brémond has suggested that, given another temperament in Pius IX and in D. Guéranger, much that was valuable might have been saved, the bitterness that characterized relations between those who claimed to represent the Roman tradition and the adherents of the French diocesan Uses in the last century would have been avoided and, had the question of the liturgy been handled as a

¹⁸ Cfr. J. Wickham Legg: *The Reformed Breviary of Cardinal Tommasi*; London: S.P.C.K., 1904; p. 14. So also L. M. O. Duchesne: *Christian Worship: its origin and evolution*; tr. by M. L. McClure; 5th ed. London: S.P.C.K., 1949; p. 452.

sober discussion aimed at the achievement of the most inclusive and generous solution rather than engineered as a *crusade*, there might have then been accomplished a re-casting of the breviary conserving on a broad scale what was good in the work of the past while adding to it from current worth and, prayerfully and hopefully, making way for the gradual and natural inclusion of matter to meet the new needs of the future. All this, had it occurred, would have made the task with which liturgiologists are faced to-day, a much easier and a far more grateful one.¹⁹ But the state of affairs being what it was, with larger insights hastily smothered by the miasma of the false mediævalism beloved of the Romanticists, the opportunity was lost.

Considering the existence, at the present time, of a vastly increased body of liturgiological knowledge, and the less stringent attitude which recent occupants of the Papal Chair have shown toward a reasonable degree of liturgical diversity, so desirable a resolution of our problem would seem more possible of realization to-day than it was during the nineteenth century. However, vaticination is traditionally unprofitable, and all too frequently erroneous, it being notoriously unsafe to pre-judge the mind and the decisions of the Holy See in such matters. Who has not smiled over the story of the last audience D. Guéranger had with Pio Nono? It appears that the years had somewhat mellowed the austere distaste which the Benedictine liturgiologist had been wont to turn upon deviation from the 'pure' Roman Rite. In the course of his studies and as the

¹⁹ Cfr. H. Brémond: *op.cit.*; t. x; pp. 145-6. The unfortunate attitude of intransigent opposition to all the reforms of the *ancien régime* which was so powerfully and seemingly, so persuasively urged upon students of liturgiology by the polemics of D. Guéranger, although repudiated by so profound and influential a scholar as Edmund Bishop, and ignored by the Pontifical Commission which revised, for Pius X, the *Breviarium Romanum* as it was put forth in 1911, has exercised an influence which is yet felt. The writings of men like D. Laporte of Saint-Wandrille display however, a different and a larger spirit. This spirit is making itself felt, I think, among Benedictine liturgiologists in increasing force. Thus it was pleasant for one who from his own studies of the liturgies of the *ancien régime* as well as from what he has learned of them from the late M. Brémond, loves and admires the devotion and the scholarship which produced these magnificent variants of the Roman Rite, to find the Editor of *Worship* in agreement with a point of view which would welcome the good and the beautiful in liturgy wherever we find it. D. Godfrey Diekmann, in reviewing a work by Père Doncoeur, S.J., points out how questionable was the wisdom of those who sought to destroy all traces of the contribution which the French liturgists of the eighteenth century had made to the age-long tradition of Christian worship. Cfr. G. L. Diekmann: review of *La Naissance, le Mariage, la Mort*, par P. Doncoeur; *Worship*; November 1952; Vol. XXVI, No. 12, p. 590.

CURRENT PROJECTS OF BREVIARY REFORM

fruit of an enriched awareness of diverse forms of prayer whose monument is *L'Année Liturgique*, he had gathered together a copious collection of liturgical formulae which he had welded into an ideal breviary of his own. He, who had made it his aim to have every bishop in France adhere to an iron standard of liturgical uniformity, hoped in 1856 to receive from the Holy See permission for the use of this private breviary by his own Congregation.²⁰ He therefore made the request, doubtless with the natural assurance of one reasonably expectant of a reward for faithful service rendered. To his surprise, he received an abrupt and positive refusal. There is no doubt that he felt it keenly, for we find him writing at this time: 'Ah! how I love this excellent Pius IX; but I love him more when I am far off than when he is nearby'.

Yet, fantastically improbable as seems the idea of Pio Nono permitting D. Prosper the fulfilment of a desire contrary to the stern and rigid principles of the *crusade for liturgical uniformity* which the doughty Abbot had waged, the mere notion of the ninth Pius as the sponsor of either the Psalter of 1911 or the new translation of 1945 is utterly impossible. *Vere, tempora mutantur; et nos ad meliora tendimur.*

²⁰ As M. Leclercq describes it, it was actually 'a voluminous Proper, almost as big as a separate breviary, for the composition of which D. Guéranger had liberally borrowed from the old Breviaries of Cluny, Glandfeuil, Saint-Benoît d'Aniane, and other ancient Uses'. Printed copies having been distributed among the Abbot's friends, this volume is occasionally come upon, says M. Leclercq. Cfr. DACL; tome ix (2); col. 1729.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Kerygma and Myth, a Theological Debate by R. Bultmann and others. Edited by H. W. Bartsch and translated by R. H. Fuller. Pp. xii + 228 (S.P.C.K.) 22s. 6d.

THIS volume offers to the English reader a glimpse of the theological controversy aroused in Germany during the recent war by Dr Bultmann's programme of 'demythologizing' the New Testament. The problem is one that has faced the Church ever since she began to invade the territory of Gentile Hellenism; the problem of restatement. In recent times we have had Hegel's attempt to understand Christianity in the light of dialectical idealism, and the liberal Protestant attempt to make it acceptable to ethical rationalism. Schweitzer may be said to have led the first reaction against liberalism which has been conducting a strategic withdrawal all through the last quarter of a century. Now Bultmann warns us that theology is in danger of forfeiting the attention of 'modern man', because the *kerygma* (the essential Christian message), as presented in the New Testament documents, is wrapped up in obsolete mythology which the modern mind will not accept. Thus, the New Testament views the world as 'a three-storied structure, with the earth in the centre, heaven above, and the underworld beneath'; even on earth 'supernatural forces intervene in the course of nature and in all that men think and will and do' and all is hastening towards an imminent catastrophe; 'then the judge will come from heaven, the dead will rise, the last judgment will take place, and men will enter into eternal salvation or damnation'. We cannot expect the modern mind to accept this mythical view of the world as true. Miracles do not, cannot, happen. Satan and the demons do not exist. The Second Coming did not occur. No traces of God's action, as creator and redeemer, can be perceived as such by the natural man. Theology's task, therefore, is to give a representation of the *kerygma* in non-mythical language and yet to preserve the fullness of the gospel message.

Obviously it is laudable to try to manifest to one's contemporaries the relevance of the Christian message. Equally obvious is it that if this relevance is not apparent to the modern mind, the fault may be partly on the side of the modern mind. I should describe the modern mind depicted by Dr Bultmann as neither particularly modern nor in any notable sense a mind. To take the question of miracles. Modern science by which, says Dr Bultmann (p. 3), 'all our thinking to-day is shaped' neither does nor can pronounce against the possibility of miracles. It concerns itself with the operation of natural (or, as traditional

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

philosophy would express it, 'second') causes, but it cannot say what might occur in the 'natural' scene if the First Cause chose to intervene. Nor can it exclude the operation of the first cause: where Mr Fred Hoyle wishes to escape from the notion of a limited past history of the physical universe (and hence from the problem of primeval creation) he does so by the hypothesis of 'continuous creation', a hypothesis which goes beyond the limits of natural causation no less blatantly than the book of Genesis. Modern science may be able to assure us that virginal conception does not take place in the species *homo sapiens* and that the body of a man dead for thirty hours is not reanimated — but the proviso in both cases is that nature is being left to itself. Granted this proviso, traditional theology wholeheartedly agrees with modern science: and precisely because it does agree, it calls the virginal conception and the resurrection of Christ *miracles*; and it contends that if you can be sure that a miracle, in the strict sense, has occurred, you can be sure that you are in the presence of an act of God. Or take the question of a personal devil. Modern science has nothing to say on this subject at all, since it confines its attention to phenomena in the material order, and the devil, like the human soul, is for traditional theology purely spiritual. Modern science is, I should suppose, more keenly aware of the necessary limitations of its own viewpoint than the science of seventy years ago. And if the modern mind is not so aware, that is because in the first place the 'modern mind' of any age always lags behind the minds of the intellectual leaders; and in the second place the modern mind is not a 'mind' at all, if we mean by mind a thinking faculty, but a pool of uncoordinated impressions and uncriticized prejudices. As regards the Second Coming, it is no doubt true that the expectation was widespread, in the first generation of Christians, that this would take place within, say, forty years of Christ's crucifixion. But whether this expectation was really justified by anything in the *kerygma* as then formulated is another question.

But probably Dr Bultmann is unfair to himself in stating his problem. What he really cares about is not so much the discarding of 'mythology' at the behest of modern man, as a deeper insight into the real meaning of the Christian gospel, and its recommendation not to modern man in the bulk, but to those modern philosophic thinkers who are grouped under the banner of existentialism. He sees with emphatic clearness that the gospel, if it is to do its work, cannot be the verdict of historians upon the evidences of Christian origins, but must be the authentic word of God speaking in the accents of Jesus Christ to a man in the here and now; and this perception should bring him up sharp against the question of the 'living voice' of the Church, and the Church's credentials. Unfortunately, he is not, I think, interested in credentials; indeed he has a Lutheran hostility to them. Because the ground of faith is identical with faith's object, there is no room for 'grounds of credibility'. To me this seems to make the passage from unbelief to belief essentially immoral; no one is justified

in transcending reason unless the act of transcendence can be rationally justified. But here we are 'up against' a profound conflict between Lutheranism and Catholicism, too large a subject for adequate treatment in this short review.

Nor is this the place for an assessment of existentialism. I believe that among those who are called existentialists there are thinkers, experiencers who are doing a very great service to the progress of philosophy and have much to teach Christian thinkers. But I suspect that existentialism, like idealism before it, is a passing phase in the age long movement of Western thought, and I should be sorry to make it an absolute criterion of theological truth.

It comes as a relief, after the somewhat rugged, dialectical, Lutheran, German quality of the essays here translated, that the volume ends with an 'appreciation', by Dr Austin Farrer, which is itself a sort of extended review of the German essays. I need hardly say that I warmly agree with a great deal of Dr Farrer's contribution and enjoyed its serene English lucidity and irony. But I should like to ask him for further elucidation on one point. On p. 220 he agrees that scientific history by itself could not oblige us, on the basis of the New Testament evidence, to accept Christ's virginal conception as true; but he says that our belief in Christ 'inclines us at certain points to accept with regard to him testimony about matters of fact which would be inconclusive if offered with regard to any other man . . . Thus it is possible through faith and evidence together, and through neither alone, to believe that Christ really and corporeally rose from the dead', and (he doubtless means) that Christ was virginally conceived. This seems to me to be pure Gore. As a historian I am indeed 'inclined to believe' that Christ was virginally conceived and rose corporeally from the dead; and I think the evidence is stronger than Bultmann seems to hold. But as a Christian I 'believe' these mysteries on the authority of the *kerygma* of the Church, and therefore with a certainty that historical investigation can never give me. So far as I can see, supernatural faith in the articles of the Creed implies the absolute authority of the word of Christ upon the lips of the contemporary Church.

Dictionnaire de Spiritualité. Tome II. Cabasilas-Cyrille.

THE new double number of this important encyclopædia has been published with commendable promptitude. It opens with the continuation of L. Cognet's article on the 'Heart and the Affection of the Heart' (*Cœur et cordis affectus*) and ends with a short note on Cyril of Scythopolis. It completes the second volume of the *Dictionnaire*, and includes an alphabetical list of the articles in this whole second volume as well as a list of the contributors.

Among the articles in this double number is one by the late E. Mersch on the spirituality that is or may be based on the doctrine of the mystical body of Christ. This article is highly compressed and perhaps somewhat disappointing. Père Mersch's death took place in May 1940, so that the

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

article is over twelve years old. It has been supplemented by a section from the pen of R. Brunet, entitled 'Teaching of the Encyclical *Mystici Corporis*' but not confining itself too closely to this theme. I am glad to see that here notice is taken of L. Cerfaux's *La théologie de l'Église suivant St Paul*; whether or not Cerfaux has said the last word on St Paul's use of the term 'body' with reference to the Church, his suggestions certainly deserve careful attention. This supplementary section has a careful note on the Encyclical's identification of the hierarchical 'visible' Church with the mystical body of Christ; it looks as though a distinction must be made between the full membership of those whom the Encyclical (published in 1943) describes as alone *reapse membra* and other kinds of inchoative membership. Attention is also drawn to the Encyclical's teaching that the 'Soul' of the mystical body is the Holy Spirit.

The articles on psychological crises and spiritual life (*Crises affectives et Vie spirituelle*) and on the sense of guilt (*Culpabilité, Sentiment de*) are especially important and mutually enlightening. The former deals, from the point of view of modern psychology, with both the 'primary' crises (of birth, adolescence, and middle age) and the secondary crises (of about the twelfth month after birth and of the fourth and eighth years; and also with some 'occasional crises or affective conflicts', these latter caused by something happening exterior to the subject, but conditioned by the subject's internal drama. The crisis is born of a tension between two parts of the ego, accompanied by the feeling that a notable part of the self is no longer adapted to the remainder. The discomfort is the sign of an interior conflict, which calls for a reconstruction of the self and a recovery of coherence. If, however, the subject lacks the courage to face the crisis realistically, he will drive the crisis-situation, or the maladjusted part of the self, from the field of full consciousness, and in consequence a 'portion of the psychism' will survive below the surface in a condition of arrested development with obsolete forms of reaction to circumstance. Neurosis may result, or at least a limitation of the capabilities of the subject, often with a core of ego-centrism which more or less paralyses the normal development of charity. Spiritually, the 'complex' may express itself in morbid aspirations to penitence, the religious life, 'spiritual childhood', or devotion to our Lady, and this is an important consideration for directors of conscience. (As is well known, acute cases of evasion of a crisis may even lead to what has been called 'divided personality'.) Among childhood phenomena which may be due to maladjustment are lying, escapist 'mythomania' and living in a world of make-believe, scruples, instability, and idleness. If the crises of childhood require especially the help of wise, harmonious and loving parents, the crisis of adolescence needs an informed confidant probably other than the parents; above all the adolescent needs external help to enable him (or her) to recover a proper self-confidence. 'In the young child love is incarnated in the love of parents; in the adolescent and the adult it is incarnated in human love;

it ends by assuming more and more its true likeness of charity, when life's partings throw the subject back on a tête-a-tête with God that becomes more and more exclusive. It is always from another that the call comes to self-transcendence which is Life's law. Hence, every crisis, once it has been resolved, takes concrete form in a step forward on the road of charity.'

Charles Beaudouin's article on Guilt links up well with Père Mersch's account of 'crises' inasmuch as Beaudouin sees the sense of guilt as a summons to action, a call for 'reparation'; it is therefore, 'a mode of behaviour in suspense', a facing of disorder, of disorder as caused by the subject and requiring action to produce adjustment, to re-establish order. If for some reason this normal outlet in reparative action is denied to the feeling of guilt, this feeling may 'go underground' and we get the state of things called by a phrase whose paradoxicality Dr Beaudouin fully recognizes, 'unconscious guilt', or neurotic guilt. Hence may occur some of those 'unintentional mistakes' which are a disguised kind of self-punishment; and even some physical maladies not to speak of scruples and obsessions.

Reparation may take the primitive form of the *lex talionis*, or that which is supplied by the idea of a debt to pay to society or God (*dimitte nobis debita nostra*); it may on the other hand be transfigured by the Christian doctrine of God's redeeming love in Christ.

The sense of guilt is studied from the spiritual point of view by Père Louis Beirnaert, who discusses the question how the saints can regard themselves — as they often claim to do — as the 'most wretched' of men. He appears to suggest that this may be due to the saints' coming to see (other) sinners no longer as 'objects of judgment and reprobation' but as 'pure subjects of divine love and pardon'. I do not know whether this explanation will appeal to many students of this problem. If sanctity involves a theocentric attitude with complete abandonment of the egocentric point of view, one fails to see why other sinners should be viewed in any different light by the saint than that in which he views himself. It should be noted that there is no difficulty in the depth of a soul's penitence vis-à-vis God; obviously as God is approached more closely the estranging power and 'guilty' quality of sin is 'realized' more profoundly. The *Cloud of Unknowing* maintains that only the contemplative — to use a convenient but misleading term — can be fully humble; and the same is true of penitence. Comparison of self with others, however, does not to me seem to be an element in pure penitence. It may be an effect of charity, leading the saint to 'make allowances' for others which he prudently will not make for himself. But is there not an element of psittacism and rhetoric in some of these protestations? If St Paul describes himself as 'chief of sinners' the saint feels that he himself cannot do less. But perhaps the simplest explanation is that the saint knows and cannot deny his own guilt and failure to correspond fully with grace: he does not

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

now the guilt of others, and lacking this knowledge he 'gives them the benefit of the doubt'.

Students of Brémond will be glad to find articles in this fascicule on Coton and Cresset; students of monastic history will turn to the article on Monastic and Religious Customaries. There is a long article (which the present reviewer has not read) on the Fear of God. Altogether, a fascicule of great variety and immense value.

The Hope of Jesus, a Study in Moral Eschatology by R. Dunkerley. Pp. viii + 288 (Longmans) 15s.

DR DUNKERLEY has written a thought-provoking little book, challenging in some respects the conclusions of other New Testament scholars, and in some respects traditional theology and what passes for such. I found myself in warm agreement with a good deal of the earlier part of the book, but unable to follow him in some of the theological framework in which he sets his exegesis. The title of the book is explained by the following questions: What were (Christ's) views about what was going to happen during his own lifetime, how things would develop as the result of his life and death, and 'whereunto it would all grow'? How far did he share the hopes and expectations of his contemporaries — how far did he transcend them and in what respects? (p. 2). In other words, what was Christ's eschatology? Dr Dunkerley's answer is that it was a 'moral eschatology', in other words a view of the future as conditional upon the free, and therefore (Dr Dunkerley would say) unpredictable, response of man (collectively and individually) to the gospel.

If I understand the basic point of his exegesis it is one with which I entirely agree, one in fact which I have come almost to take for granted. It is, that the gospel story is in one aspect, the record of what I have called 'the failure of a mission'. Christ came to mankind, and immediately to the Chosen People, 'in the fullness of time' with a real summons to repentance and faith, a summons which (at the historical level of thinking) must be said to presuppose the real possibility of a substantially adequate response. The adequate response could have been given, should have been given, and was not given; and (still at the historical level of thinking) we must describe the course which the gospel story and the Christian story have in fact and in consequence pursued as a *pis aller*, a 'second best'. It sounds at first paradoxical to describe the redeeming death of Christ as a second best, and we must return to this question later on. For the moment let it suffice to say that both exegesis and theology imperatively require that the 'old Israel' was not rejected by God in Christ until it had rejected him and his gospel; that this rejection was culpable, that is that it ought not to have occurred; and that what ought not to occur need not occur. There remains the question whether this rejection was culpable in itself, or only in its causes. In other words, had the past sins of Israel so blinded the generation contemporary with Christ that this generation could not recognize the truth? Broadly speaking, I think it must be said, as Dr

Dunkerley would say, that inherited blindness was not so culpable as that. He appeals in support of this thesis to three passages, two of which are virtually self-evidencing. They are (a) the 'upbraiding' of the cities of Galilee (Matthew xi, 20-4) because they had not repented; (b) the lament over Jerusalem (Matthew xxiii, 37-9); (c) the scene in Luke xix, 41-4, where Christ weeps over Jerusalem and utters the cry 'If thou hadst known the things needful for thy peace'. I think he is right in urging that the life is taken out of these three sayings if Israel's rejection of the gospel was pre-determined. And so too the drama of Christ's public life is in large measure destroyed, if we fail to see that a change of plan takes place when, about the middle of the story, the response of the multitudes becomes plainly inadequate and the opposition of the authorities hardens.

Theologically we may say that Dr Dunkerley transposes into the field of action the christological truth that Christ had a real human nature, a real human will, and a real human faculty of action. His mission does not merely symbolize, it puts into act, the will of God for the salvation of Israel and of mankind — it is an 'efficacious sign' of that will.

There is a fascinating question, of course, lying behind this exegesis. What was the aim, in the wider historical field, of the 'plan of action' which inspired the first stage of Christ's mission? The Jews, Dr Dunkerley says, 'should have yielded to the moral challenge' of the gospel, 'should have allowed the love of God through (Christ) to conquer the self-will of their hearts and their enmity towards Rome, and then to work out through them in social and political ways. The Jewish nation would then under his leadership have fulfilled its true function and gone forth as a light to the Gentiles — to the moral not the military conquest of the Roman Empire and the establishment of the era of peace and goodwill on earth' (pp. 30 f.). One result of the Jews' 'refusal of God's will' was that, instead of this, Christ was crucified; a second, that the national existence of the Jews was destroyed (it is a good point in Dr Dunkerley's favour that the prophecy of Jerusalem's destruction thus becomes an integrated element in the story); a third, that the Church started its mission much less favourably placed than it would have been if the Jewish people as a whole had accepted the gospel. 'The tragedy of the great rejection has been constantly repeated' in subsequent history, and so far as Christianity has failed, it has failed because, as Christians put it, it has 'not been tried'.

I find myself differing from Dr Dunkerley mainly when he passes from exegesis to theology. Everyone must agree that the purpose that inspired the first stages of Christ's mission and which even explains his final challenge to the authorities in Jerusalem, the purpose, that is, to convert the Chosen People, was in some sense the purpose of God. Are we then driven, as Dr Dunkerley thinks we are, to say quite simply that God's purpose was frustrated? Are we further driven to say, as he appears

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

(p. 183) to hold with A. T. Cadoux, that God's power and prevision must alike be limited by the fact of human freewill? Can we sensibly speak of a 'hope of God' (p. 101) that was belied by the rejection of Christ? It is at this point that an exegete must surely confess that he is as exegete, 'out of his depth'. For here we invade the field of philosophy and mysticism. It is true that exegesis must respect the moral order and the 'moral' perfection of God. But it must respect philosophy and mysticism too. It is philosophically certain that the *mysterium tremendum*, the 'Object' of adoration, is lacking in no perfection, is therefore unlimited in knowledge and power as in love. It is further, I think, certain that the fount of morality and obligation is in all respects infinite.

Theologians and philosophers attempt to meet the real difficulty which impresses Dr Dunkerley by a distinction in reason between the 'antecedent' and the 'consequent' wills of God, and again by a full recognition that God's being (and therefore his knowing) is outside time. God's antecedent will is an *ens rationis* 'corresponding' to the natural and supernatural tendencies bestowed on his creatures. His consequent will is his real will, and it 'takes account', from the metaphysical plane of God's being and knowledge, not only of these tendencies but of creaturely failures to actualize these tendencies; so far as they are failures freely willed by creatures, they are 'foreknown', or rather supertemporally known, by God and this supertemporal knowledge in no way derogates from the freedom of the fallible created agents. These failures do not impose a limit on divine power, because they are permitted by God in creating fallible creatures, and in that sense are in harmony with his consequent will. They are not objects of divine approval because, in their formal aspects as failures, they have no entity but are absences of entity, and what God 'sees to be good' is only (and all) that *is*. But they are *de facto* conditions of the redeeming self-sacrifice of Christ, which is the greatest triumph of divine wisdom, power and love; so that the Church dares to sing 'O felix culpa'. It appears to me that Christ's self-oblation 'unto death, even the death of the cross' must be said to have been the *de facto* purpose of the Incarnation and to express the consequent will of God. And the human will of Christ, while governing his actions by the antecedent will of God, accepted his sufferings in accordance with God's consequent will.

Some such thoughts as these may suggest a certain modification of Dr Dunkerley's treatment of prophecy. He rightly (in my opinion) emphasizes the very large element of 'contingency' in prophecy. Thus when a prophet speaks of punishment to come, he implies (and sometimes states) the condition : Unless repentance precedes the 'day of judgement'; and when he speaks of the glories of the Messianic age he presupposes that men will not prove themselves unworthy of that glory. Dr Dunkerley holds that Old Testament prophecy speaks of only one coming of the Messiah, a coming which would inaugurate 'a time of great prosperity and blessedness' (p. 145), and that it nowhere suggests a failure involving

the death of the Messiah. In particular, the primary reference of the picture of the Suffering Servant of the Lord (Isaiah lii, 13 — liii, 12) 'was surely to someone of the prophet's own time': it was not 'God's intention' to predict, in this passage, the passion of Christ. But he also holds (p. 148) that 'it was a true instinct of the Church . . . which found in the Cross the supreme fulfilment of this passage'. But if the cross is the supreme fulfilment of the passage we are justified in saying that, in the consequent will of God, the passage was genuinely and most fully intended as a prophecy of the cross. When Christ explained to the disciples on the road to Emmaus 'the things concerning himself in all the scriptures', taking his cue from 'Moses and all the prophets', it was doubtless this ultimate bearing of prophecy that he expounded, showing that a suffering Messiah was indeed the mystery towards which scripture pointed ('Was it not destined that Christ should suffer thus and so enter into his glory?'); granted the fact of human fallibility, and granted the actual sins known supra-temporally by God, the Cross was at the very heart of the Messianic mystery.

A New Testament Commentary for English Readers. I: The Four Gospels by Ronald A. Knox. Pp. xv + 276 (Burns Oates) 18s.

MGR KNOX's work for the propagation of bible reading and knowledge is carried a notable step further by this first volume of his projected New Testament Commentary. It is written for those who 'have no skill in Latin or Greek', and for use with the Knox version, and its purpose is to examine 'such difficulties as present themselves to the mind of the ordinary reader', not to increase his background knowledge. It does not offer a theology of the Gospels, but presupposes the doctrines of the Catholic faith and the common teaching of traditional theologians.

An introduction presents the reader with a brief statement of the Synoptic Problem, and as the author refers to my critique of the Two Documents hypothesis, I may be expected to comment on his suggestion that Luke did not have access to Matthew's gospel in its full form, but to a collection of our Lord's sayings, 'derived principally or even wholly from Matthew's Gospel'. It will be observed that this hypothesis does not contradict mine, but adds a refinement to it. Matthew's gospel would retain its priority, but a conjectural source would be interposed between it and *Luke*. *Matthew* would be not the father, but the grandfather, of *Luke*'s 'Q' passages. I have no radical objection to such a hypothesis, provided it can be proved to be useful. But the *onus probandi* is always upon the shoulders of the scholar who appeals to a conjectural document. And I doubt whether a mere collection of the sayings of Christ will satisfy the *data* of the problem. Thus, to give an obvious illustration, *Luke*, having terminated his Sermon on the Plain (which is the same sermon as Matthew's Sermon on the Mount), goes on (in words for which I forsake the Knox version, as it does not fully bring out my point): '*When he had*

completed all his words in the hearing of the people, he went into Capharnaum' and proceeds to tell the story of the healing of the Centurion's servant, in the course of which he quotes sayings from Matthew's version of the same miracle. These sayings include one of our Lord's, but also a long saying of the Centurion. They can hardly have existed apart from the incident in which they are embedded. And the sentence above quoted seems to me to be copied from Matthew, who follows the Sermon with the statement: 'And it happened, when Jesus had finished these sayings . . . And when he had entered Capharnaum', followed by the episode of the Centurion's servant. The close parallelism between the two Gospels here (*Luke* lacks in this context the story of the healing of a leper, found in *Matthew*, but then *Luke* had already, in an earlier context, copied this same story from *Mark*) persuades me that *Luke* was using, not a collection of sayings of our Lord excerpted from *Matthew*, but either *Matthew* itself, or an 'edition' of *Matthew*'s Gospel earlier than the one which has survived. I should like to take this opportunity of trying to meet two difficulties mentioned by Mgr Knox as created by the hypothesis of *Luke*'s direct dependence on *Matthew*. 1. Why did *Luke* regularly follow *Mark*, not *Matthew*, in the incidents he relates and in his order of relating them? My own view is that *Luke* began (in the account of our Lord's baptism by John) to try to weave his two sources together. He found this impossibly difficult and not very useful; it was specially difficult when his two sources started disagreeing over the order of incidents. He, therefore, decided to choose one or the other. We may never know for certain why he chose *Mark* instead of *Matthew*. All sorts of reasons might be suggested, including the possibility that he knew that *Mark* had listened to Peter preaching, and had a high regard for Peter as an accredited eye-witness. 2. Why does *Luke* so often disagree with *Matthew* about the context of a saying? I think that this was to a large extent a consequence of his decision to follow *Mark* in the substance and order of his narrative. This meant that *Luke*'s borrowings from sources other than *Mark* had to be piled up in blocks between his great blocks of 'Marcan material', and it is obvious that in this process the contexts of the Matthean material would frequently have to be sacrificed.

Mgr Knox's treatment of the Fourth Gospel is refreshing. 'It seems to be the reminiscences of a very old man, who has an old man's tricks of narration. He will recall, as if conjuring them up with difficulty, details about names and places and relationships which have nothing much to do with the story. He will give us little footnotes, as if to make sure that we are following; often unnecessary, often delayed instead of being put in their proper place. He will remember fragments of a conversation, passing on from this utterance to that by mere association of memory . . . He will alternatively assume that we know the story already, and narrate it in meticulous detail . . .' Such a passage is worth whole chapters of what passes as 'criticism'.

Now I want to trail my scapular, and I shall not object if Mgr Knox treads hard on it. I wonder, then, whether readers will get the impression that Mgr Knox is too ingenious (I am sure he hates the word) in his efforts to 'harmonize' the apparent discrepancies between the gospels? Does he suppose that the Gospels are like four aerial photographs, taken at various points and differing altitudes, of the same landscape, and that therefore each must be shown to agree in every detail with all the others, once we have made allowance for the difference in the points at which the exposures were made? For myself, I find it easier to think that the correct analogy is not with photography but with painting. If Rembrandt and Goya had each painted the same Spanish grandee it would be a mistake to object that they appeared to contradict each other about the length of his fingers or the fabric of his doublet. Painters do not claim to give photographic truth; but they claim to portray truly, and may penetrate to the essence of their subject to a degree beyond the power of the camera.

After that, I must retire to my corner to make ready for Mgr Knox's counter-attack. I will only add that all English Catholics must feel grateful for the guidance he has offered to us in reading the Gospels. The book is sure to be well thumbed by preachers: but I hope the laity, too, will arm themselves with copies, and be prepared to challenge their spiritual pastors, when these latter dare to disregard the guidance offered to them by one who has done more than any living Catholic scholar in this country to reintroduce the Bible not only to the priest's study but to the layman's treasury of favourite books.

DOM CHRISTOPHER BUTLER

The Word. A Meditation on the Prologue to St John's Gospel by Adrienne von Speyer, translated by Alexander Dru. Pp. 159 (Collins) 10s. 6d.

THE author of this book has already made a name for herself as an inspiring commentator on scripture. She has revived the older method of commenting, an essentially subjective method. But to leave the description there is to misunderstand her approach and to miss all the value which lies in this kind of writing to-day, as did the reviewer in *The Times Literary Supplement*, damning the book with faint praise as an inspiring piece of meditation which however lacked the scholarship or the extent of scriptural knowledge to give it the reputation generally allowed to the author.

Adrienne von Speyer's work has that synthetic approach of which Gustave Thibon has been the chief exponent and leader. This book shows an acquaintance with theology, liturgy and scripture which until recently was considered quite exceptional in a lay person following a vocation in the world — Frau von Speyer is a doctor and a housewife. It also shows a depth of religious experience which until recent years has usually been considered the privilege of the religious 'contemplative'. The book is in fact part of the body of religious writing by lay people that is helping to make the 'development of doctrine' into something more than a notional idea — and of course it was precisely in relation to lay people and

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

consulting them in matters of doctrine that the conception of the development of doctrine had its origin, both conceptions being part of the great seminal work of Cardinal Newman. Perhaps it is not insignificant that much of this new writing by lay people on doctrinal matter is taking place on the continent where finely printed editions of all Newman's works are now easily available, whereas in this country his works have long been out of print.

Frau von Speyer's work is at times Germanic — Mr T. S. Eliot is quoted in the blurb as calling it 'eccentrically French' which may come to the same thing; and Mr Dru, the very capable translator, warns the reader in a preliminary note: 'the meditations are concentrated: the writer never pauses or hesitates in revealing the sense of the text. The book, therefore calls for the reader's undivided attention and co-operation. Read hastily it will seem obscure and taken in too large doses will leave a sense of confusion.'

The best thing seems to be to give some examples from the book, and thereby, it is hoped, to recommend it.

'The unspoken word is no less essentially part of a true conversation than what is said. Words are supported on the unexpressed foundation of a common understanding in love. This foundation is the reciprocal, the essential, the absolute word. It does not need to be expressed, but assigns all the relative and explicit words their place, and expresses itself in them. In prayer this unspoken word of love is deposited in the grace of God. When a man uses a particular form of words to God and says he will love him above all things, it is probably untrue as among relative words, since he still loves the world and does not live exclusively for God. Yet God accepts the words in grace, accepts them for what he has already given the man, as a fully affirmative Yes; God hears the word in all the fullness in which it is deposited in him (p. 34).'

'In all I and Thou relationships, love is both life and light. As life it is the bestowal of personal affection, as light it is a universal love radiating in all directions: the love of God and of one's neighbour. If love is not light its life suffocates. It is not only in the family, but in the wider circle of society as a whole that the light begins shining in the darkness. Love must allow others to be other; it must accept the proximity of other circles, in which others are related not to it, primarily, but to God . . . All this is fulfilled in the relation between Christ and the Church, the relationship which gives its final and redeemed form to the relation of man and woman and to every form of human society' (p. 62).

On marriage and on the Church, we have echoes of some of the early Fathers; this is a return to a theology, that uses the fundamental images of human life, but which is also enlightened by the personal experience of them, and is made actual in particular modes of these images.

'It is because the blessing of children is left open that Christian marriage remains open towards the Church. Every Christian marriage is blessed

by God and is fruitful in him, whether through the blessing of children or the blessing of sacrifice. If God chooses the second alternative the spiritual fruitfulness of marriage is increased and widened out invisibly so that it flows into the whole community. The natural and supernatural fruitfulness of marriage and of the Church form the inseparable unity. A vocation to the priesthood or to the religious life may lead to the extinction of a family but to the beginning of unending fruitfulness in the Church.

'The Church, too, knows the double meaning and mystery of blessing, either as fruitfulness or as sacrifice, for God decides whether a community is to be rich and fruitful, or humanly speaking, sterile. Whether the blood of martyrs flowers in the miracle of a new Christianity or whether the persecuted Christianity of a whole country disappears, seemingly without fruit. In this mystery the Church and marriage are one' (p. 101).

JOHN M. TODD

Jesus Christus—Mittelpunkt der Weltanschauung (1st Vol.) by Adolph Vykopal. Pp. 224 (Nauwelaerts, Louvain and Ferdinand Schöning, Paderborn, 1953) n.p.

THE Greek gods, 'looking only at their respectable side . . . are poor ignoble conceptions ennobled bodily only (as if they had bodies) by the artists, but once in action and motion worthless — not gentlemen or ladies, cowards, loungers, without majesty, without awe, antiquity, foresight, character; old bricks, young bucks, and Biddy Buckskins'. So thought Hopkins in a letter of 1885 to Bridges. Since that date, especially since the advent of analytical psychology, they have come to be taken much more seriously. But even the Jung-Kerenyi interpretation does not raise them beyond the level of psychology.

For Adolph Vykopal, however, their importance stretches beyond the psychological into the spiritual. He regards the Orphic movement — whose influence he claims to detect in many of the brilliant figures of classical Greece — as a parody of the Messianic hopes which God was breathing into humanity at that period. The Orphic movement was an attempt by Satan to deflect the course of world-history from its movement towards its centre in Jesus Christ. A similar agency was at work in the spread of the teachings of Confucius, the Buddha and Zarathustra.

Vykopal's intention of displaying the world as Christocentric is admirable, and he has devoted great energy to the study of Orphism, but his rather startling familiarity with the plans of Satan has the same effect as many investigations concerned with Satan: the Old Enemy slyly begins to occupy the centre of the stage. The result is the opposite of what was intended — again this is not without its parallels. For we should expect that a Christocentric interpretation of history would throw more light upon history than positivist or Marxist interpretations do; Vykopal's work left me more aware of the darkness. Perhaps subsequent volumes will have the more desirable effect. I hope so.

DONALD NICHOLL

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

The Spirit of Love, based on the teachings of St Francis de Sales, by C. F. Kelley. Foreword by Jacques Maritain. (Longmans) 21s.

This is a work of outstanding value. It seems to me indeed one of the best expositions I have read of the Christian spiritual life considered as a creation of grace continuous from the ordinary Christian life to the heights of contemplative prayer. The more regrettable therefore is it that it should be marred by one serious defect. But of this later. It is not only gracious, but simple justice to dwell on the many merits of Mr Kelley's work.

There is wide and thorough knowledge by no means confined to the writings of St Francis — this, surely, rather than François is the name by which we know him here — but widespread not only through the field of Catholic mysticism but to the Anglican William Law and beyond the Christian pale to Hindu and Buddhist religion. Indeed not one of the least merits of the book is its recognition of the profound truth to be found in the religious philosophy of the East and the use made of it to illustrate Catholic spirituality. Mr Kelley has confirmed a long cherished conviction that Catholicism presents the *via media* between a mainly non-mystical Protestantism and the pantheist or semi-pantheist misinterpretation by the Hindus of what is nevertheless a genuine mystical intuition of Godhead and union with it.

Mr Kelley expounds his subject matter with an admirable clarity and arranges it well in six chapters: '1. Love: The *Via Media*. Devotion. Philia (the Catholic synthesis of Eros and Agape). 2. The Theology of Love. 3. Love and the World. Love and the Lay Apostle. *Laborare est amare*. Marital Love. 4. Love's strategy. Purgation. Meditation. *La Posture de Suavité*. 5. Love in Contemplation. The Methodless Method. Quiet Repose. The Wounds of Love. Union. 6. Love in Practice. The Little Virtues. 'Desire nothing and refuse nothing.' These headings of themselves reveal a thorough grasp of Salesian spirituality. And the exposition is everywhere supported by well chosen quotations. As I read, the thought pressed upon me: Does not St Francis's teaching as it is here explained cover the ground of spirituality and its mystical climax? Has St Thérèse added anything? Is not her little way precisely the way of little virtues and ordinary duties which is St Francis's path to sanctity? And, as Mr Kelley himself points out, De Caussade's sacrament of the present moment is Salesian.

In view of what seems to be a growing Christocentric reaction against the mysticism of transcendent Godhead stemming from the pseudo-Denys and St Gregory of Nyssa, I was glad to see the latter upheld by Mr Kelley, both on his own behalf and as the mysticism of St Francis. He truly observes in a note: 'Is it not true that unless Christianity is presented to the educated Easterner as that of St Dionysius he will be unable to accept it?' We must not suppose that Mr Kelley confines himself to expounding, however well, the teachings of St Francis. Not only, as I have pointed

out, does he corroborate and enrich them from his own extensive and detailed acquaintance with mystical literature, he gives us profound insights of his own. Too many to be quoted in a review, I can present only a few particularly striking examples.

'If he (a disciple of St Francis) would speak of the spirit of man as being athirst, it would be athirst not to have reality but to be reality' (p. 24); 'Salesian love occupies the *via media* between oriental immobility and Western preoccupation with time and change. Its good is not life nor is it eternity. It is eternal life' (p. 24); 'The God postulated by the operation of pure love' is 'the nearest we can get to God in himself' (p. 26); 'Because God is superpersonal he can be personal to us' (p. 44); 'The misery of man' is 'to have lost the divine oneness; the greatness of man to have kept the divine likeness' (p. 46); 'Instead of pride of life divine humanism', better termed Christian humanism, 'teaches joy of life' (p. 52); 'The whole universe is God's love. He thinks, he loves, and immediately all things become crystallized, exist and live' (p. 56). Too long to quote is a passage admirably showing St Francis's — may we not say Catholic? — theology as the reconciliation of God's transcendence and immanence (pp. 56-7). Time and eternity are only 'distincts', not opposites. 'Eternity is the realm of the spirit, that supreme point of the soul, and time is the realm of the psychic self' (p. 74). But Mr Kelley's language here is ambiguous — though the human spirit touches eternity, because it is created it is not, cannot be, eternal. 'The source of all' (God) 'is in himself the substance and in the world the shadow' (p. 82). A most valuable passage points that, although men in invincible ignorance may attain sanctity outside the Church she offers her children inestimable treasure. 'Love has its heart in eternity but its feet are in time' (p. 93); 'Symbolism is the vision of the infinite in the finite' (p. 99); 'The real . . . is simply the supreme will which gives itself to God' (p. 111); 'Perhaps we are too prone to reduce prayer to science rather than science to prayer' (p. 164). This introduces a shrewd criticism of depth psychology. Its value is fully recognized but we are wisely warned against its liability to induce a morbid self-consciousness and its confusion of what may be called the middle depths with the centre of the soul — Mr Kelley calls them psyche and spirit. When we reach 'the sovereign degree of divine love', 'we will realize that on the divine side all is unsounded mystery. All becomes mystical to the genuine mystic' (p. 203); 'Simplicity implies quiet repose. But we cannot *make* quiet. We can only *make* noise. Quiet can be gained only by stopping the noise' (p. 167). I am unable to accept as it stands (p. 229), the statement that prayer is always a means never an end. For prayer is essentially union with God and that is man's end. The context, however, makes it clear that Mr Kelly has in mind the exterior expression of this essential prayer and he continues with this fine passage: 'The man who has perfected the spirit of love is always doing the same thing all day and all night. He is reading a book or working in the garden.'

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

... or eating or sleeping or praying' (explicitly). 'But all the time he is secretly aware that he is doing just what God wants him to do in each moment. All the surface actions are merely the result of one underlying intention, like a river, which passes over rocks and falls, turns one way and then another, widens into a lake and narrows into a gorge, but all the time the act of flowing remains the same.' Such sayings as these are pregnant with a significance to be extracted by meditation. But even in these few quotations one is conscious that Mr Kelley's language is not always adequate to the thought it is obviously intended to express. And this brings me to the defect, the serious defect, to which I alluded at the outset. Mr Kelley does not know how to employ with due precision the writer's medium, the English language.

Once more space forbids me to adduce all the instances of faulty language I have noticed. Some even are to be found in translations from the original French. For Mr Kelley, it would seem, though making considerable use of Dom Mackey's translation has introduced translations of his own. There are, it is true, a number of obvious misprints and it is not always possible to be sure whether a mistake is a misprint or a genuine mistake. But there are only too many of these. Sometimes they render the meaning of the writer's words different from what the context or his point of view proves it to be. 'The higher self and the spirit, that is to say the God within the person were considered', by the scholastics, 'one and the same' (p. 39). An unfortunate and certainly unintended pantheism of language. And the same must be said of the statement: 'Detachment from things . . . means attachment to that greatest and most significant Self of which we are but infinitesimal parts' (p. 127). Or again, 'The world is an unimportant and superficial characteristic of the reality of God' (p. 181).

But most mistakes are just abuses of vocabulary. 'That men should neglect knowledge of a higher order for the sake of science . . . is a sorry dilemma' (p. 6). 'God had cut out for him a mighty order' (p. 12). 'Induced' is used of an unsuccessful attempt to induce (p. 15). 'Keeping religious emotion within the bounds of *wonderment* and reason' (p. 19); 'either overly sentimental or overly impassive' (p. 25); 'The sacrament, the rite, the deed, the dogma . . . unless viewed in the light of pure love will produce merely human ends' (p. 26); 'A complete summation' (p. 30); 'the sentimental attachment others may have formed of this incident' (p. 10); 'A long and slow tendering process' (p. 36); 'for which a special debt is to be paid to Father D'Arcy' (p. 36); 'the most highly revealed solution' (p. 59); 'a man searching with all of his attributes for the truth'; 'Intraspecies warfare, specialization, bigness, these three life-destroying diseases' (p. 96); 'Penance must be made' (p. 125); 'These impairments never cease to plague the human heart' (p. 137); 'to assume *suavité* toward God' (p. 139); 'under a judicious and hidden form' (p. 130); 'an understanding of this psychological insight' (p. 116); 'the fickle and

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

illogical aspects of the importance attached to intricate techniques' (p. 160); 'The recordings of those who knew him mention' (p. 8); 'There is a variance meaning a difference' (p. 124); 'This longing must be tendered with a great respect'; 'without losing the features of their primitive originality' (p. 273).

If Mr Kelley's book is to be worthy of itself, and that is no slight worth, its language must be carefully and thoroughly revised.

E. I. WATKIN

Guide to the Bible by the Monks of Maredsous. Translated by Gerda R. Blumenthal. Pp. 92 (Sands) 3s. 6d.

THIS excellent guide to the Bible was originally written in French as an introduction to the Maredsous popular edition of the Bible. It is well translated into English and would be very suitably incorporated into future English editions of the Bible. It contains, in 92 pages, all the knowledge essential for profitable Bible reading. Attention is drawn to the papal encyclicals on the Bible and there is a short account of the history of the Hebrews and a chart giving the main Bible dates. In the section 'The Bible is general', there is an explanation of the meaning of Inspiration; the functions of the Biblical Commission are mentioned, and the reader is told about the various literary forms to be found in Scripture, with the consequence that 'it is our task to determine whether the authors intended a word in its proper sense or perhaps in a figurative or metaphorical sense'. This section also gives the meaning of the word 'Bible', a list of all the books, and a word about the language they were written in and how they were translated into Greek and Latin.

The greater part of the guide consists of short introductions to each of the books of the Old and New Testaments which include accounts of their doctrinal and historical contents. The introductions to the Old Testament books also have good selections of the most interesting and important chapters. The selections are particularly helpful for Job, Psalms, Judges and the Prophets. The introduction to the Epistles of St Paul and to Hebrews is helpful and serves as a guide chapter by chapter. The last page of the book repeats and emphasizes that the Divine Revelation teaches religious truth and not scientific facts.

DOM CHARLES HALLINAN

The Text of the Epistles, a disquisition on the Corpus Paulinum by G. Zuntz. The Schweich Lectures of the British Academy, 1946. Pp. xi + 295 (Geoffery Cumberlege) 27s. 6d.

MODERN critical editions of the New Testament show a large measure of agreement. This, as Dr Zuntz observes (p. 8), is due to the fact that the editors 'follow one narrow section of the evidence, namely the non-Western Old Unicals', especially (we may add) the great fourth century B and N. To take us back to about the beginning of the third century

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

we now have for the Epistles of St Paul (including *Hebrews* but not the Pastorals) the Chester Beatty papyrus, p 46. Dr Zuntz's very important Schweich lectures are an attempt to use this new evidence, in conjunction with what was previously available, in order in some measure to bridge the gulf between the extant manuscripts and the originals.

In pursuit of this aim he argues against the rejection *en bloc* of the Byzantine text', and he makes an important distinction between the so-called 'Western' textual tradition and the real Western textual tradition. The Byzantine text, which is broadly speaking common to all the late MSS., results, he thinks, from an officially imposed revision of the seventh or eighth centuries. The real Western tradition is to be sought in the bilingual MSS. D (Codex Bezae, or Claromontanus) F and G, in the old Latin, and in some Western Fathers. The so-called 'Western' text is really a name covering both the real Western tradition and the *detritus* of texts popularly current throughout the greater part of Christendom in the second century A.D. When the real Western tradition is supported by the Byzantine text or the 'Western' text outside genuine Western witnesses against the Alexandrians we have a reading that must go back to a point before the Western tradition diverged (i.e. to the second century); and the fact that such a reading is negated by the Alexandrians is not necessarily decisive against it.

In THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW, 1951, p. 95, the present reviewer wrote: 'From the point of view of recovering the official text . . . the great problems of the present time are the so-called Western text and the pre-history of the "Alexandrian, recension". Dr Zuntz does a great deal for the elucidation of the latter problem. P 46, despite an admixture of so-called "Western" readings (there are some of these even in B), turns out to represent a proto-Alexandrian stage (thus my statement, *ibid.*, that the Chester Beatty papyri give some evidence "apparently unaffected by the Alexandrian recension" requires correction); Clement of Alexandria and Origen also bear witness to this proto-Alexandrian stage, and a brilliant study of 1739 seems to justify Dr Zuntz's use of this minuscule as another reservoir of proto-Alexandrian readings. B itself stands with this proto-Alexandrian group rather than with the later Alexandrians, and "is in fact a witness for a text, not of c. 360 A.D. (when it was actually written), "but of c. A.D. 200" (p. 83). The so-called "Cæsarean text" was, in his opinion, in its earlier stages a part of the general proto-Alexandrian tradition; there was a revision along this particular line of tradition, but it was the fourth century revision of "Euthalius". Another source of proto-Alexandrian readings is the Coptic versions, which must have "branched off", if not originated as versions, not much later than the date of p 46. The proto-Alexandrian group of witnesses is mainly comprised of: "p 46 B 1739 sah, boh, Clem (Al) orig" (p. 156).

Two questions are of supreme importance: 1. Did the so-called 'Western' text, which while it sometimes preserves the truth against all other

witnesses, is yet manifestly often corrupt, have a single origin? 2. Was the 'Alexandrian text' the outcome of a single recension made — it must be said, in view of the new evidence — before A.D. 200 — or what was it?

1. If I understand Dr Zuntz correctly, he has reached an important conclusion in reference to this question. The popular text of the second century (i.e. the text which is witnessed to by both East and West but is often contradicted by the Alexandrians) had 'a large amount of agreement in error which makes it impossible to connect this early text, in its essence, directly with the archetype' (p. 266), since in that case the Alexandrians would have had no source or reservoir for their (correct) opposition to many of these errors. These errors probably represent 'the accumulation of alterations in various copies which were subsequently collated . . . the whole process [i.e. collation of copies and hence the constitution of the popular text] must have been carried out at a very early date and at some central place' (p. 267). In other words, a non-critical 'recension', probably early in the second century, lies near the source of almost the whole of the non-Alexandrian tradition of the text. This, it seems to me, must be Dr Zuntz's meaning, though this 'recension' fails to obtain representation on the chart at the end of his volume which is described as 'An Attempt at a Graphic Presentation of the "Stream of the Tradition"'. But if Dr Zuntz believes in this early non-Alexandrian, non-critical, 'recension' he concurs, as to the fact, with the conclusions drawn by H. J. Chapman (*Rev. Bénédictine*, 1912, p. 252) from the 'harmonizations' in the 'Western' (Dr Zuntz's 'popular') text of the second century (it should be observed that Dr Zuntz is speaking of the Pauline *corpus*, while Chapman speaks more generally): 'Before Marcion the three synoptists had been harmonized with one another, with St John, and with St Paul. It is obvious that it must, therefore, be quite incorrect to assert . . . that the first collection of New Testament writings was that of Marcion. He evidently took his Luke from a tetrevangelion. And with the four Gospels were certainly all those other books from which harmonistic readings were borrowed — nay all those books which show these Western (i.e. Dr Zuntz's 'popular') characteristics . . . I believe there are a large number of converging arguments to prove this collation earlier than Marcion's, to have included the four Gospels, Acts, the chief Epistles of St Paul, the Apocalypse, with I Peter and I John.'

2. The odd feature about the Alexandrian textual tradition is not that it witnesses against the errors of the 'popular' tradition, but that in certain respects its opposition increases with the lapse of time (in the first three or four centuries) — that not infrequently a correct reading is preserved in a later Alexandrian witness against the combined evidence of the 'popular' and the proto-Alexandrian texts. How can this be explained? Dr Zuntz argues that the Alexandrian readings are the result not of a single recension of the text, or of the throwing into the arena at a single given moment of the evidence of a single remarkably pure

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

manuscript, but of the persistent activity and influence of a school of textual criticism comparable with that of the Alexandrian school to which the text of Homer is so deeply indebted. And he thinks that to this 'school' we owe the formation of the Pauline *corpus* (including *Hebrews* but not apparently the Pastoral Epistles) at a date which is probably $\pm$ A.D. 100. That there are difficulties in this hypothesis anyone can see. How in particular were the later Alexandrians able to dig up and publish readings which appear to have escaped the attention or to have failed to commend themselves to the proto-Alexandrians? But it is doubtful whether any hypothesis doing justice to the facts can escape this particular difficulty. Moreover Dr Zuntz has himself (in *Revue Biblique*, 1950, pp. 50-82) shown that in the history of the Harkleian Syriac text the same phenomenon occurs: 'J was a manuscript' of this text 'very inferior in quality to C and O, though some four hundred years older than they. The first generations to use the Harkleian version were those whose mind was most steeped in the classical Syriac version.' Similarly he points out (*ibid.*, p. 582), that the tradition of the Latin Vulgate was obscured, especially in its first stages, by the persistence, in most copies, of the older versions which it was meant to replace.

My impression is that Dr Zuntz's 'disquisition' will prove to have been a milestone in the history of textual criticism. We must lament that we have no witness for the Gospels comparable with p 46; but inferences with regard to the text of the Gospels and the formation of the *corpus* of the four Gospels (the *tetrevangelion*) may be permitted on the basis of the new light thrown by that papyrus on the text of the Epistles. And lest anyone should imagine that these textual questions have little bearing on the more general problems of New Testament scholarship, we may refer to Dr Zuntz's claim that the textual evidence for the absence of 'at Ephesus' from the first verse of *Ephesians* is a very strong argument against the theory of that epistle's origin which is associated with the name of Dr Goodspeed; a strong argument for the view that *Ephesians* was not composed by the person responsible for publishing that collation of letters which *Ephesians* (if not authentic) presupposes.

DOM CHRISTOPHER BUTLER.

The Water and the Fire by Gerald Vann, O.P. Pp. 187 (Collins) 12s. 6d.

MANY of the books which are written nowadays merely tell us what is wrong with the world: but in this very useful book Fr Vann gives us some practical suggestions as to what each of us can do to re-order the chaos.

'The experience of the race repeats the experience of the individual . . . the world we live in reflects and expresses to a great extent the inner world of our own souls.' So we must first try to discover what is wrong with ourselves before we can hope to help others. Fr Vann analyses the causes of our anxiety-ridden and neurotic restlessness, of the frenzied

tempo at which we live, and shows us that these are the result of the loss of our roots in nature, the loss of symbols, of community life, etc. But underlying these characteristics is the deeper fact of the impoverishment of the human spirit, which causes life to become 'unreal', and which may lead to a final eclipse of the spirit in the life of our society, if nothing is done to remedy it. There is therefore only one thing for us to do, to relearn what we have lost and then to experience it, to live it.

Few would deny that the development of science is to a large extent the cause of our more materialistic outlook in the world of to-day. Even though we have to admit its successes and triumphs, nevertheless it seems to be true to say that 'we have made science kill reality instead of illuminating it'. Why? It is not simply because science has developed largely into a weapon of physical destruction, but rather because it is a weapon that destroys the psyche: science more than anything else lays emphasis on one of the four functions of the psyche to the relative exclusion of the others, on the reason to the relative exclusion of sense, feeling and intuition. Fr Vann quotes from D. H. Lawrence who said that 'Knowledge has killed the sun making it a ball of gas with spots; knowledge has killed the moon, it is a little dead earth fretted with extinct craters as with smallpox; the machine has killed the earth for us, making it a surface more or less bumpy, that you travel over'. It is good to know what science has to tell us of the sun, but we have lost the other sort of knowledge 'the great purring lion, the sun-god who goes down at night into the sea to be re-born next day at dawn'; and it is this that we must recover, 'for we are perishing for lack of fulfilment of our greater needs, we are cut off from the great sources of our inward nourishment and renewal, sources which flow eternally in the universe'.

If we are to make our lives real we must make them natural, which entails the development of the whole personality. So the task of education is not merely to teach us to know facts about things but also to know the things in themselves, to know 'the ontic in things'. We must learn to stop and be still and look so that the objects may reveal their mystery to us; we must learn that the first thing is to receive and accept; 'we must open the mind and heart to reality and let it flood in and take possession'. In other words we have to regain the sense of mystery and love and reverence.

In this respect it is clear that Fr Vann attaches very great importance to the use of symbolism, for three of the central chapters in his book are devoted to this subject. 'As we lose touch with real things we lose the lessons which we should learn intuitively from them; we forget humanity, symbols.' Throughout history men have learnt something of the deeper secrets of life from symbols, but to-day they are lost to us. The modern way of life ignores symbolism and so loses a very important means to the discovery and to the understanding of the deep truths about our human nature and human destiny. But the Church, which teaches us

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

human, is full of the use of symbols in her daily life, and it is in the struggle above all that the Christian will find himself rooted again in nature and in humanity, for his religion itself is rooted in their deepest realities. Therefore we must learn, not only by listening to and assimilating the Church's dogmatic teaching, which we might call the 'rational' side of the Church's life, but also by living her daily life, 'living the Church's symbols'.

So far most of the emphasis has been on the individual. But we must not forget that man is a social animal and therefore needs both to help and be helped by others. This has its immediate application in the married state, where man and woman become united in one flesh. 'Man adventures in ideas, in scientific discovery and invention . . . woman remains the conservator: keeping and pondering in her heart the words, the experiences which life brings, looking beyond the immediate to the ultimate, and thus gradually acquiring her rich store of intuitive wisdom'; so each has something to offer for the completion of the other's personality. The same is true in a broader sense of community life, the life of the family and the life of society as a whole: each of us has something to offer society, just as society has something to offer us. And here again, as indeed throughout the whole book, the themes of death and re-birth, the darkness and the light, appear — as Fr Vann has told us elsewhere, 'Co-ordination implies subordination'.

In conclusion, the Christian to-day seems to think of his religious life as something which affords an escape from the problems which confront him in his natural life. In doing so, however, he is only introducing into his own life the gulf between matter and spirit which is ever widening in the world to-day. Perhaps the chief message which Fr Vann has for him in this book, and which he effectively conveys, is that he must integrate his spiritual life with his natural life; he must build the spiritual on the natural, for 'holiness includes the fulfilment of human nature'.

DOM KEVIN TAGGART.

Selection One edited by Cecily Hastings and Donald Nicholl. Pp. xxi + 216 (Sheed and Ward) 15s.

THE editors of this selection tell us that they have made it because of the spectacle of a disintegrated world. There was disintegration before Christ brought back unity with his Incarnation. The Renaissance began to split that unity once again by reintroducing the polytheism of humanism. Scholars set their own gods up and performed their own private acts of adoration. But the Olympus of the contemporary world is peopled with many more gods than either that of ancient paganism or its Renaissance imitation. To-day it is not only scholars who have private cults. There are gods on the cinema screen and the football field as well as in politics and sociology. More than at any other time each man is a god to himself, looking to no authority other than his own. Each man is a specialist,

almost completely cut off from everybody else. And specialization, the editors stress, is one of the chief causes of disintegration. To see this for ourselves we must look at the universities. 'Specialization in learning has been taken so far that experts in one subject cannot even speak the same language as experts in some other subject, they move in quite different worlds' (vii). And again: 'If our modern institution is more properly described as a multi-versity, that may well be due to the fact that most of us live in a multi-verse, a broken world, and one in danger of splitting up entirely, because we cannot believe in an all powerful being sustaining and guiding it towards a harmonious end' (viii).

Against disintegration and the specialization that causes it the editors set, as the object of this book, 'a human being as unspecialized intellectually as Professor Kälín has proved him to be biologically' and so capable of 'an affirmation of faith in the universe'. The means by which they hope to effect this affirmation of faith, this remedy against specialization, consists of thirteen articles, the first of which is on evolution, the second on primitive religion, the next three on psychology. Of the remaining eight articles, three are devoted to scripture, two to theology, two to divided Christianity and one to philosophy.

Here then we have the reason for this book, its purpose, and a summary of its contents. Let us look at each in turn and see whether we can arrive at the same conclusion as the editors.

Specialization is certainly, we feel, an abuse, if it is exaggerated. We ought, however, to analyse our motives for being against it very severely. Are we satisfied that our dislike of it is not prompted by boredom at the never-ceasing grubbing in our own subject of study? We find that there are many exciting subjects to be studied besides our own and we make excuses to ourselves for looking at them. Even if our motives are pure and we are genuinely disturbed by specialization, are we sure that our alternative — here we move to the second point — will not cause more disintegration in the universe than specialization itself? The danger of being unspecialized is the danger of being uneducated. It invites dilettantism and smattering, and can be a deterrent to a real grasp of anything. 'Man', wrote Cardinal Newman in his *Idea of a University*, 'is made to view, to criticize, the sensible data before him, to refer effect to cause, to put them into a system and stamp them with one form. He is impatient if he cannot do so, hence "offhand sayings, flippant judgments, shallow generalizations".' The judgment of the specialist will be less flippant than that of the dilettante. The former does know something, and since right action can only be founded on firm knowledge we must prefer narrow knowledge to no knowledge at all.

Our third consideration brings us to the crux of the business. Will the contents of this book provide a remedy against the dangers of specialization? Or will it merely foster dilettantism? The flyleaf of one of the books in the Downside library bears the following inscription in Edmund Bishop's handwriting: 'The butterflies of theory have no place

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

n a handbook of this type'. We feel that the same cannot be said of this book. It is difficult to see why any one article should have been chosen for the editors' purpose rather than any other, why Neuer religion should figure rather than the apostolate of the Eskimo, why psychology should give man a greater faith in the universe than dialectic. We wanted to affirm our faith in the universe with the editors but we were bewildered by the variety of articles and were at a loss where to begin. If this were professedly an anthology we should have been content to admire and savour each bloom as it came along and then to pass on to the next one without any further worry. But this was a selection, we reminded ourselves, with a purpose, and solitary sniffs were not enough. We wanted to treat the flowers as though they were growing in the open, to see how they looked in their natural background, to note how they were related to one another. We wanted to take them in as a whole. We tried hard, but they still remained, very beautiful as some of them were, separate blooms, each cut neatly from its roots, standing in an artificial bowl of cold water. The remedy to specialization is not theory. It is grounded thinking, following the main root of a deep fixed plant and then exploring the lesser and more horizontal roots. The specialist is better off in this respect than the theorist. He is certainly grounded with a firm root. His trouble is that he cuts off the horizontal roots and so the rest of reality. The theorist on the contrary tries to attain his universality from above. He sees a lot of pretty flowers and picks what takes his fancy. Rootless, they soon die on him and he must needs wait till next spring for another bunch. To apply grounded thinking as a positive suggestion for this book we submit that the Scriptural articles, which are its best part, could have been expanded to cover the whole. This would have given us our main root. In the following editions we could have followed out the roots subsidiary to Scripture through the Fathers, through theology, through philosophy and so on. In that way we would have reached in time a grounded grasp on the whole of reality, and so make our act of faith in the universe.

In sum, we do feel the danger of specialization in the world to-day, but we feel even more the danger of dilettantism. We repeat, specialization cannot be countered by theory. If we return to the universe of the Medieval University we must needs return to grounded thinking.

DOM LAURENCE KELLY

Society and Sanity by F. J. Sheed. Pp. 225 (Sheed and Ward) 10s. 6d.

It is not easy to be just to Mr Sheed's book. It has many fine things in it but also many things which ought to be disputed. The fine things are fine because they are properly and admirably commonplace—a good, clear exposition of the Catholic teaching on marriage for example—and therefore hardly call for comment. The reviewer is driven to concentrating on disagreements but under the protest that this is a good book and worth reading.

On the first page of the book we find this:

'People making engines study steel, people making statues study marble, people making social systems should study man, for man is as much the raw material of social systems as steel is of engines, or marble of statues.'

By this 'study' we shall get the answer to the question what man is and the necessary first principles with which to make a proper social system. Of a piece with this is Mr Sheed's criticism of Marx:

'Karl Marx did not make the error of thinking what man is does not matter: he merely made an error as to what man is.'

But surely Mr Sheed has quite obliterated any distinction between an ideological approach to society such as the Marxist and a truthful, realistic approach, which pays more attention to what men are than to what man is. It is characteristic of the ideological method that principles are deduced and blueprints manufactured: it is assumed that men are like engines or plants or whatever, appropriate analogies are drawn and principles erected to which men are required to conform. But men are persons and must be treated like persons not only in the flesh but in abstract discussion too, which means that for the most important purposes they are quite unlike either railway engines or statues and that being made in God's image is not at all similar to being made of steel or marble. Mr Sheed's approach will do for the physiologist but not for the social thinker.

Mr Sheed's first principles are presented as the assumptions of western, *né* Christian, civilization and one is allowed to suppose that like Marxist social principles they are drawn from history. In fact, Mr Sheed's principles are the fundamental doctrines of revealed religion and as such cannot possibly be social principles. The fundamental difference between Christianity and Marxism is thus here concealed: the dogmas of Christianity are not simply different from those of Marxism, they refer to an altogether different sphere of existence, whilst the fundamental Marxist dogma is that there is no sphere of existence outside the social other than inanimate nature. Christian dogmas are only social at all in that they have to be lived with by Christians who accept them, in the state to which it has pleased God to call them. It is surely this supernatural character of Christian dogma which has enabled Christian social thinking to take that radically sceptical and empirical approach to social problems which is usually called traditional. Tradition is hardly mentioned in Mr Sheed's book.

It seems to this reviewer that Mr Sheed shares with the ideologue his horrible method and that like him he supposes society to be much more artificial than it really is. He wants to build society one way, the Marxist say, another, both seem blind to the fact that society is not built at all.

In the end Mr Sheed's society compares with real life much as a Meccano model compares with the real thing. There is a resemblance but it is only a model: it is so much easier to find out how the parts of a

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

model are screwed together than it is to appreciate the proper relations of the real thing.

It only remains to add that Mr Sheed is fortunately inconsistent and that in spite of all this he manages to say excellent things about sex and marriage, and that he is very good on the estrangement of English Catholics from English society.

ERIC JOHN

Plotinus by A. H. Armstrong. Pp. 173 (Allen and Unwin) 10s. 6d.

PROFESSOR ARMSTRONG'S reputation in the field of Plotinus studies stands so high that it would be an impertinence for one so much less qualified in that field to pretend to be able to sit in judgement on his work. It will be sufficient therefore to give some indication of the contents of this small volume, which forms one of the series of Ethical and Religious Classics of East and West. In the Introduction, after telling us what is known of the life and writings of Plotinus, Professor Armstrong goes on to consider the background of the *Enneads* and to discuss briefly the thought of Plotinus. This is clearly the most important and the most valuable part in the book, for the reader to whom it is presumably directed would make little of the selected extracts in translation without the preliminary explanation. But many who are not unfamiliar with the doctrines of Plotinus will be grateful to have so readily available a succinct and clear statement of those doctrines.

The remainder of the book consists of translated extracts, first from Porphyry's *Life* and then from the *Enneads* themselves. The latter have been rearranged by Professor Armstrong and do not follow the original order. This seems to be a useful and helpful procedure, since we are now presented with Plotinus's treatment of selected topics — the three hypostases, *Nous*, souls, etc. — in a way which beginners will welcome and others will still find worth while.

St Augustine, in his *Confessions*, makes such significant acknowledgements of the influence on his intellectual and spiritual development of the writings of Neo-Platonists that no one who is interested in the development of Christian thought can fail to recognize the importance of Plotinus in the story of Christian philosophy and theology. We must therefore be immensely grateful to Professor Armstrong for this addition to our education. It is true, of course, that the Platonic suspicion of the body has been allowed to influence overmuch the thought of some ascetic writers, but it is none the less important to remember that it is possible to be a good Christian without necessarily being a thoroughgoing Aristotelian. Any work which helps to broaden our approach to the attempt to state ultimate truth in human terms is therefore to be welcomed. This is one amongst many reasons for being grateful for this book.

T. CORBISHLEY

A History of Philosophy, Vol. III, *Ockham to Suarez* by Frederick Copleston, S.J. Pp. x + 480 (Burns Oates) 30s.

ALTHOUGH this latest addition to Fr Copleston's survey of the history of philosophy might be regarded as the second volume on medieval thinkers, it does in fact bring us well into the modern period and deals to a large extent with an outlook that belongs more to our age than to that of St Thomas. Suarez and Victoria carry on the scholastic tradition, but they are of the sixteenth century as truly as Maritain is of the twentieth. Nor does this volume deal with the scholastics alone: ample space is rightly allotted to Francis Bacon; the scientific movement of the Renaissance and the political philosophy of Hooker and Grotius are also treated at length.

Beginning with the fourteenth century, Ockham inevitably looms as large in this volume as Aquinas in the earlier one. The apparent inconsistency between the cold logic and the political partisanship of the former is satisfactorily resolved: 'Ockham was an independent, bold and vigorous thinker, who showed a marked ability for criticism; he held certain clear convictions and principles which he was ready to apply courageously, systematically and logically; and the difference in tone between his philosophical and polemical works is due rather to a difference in the field of application of his principles than to any unreconciled contradiction in the character of the man' (pp. 46-47). The difference between Ockham and Aquinas in their theories of universals is shown to be more subtle than is sometimes supposed: in their denial of extra-mental reality to universals they were at one; the difference was due to the Augustinian strain in St Thomas which led him to accept in the simplicity of the divine mind *universalia ante rem*.

In the chapter on mysticism the ease with which certain texts of Eckhart and others could be given an heretical interpretation is shown to be consistent with perfect orthodoxy of intention on the part of their authors. More perhaps might have been said about the difficulties of the Dominicans, charged with the task of preaching in the nunneries of their Order, in presenting for the first time a German version of the precise scholastic terms. And the only important omission from an amazingly full bibliography noted by the present reviewer was of J. M. Clark's *The Great German Mystics*,¹ which would be particularly useful for further reading on the subject of this chapter.

Fr Copleston takes his task as historian very strictly, being particularly careful to search out the philosopher's precise views and to set aside his own sympathies and antipathies. If he calls Molina's opponents Bannezians rather than Thomists, that is because historically those opponents were led by Bannez and the question of their claim to be maintaining the views of St Thomas is outside the scope of such a book as this. Naturally, a Jesuit may be expected to give a good account of

¹ Blackwell, Oxford, 1949.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Suarez. This is particularly lucid and the profit is wholly ours, for Suarez as a very great philosopher in his own right and a distinguished interpreter of his more illustrious and better-known predecessor.

A good history of philosophy should send readers back to the sources and that is certainly what Fr Copleston would wish, but — stimulated as we are by his exposition — that is largely impossible in this period. All except the few who have opportunities of research in some of the older university libraries will have to come back to this volume even to know what some of the greater philosophers said. Much editing is still necessary for Ockham, Nicholas of Cusa and Suarez; and the last edition of any of the works of the late fifteenth century Aristotelians was in 1567.

EDWARD QUINN.

Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. German text with English translation. Pp. 232 + x (Basil Blackwell) 37s. 6d.

WHEN a philosopher has succeeded in changing the map of philosophy, shifting frontiers and demarcating the boundaries of possible knowledge, it seems odd that his final pronouncement should, in effect, be a recommendation to roll up the map of philosophy. Yet such a pronouncement Wittgenstein seems to have made in the concluding aphorism of the *Tractatus*: 'My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.' In the years that followed the publication of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein considerably modified his original views, and instead of trying to fit language into the grid of his logical schema, he tried to make his logic more flexible, fitting it to the actual contours of language itself. Since he was compelled to travel over a wide field of thought, criss-cross in every direction, Wittgenstein describes his book as an album, a number of sketches made in the course of long and involved journeyings. It was his plan to publish his old and his new thoughts together, so that the latter could be seen by contrast with and against the background of his old way of thinking. And indeed, so closely does Wittgenstein focus his attention on the problems that first provoked the writing of the *Tractatus*, that unless these problems are fully appreciated, the clarity gained by consequent readjustment is lost. Wittgenstein wished to define the limits of language. Explorers had gone before him, dropping clues — notably Frege and Russell—but Wittgenstein's account, though it owed much to both, was to differ from theirs in many respects. Those who once sailed to what they supposed to be the edge of the world, naturally did so with trepidation; but their training enabled them eventually to see the world in the round, and Wittgenstein's has been similarly rewarded.

If we were asked to show by means of a graph the very rules of graphical representation, we should be at a loss to know what to do; we could only refer again to the graph in the hope that the rules which we could not represent thereon, *showed* themselves, made themselves evident. Similarly with the rules of language, or with the laws of logic; although these cannot be stated, they *show* themselves. If we formulate the universal proposition: 'All propositions are either true or false'—we have framed a proposition that refers to itself and is, therefore, an exception to the rule we intend to lay down. Since the law which we mean to assert as unconditionally true must itself apply to what we have written down, it would seem to elude our most persistent attempts to formulate it: in this sense it cannot be expressed, though, in Wittgenstein's phrase, it shows itself.

In order to escape from such inherent paradoxes, Russell elaborated his *Theory of Types*, and in connexion with this coined the useful expression, 'systematic ambiguity'. A different solution has been offered by Dr Waismann who groups statements according to the similarity of their usage in distinct domains, in language-strata. He has convincingly shown that such words as 'truth', 'verifiability', and 'meaning', have a systematic ambiguity varying with the several kinds of statement to which they apply. His picture of language naturally stratified into layers is at variance with the over-simplified picture which Wittgenstein gives in the *Tractatus*. But Wittgenstein himself reacted against the rigidity of his earlier views, and approaching the same problem from a different direction seems to have reached a similar position. He describes our language as 'an ancient city; of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods: and this, surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight, regular streets and uniform houses'. To Dr Waismann our language, in that it conceals different logical systems, appears to be like a maze of lines running into one another without yielding a very precise contour. To both philosophers, language is a labyrinth of intersecting paths. A reader, afraid of losing his way in this labyrinth, may perhaps be excused if he follows the thread that seems to him to lead to the centre. It is a familiar route and it takes us back to the Law of Excluded Middle.

Wittgenstein introduces the problem as follows:

'To say that a proposition is whatever can be true or false amounts to saying: we call something a proposition when *in our language* we apply the calculus of truth functions to it. Now it looks as if this definition — a proposition is whatever can be true or false — determines what a proposition was, by saying: what fits the concept "true", and what the concept "true" fits, is a proposition. So it is as if we had a concept of true and false, which we could use to determine what is and what is not a proposition. What *engages* with the concept of truth (as with a cogwheel), is a proposition.'

But this, continues Wittgenstein, is a bad picture, since the proposition

— only a proposition can be true or false — can say no more than that we only predicate 'true' and 'false' of what we call a proposition.

'And what a proposition is, is in one sense determined by the rules of sentence formation (in English for example), and in another sense by the use of the sign in the language-game. And the use of the words "true" and "false" may be among the constituent parts of this game; and if so it *belongs* to our concept "proposition" but does not "*fit*" it.' By 'does not "*fit*" it', Wittgenstein appears to mean, does not *determine* the proposition, and is not, therefore, *a priori*.

One is led to see in the antithesis of true and false — those contrast-words that exhaust the field of possibility between them — a mould into which our thought is forced, and it is against this view that Wittgenstein's remarks are directed. 'If we think that any feature of our language and thought is absolutely necessary, this is nearly always because we have not made the effort of imagination needed in order to project ourselves outside our habits.' Wittgenstein asks us not to regard ourselves as inevitably bespectacled and obliged to look through lenses respectively marked 'true' and 'false'. We can always take our spectacles off. None the less, it is doubtful whether we shall see any better if we do succeed in removing our spectacles; it is more likely that we shall find ourselves groping about the labyrinth without hope of ever escaping.

Although truth and falsity, represented by 1 and 0, constitute the basic categories of a two-valued logic, we may suppose $p = 1$ means that p is certainly true, and $p = 0$ means that p is certainly false, and $p = \frac{1}{2}$ means that p is neither certainly true nor certainly false. This function has the value $\frac{1}{2}$ when both p and q have that value. But although p and q may be in doubt, 'Either p or q ' admits of no doubt. Just as white or not-white exhaust the possibilities only within some limited universe of discourse — that of colour, for instance — so with true and false. There are various assertions which are neither true nor false because concepts are indeterminate with respect to what falls outside their definitions. This is a point on which Dr Waismann insists, and indeed was appreciated by Occam when he maintained that singular propositions about future contingent facts were not determined as to truth or falsity. But, according to Occam, the law of excluded middle was not thereby denied, for the disjunction 'A or not A' is always necessary and true: by subtracting certain consequences from its sphere of influence the scope of the law was limited.

The introduction of a graduated scale of truth-values is not particularly helpful. A three-valued logic with its intermediate value of $\frac{1}{2}$ gives the misleading impression that there are *degrees* of truth. But surely, when we say that something is half-true, we are referring to the *evidence* we have for the truth? Dr Waismann's picture of the many-level structure of language, and Wittgenstein's picture of family resemblances between groups of statements, have much in common with a logic constructed on a large number of truth-gradations. It may readily be granted that words

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

like 'true', 'verifiable', 'meaningful', are systematically ambiguous, referring as they do to language-levels. But have they nothing in common? What of the logic of the element common to the varying uses of such words?

Logic may be like a game of Happy Families in which we collect statements according to their family-resemblances, but as Wittgenstein admits, 'If rule became exception and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency — this would make our normal language-games lose their point'. Most certainly it would; but is any language-game conceivable in the conditions that Wittgenstein here envisages? Without some principle of consistency there can be no language at all; and in such a principle the law of excluded middle appears under another and less cumbersome name. The point has been made clearly and convincingly by Professor Barnes: 'The rules of any game must conform to what, since it is not an arbitrary rule, we may call a principle, the principle of consistency. For example, if I am given permission to make what rules I like for a game of snakes-and-ladders, I may make a rule that anyone reaching square 17 goes down to square 6, or that anyone reaching square 17 goes up to square 62. But I am not at liberty to make both these rules, since they are mutually inconsistent.'

It is impossible, in the space of a short review, to do justice to the range and penetrative power of these investigations. Wittgenstein describes philosophy as 'a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language'. He studies the behaviour of our forms of expression from many different angles, he asks us to look at the sentence as an instrument and its sense as its employment, he shows us how problems arise through our entanglement in the rules we have laid down; by distinguishing the surface-grammar of a word from what he calls its depth-grammar, he puts many problems into clearer perspective, and sometimes, to use his own phrase, he succeeds in condensing a whole cloud of philosophy into a drop of grammar. Whereas the style of the *Tractatus* is oracular and aphoristic — its elucidatory propositions contained all tightly packed within each other like a succession of Chinese boxes — the style of the *Philosophical Investigations* is, by comparison, diffuse and at times almost domestic. A modest programme for philosophy is set forth: 'We must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its power of illumination — i.e. its purpose, from the philosophical problems.' A modest programme, but essentially a reverent one.

IAN DAVIE

Choir of Muses by Etienne Gilson, translated by Maisie Ward. Pp. 192 (Sheed and Ward) 12s. 6d.

THIS excellent translation of an interesting book which, though slighter than the author's other works, is the product of a learned and thoughtful mind. The 'muses' with whom the author is concerned are the women who have been the inspiration of great art. The curious thing about the

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

women who have been 'muses' is that they have received an ideal existence in their admirer's mind. This kind of love has affinities with the Platonic love described in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*. Though the element of homosexuality among the Greeks disgusts, their very homosexuality hindered the normal consummation of love and, in the best cases, led to a transcendental relationship. The stirring of sensuality was the beginning of a glimpse of ideal beauty. Yet the artists themselves tend to explain their experiences of love in terms of religion. There seems to exist a living unity between love, art and religion.

The reader may gather incidentally that the archetypes in the author's mind are Dante and Beatrice and the Troubadors, but the actual cases which Professor Gilson considers in separate chapters are Petrarch and Laura, Baudelaire and Madame Sabatier, Wagner and Mathilde Wesendonk, the philosopher Comte and Clotilde de Vaux, Maeterlinck and Georgette Leblanc, the Brownings (the exception which proves the rule) and Goethe's last amorous adventure at the age of seventy-four with a girl of seventeen. Each case seems to follow a pattern. With Petrarch, Baudelaire, Comte and Goethe, the love originates in sensuality alone, and its frustration by the woman's refusal causes the poet to live on the memory of the original experience as a continual source of inspiration and consolation. With Wagner and Maeterlinck, the love is studied for the sake of their art and the love's frustration is almost essential to the birth of the artistic work. Artistic technique, as Balzac noticed, is paralysed under the tension of lust. Wordsworth, it may be remembered, defined poetry as 'emotion recollected in tranquillity'.

The next stage is discernible when the 'muse' is idealized and becomes the object of religion. Laura had the happy effect of drawing the repentant Petrarch back to God. But Baudelaire's women are idols by his own confession, although they may have had the happy effect of relieving his pathological condition. The melodramatic love of Comte for Clotilde de Vaux is humorously pictured, and the progress of the religion of Clotilde from dulia through hyperdulia to latria gives excellent entertainment. What seems to happen to the artist is exemplified by Professor Gilson in Goethe's experience — 'a flash of that elementary reality . . . a child's face gave him a glimpse of Paradise' (p. 154).

The three elements in the evidence, Art, Eros and Religion are brought together and related in the two final chapters. The reason why certain great works of art have been conceived in the love of a man for a woman, so that their birth seems as natural as the birth of a child, seems to be twofold. On the side of the artist, there is a primeval urge to produce. The artistic process is like thought in that it moves from pregnancy to delivery. On the side of the source of inspiration, the beautiful face and body are desirable only in so far as they are the means of attaining intelligible beauty. The 'muse' exists to produce what the Troubadours called 'delight', an interior exaltation or ecstasy. At this point art touches

and may diverge from religion. 'To serve God through art is all the more difficult because the urge towards perfection, always alive in the heart of the genuine artist, is an irresistible temptation to serve art as if it were a god' (p. 190). The great artist in a sense by-passes morality. He glimpses what fundamentally satisfies man fully. 'Poetry even at its purest is not prayer; but it rises from the same depths as the need to pray' (p. 191).

This is a book calculated to stimulate thought pleasantly and may be useful in giving a jolt to those of a 'positivist' inclination.

DOM BERNARD MOSS

Be not Solicitous. Sidelights on the Providence of God and the Catholic Family, edited by Maisie Ward. Pp. 254 (Sheed and Ward) 12s. 6d.

THIS is a collection of fourteen pieces about and by Catholic families to-day, all but one in America. Nearly all have small incomes, nearly all have big families, nearly all are obviously very happy, and equally obviously owe that happiness to their faith. But the true stories presented here, autobiographically, are not superficial; the happiness is the fruit of suffering and hard experience. The book is introduced by a 57-page essay by Maisie Ward, entitled 'Plea for the Family'. The whole makes good reading. Maisie Ward is her usual perceptive self. The stories are all strikingly authentic and Christian. If anyone doubts that the Christian family stands in the place of battle to-day, let him read this book.

Most of these stories have been written or collected under the influence of the apostolate in America which is grouped round the *American Catholic Worker* and *Integrity*. Here is an aspect of American Catholicism which is still not too well known in England. Two paragraphs in Maisie Ward's introduction may open up a new viewpoint for many people:

'All sociology, Fr Vincent McNabb used to say, should begin from the Gospels; this remarkable formula appears all the more striking when we study its application in such a country as the United States. Because the States are so immensely rich and so far advanced in all the applied sciences, the idea has grown up in Europe, and especially in France, that they are more materialistic than other countries. No one looking impartially at France and at the States feels much inclined to concede this. French materialists (of whom there are many) are every bit as materialistic as American materialists. And American idealists (of whom there are also many) are perhaps the most complete idealists in the world to-day. For when he gives up his materialism the American has more to give up of goods and of opportunity — and he gives up, as he gives, lavishly and wholeheartedly.

'The cult of poverty, to be seen in so many of our stories, is one example of this new and generous American sociology, the cult of the family is another. Next comes the abandonment, when possible, of urban civilization, the constant search for the great ideas and ideals of Christianity in the Bible and in the Christian Classics, the increasing effort to base all life on trust in God's Providence.'

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

The mention of Fr Vincent McNabb's name is a happy gesture. Many Catholics in this country regard his work and that of the 'Distributists' with whom he was associated as a failure, and in any case quite irrelevant. A closer analysis will reveal that it has been and still is immensely fruitful. There are many aspects of the fruitfulness of this 'failure'. The stories in this book are witness to one of these aspects.

The book's title is well justified by the stories. The families have tried out this particular piece of what some would call 'perfectionism', and found that it works. The husband and wife give their last dollars to a destitute family even poorer than themselves, and at the very moment they are doing it, unexpected help is on the way to enable them to buy food for the coming week, for which otherwise they would have no money. They take it literally: 'Seek ye first the Kingdom of God'. One story is of a couple whose first child was a total mental defective. The social coldness to the big family is a constant theme, along with the 'advice, sarcastic and solicitous' from more 'prudent' folk. However, from several stories it is clear that as the family grows bigger still and happier and healthier and more Christian with it, it becomes its own justification and becomes the 'advisor' rather than the 'advised'.

As Maisie Ward remarks, this book comes into the French category of *témoignages*. We need more of this sort of 'witnessing' and 'giving of evidence' in the English language. This is the life of the Church to-day. There is only one story from England in this book, that of Molly Walsh and the English *Catholic Worker*. We may hope that a collection of stories from England may be made in the not too distant future.

JOHN M. TODD

Analecta Monastica, Deuxième série, by Dom Jean Leclercq, O.S.B., monk of Clervaux. Pp. 206 (*Studia Anselmiana*, Vol. XXXI. Rome, Pontificum Institutum S. Anselmi; Orbis Catholicus, Herder, 1953) n.p.

MAINTAINING his purpose of making us better acquainted with the thought of the monks of the Middle Ages in theology, spirituality and monastic life, Dom Leclercq here presents a fresh collection of writings by eight different authors, from the VII to the XIIc (cfr. *Downside Review*, 1950, Vol. LXVIII, pp. 101-03). Two of these writers are anonymous, one being hitherto known as Macarius, the other a monk of Bec, in Normandy. We know the rest at least by name, but for several not much detail can be added about their *curriculum vitae*. What is to be sought here is not so much historical fact as the thought of these men on matters of perennial interest. Most of these texts were known before by some entry in a catalogue; or by some allusion, often laudatory, made by a scholar such as Dom Morin or Dom Wilmart. The publication of Dom Leclercq now puts these texts at the disposal of everyone.

First he gives us the Prayer about vices and virtues of Ambroise Autpert (eighth century), completed in the eleventh century by Jean de Fécamp.

This is essentially an ascetic writing in which we encounter ideas that are part and parcel of monastic tradition; Jean de Fécamp adds an introduction and a conclusion, as well as a few passages insisting above all on grace and God's action to help human weakness. The sermon on Perseverance for monks, falsely attributed to St Macarius, is later in date than St Benedict. When he is delineating the essence of monastic life (a Christian life, realized logically, completely), the author draws his arguments and examples, not from monastic history as one would expect, but from the Old Testament, proposing several of its figures as models for monks. For him the Bible is the book of all books. In his Introduction Dom Leclercq calls our attention to various parallels along this traditional point of view which he has studied elsewhere. The third text is the Exhortation to love of the cloister by Guillaume Firmat, who lived in Western France towards the close of the eleventh century: the author is but little known, whereas his themes are familiar; the cloister is compared to paradise, he speaks of the holy and delightful leisure of monastic life which draws all its value from the fact that the monk is busied with holy reading; Firmat develops the theme of the mystical marriage with Wisdom, more clumsily, it is true, than the great mystics were to do from the fifteenth century onwards. He also explains mystic flight: by detachment and contemplation the soul rises to God and lives in contact with him. The text of this document is based on an Oxford Manuscript.

Interesting though these texts may be, English readers will be particularly pleased to find here several of their compatriots: Elmer, who was prior of Canterbury from 1128 to 1137; Gilbert Crispin, abbot of Westminster and Odo, another prior of Canterbury, then abbot of Battle in 1175, dying in 1200. Almost half the volume, pp. 45-140, deals with these authors and their texts. In the forefront stands Elmer with his spiritual writings, and Dom Leclercq affords him a more detailed introduction than the others. Of Elmer we have sixteen letters, drawn from various manuscripts; as a rule they are written to men known to us only by their Christian names, no other precision being possible; one of them, the fifth, is addressed to Richard, prior of St Pancras of Lewes; the next, a very short one, to a monk of St Peter's, Gloucester, Nicholas, who lived under abbot Gregory: it is being sent together with two meditations: the first, where the soul is roused to seek her God, is printed here after the letters; the second, a complaint of God's absence, is to be found in Migne's Latin Patrology (t. 158, 709-22) and so is not reprinted here. Elmer enjoyed the reputation of an expert in spirituality; he was much consulted and requested for spiritual advice. His letters are his replies to these requests: they bear the stamp of letters of direction, or else are merely letters of friendship, and according to which is the case they may be very long; the fourth to archdeacon Thurstan occupies 374 lines: the fifth to Richard of St Pancras is a little treatise, *De bono vitae claustralis*,

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

oo lines long; the eighth on the Flight of the saints, that is their flight from the dangers besetting the soul, is of 287 lines; several others are about 100 lines long. Elmer pours out his soul and speaks with complete naturalness of what fills his heart: monastic life, whose qualities he extols as he contrasts it with life in the world, and then celebrates the various elements that compose its grandeur and its security: separation from the world, contemplation, union with God, communion with angels and saints, peace of soul (*pacificus aliis sibiue tranquillus*), absorption in the desire for heaven which assures its stability; it is a life given over to such exercises as will liberate it from the world and sin and unite it to God. At the centre of Elmer's spirituality is his search after God, with firmness of desire and hope, with humility that breaks our self-will, with the joy of the Holy Spirit. All this doctrine is to be found in Elmer's pages, whether he is writing to lay-folk recommending them to choose the cloister, or is conversing to friends already in monastic life, stimulating their fervour by letting them share those sentiments which overflow within him. His writings are, however, of unequal value: there are admirable pages, felicitous expressions and well rounded phrases, there are also wearisome passages. He draws from authentic sources of monastic tradition, especially from St Gregory the Great and other Fathers.

Gilbert Crispin's letter had been many times listed, and most recently by R. W. Southern, but never published. It treats of the nature and utility of monastic life, which the author presents as the fulfilment of the baptismal promises, and as a new baptism: it is the most perfect way of living the Christian life: it is offered to all and everyone is free to enter upon it, even clerics, whose bishop cannot withhold them. Of the texts of Odo of Canterbury (a letter, some biblical commentaries and some twenty-five sermons) Dom Leclercq gives extracts only, in which Odo expounds his view of the relations between monastic profession and baptism and the forgiveness of sin.

We are somewhat remote from Elmer with the anonymous monk of Bec, seventeen of whose letters Dom Leclercq publishes here. He must be dated about the middle of the twelfth century. Each of these letters is a studied little masterpiece, composed according to all the rules of its kind: they enable Dom Leclercq to give more precision to what he has written elsewhere concerning medieval letter-writing: though addressed to individuals, they are intended for public reading: they were enjoyed as were the writings of Cicero or any other classic. They are letters to intimates and friends into which considerations on monastic life find their way, often expressed beautifully; these views are in line with what is usually found among monastic authors in the Middle Ages. He is a sensitive soul; he seeks spiritual friendship; in the monastery he finds just those souls with whom he can commune; it happens also that he suffers from being misunderstood, yet even when smarting at a friendship broken, he can still be cold to another who needs his affection. He has

his detractors: to them two of his letters are addressed: the author, who is naturally in the right, has a sharp pen and can prod the steel within the wound. We may well wonder how such sensitiveness can be held to coexist with the detachment demanded of the monk. Still, he is zealous for good observance; several of his remarks are singularly apt; in two or three of his letters he complains that things are not going too well at Bec, he even solicits the intervention of the archbishop of Rouen.

Finally, Dom Leclercq tells us of Geoffroy d'Auxerre, St Bernard's successor at Clairvaux and his biographer, and of his witness to Cistercian life and the part the monks played in those hard times for the Church. This final study is a homage to St Bernard on the occasion of the eighth centenary of his death.

As Dom Leclercq has done well to point out, the witness of all these men is important, because it is not the witness of great abbots or monastic leaders, but of personalities in the second rank who speak quite naturally of the life they are living to others engaged in the same life. They afford us a living picture of monastic life in the Middle Ages; what interests us is not so much their originality (originality is only to be found in the ways things are said), as the unanimity of the witness they present.

In a second edition a few faults need correction, e.g., p. 105, l. 49: for *Os hominis*, read *Os homini*; p. 122, l. 88, *intercidi*—read *interdici*; p. 157, l. 22, *quae iniquitas in ea*—read *quae iniquitas mea*; p. 165, l. 19, *interdecete*—read *intercedente*; p. 176, l. 6, *quae auferetur* should be *quae non auferetur*; p. 113, l. 135-6, *nos consentientibus daemonibus suggerentibus* should read, *nos consentientes* (or *consentiendo*) d.s.

DOM HUBERT DAUPHIN.

Medieval Religious Houses: England and Wales by D. Knowles, R. N. Hadcock. Pp. xxiii + 387 (Longmans) 42s.

In 1940 Professor Knowles published a small hand list of some of the vital statistics of the religious houses of medieval England, and a list of corrections and addenda in the *English Historical Review* for 1945; in 1950 Mr Hadcock published his ingenious map of Monastic Britain. The present volume is a work of collaboration between these two authors, in which all the previously published information is combined with a great deal of hitherto unpublished material into one large work of reference. A similar volume for Scotland is promised. The authors have placed every student of medieval history in their debt as a result of their valuable and extensive labours.

The principal additions to the previously published lists are the inclusion of the military orders, hospitals and colleges, together with such ancient Celtic monasteries as survived into the later period. More information about all the houses is given, chiefly details of income and numerical strength. The special problems of early monasticism, English and Celtic, fully justify the authors' decision to decline any systematic account of the houses of this period.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

The lists of facts and figures are preceded by a short and lucid survey of the main trends of English monasticism, for which Professor Knowles is responsible. It is difficult to imagine that many of the users of this book will not already be familiar with the fuller works of Dr Coulton, Professor Knowles himself, Dr Little and other historians of English religious foundations. On the other hand this introduction will be most convenient for quick reference to the salient facts and dates. Occasionally one wants to quibble at some of Professor Knowles' statements. He writes:

'... the hierarchy of England between 970 and 1066 was largely recruited from the monasteries and its influence was directed towards their support ...'

Is not this generalization too-confident? At Wells for example, the reformed English monasteries provided an unbroken succession of five bishops between 974-1033. The next two bishops, Dudoc and Giso, were probably recruited from the royal chapel and neither was monkish nor English. The accession of Cnut probably had more influence on the English Church than Professor Knowles seems to allow for; some churches, e.g. Worcester, seem to have lost a good deal of land. Professor Knowles is far too kind to the two mendicant archbishops of Canterbury. Walter Mauclerk became a Dominican in 1246 not 1244 as Professor Knowles implies.

The facts and figures which form the major portion of the book are most illuminating and occasionally very surprising. The conventional picture of the later middle ages as a slow, uninterrupted, decline is contradicted by a steady rise in the number of religious between the years following the Black Death and the years immediately preceding the dissolution of the monasteries. A more detailed account of the methods used for obtaining these figures would have been welcome, since 'in a great number of cases they have had to be estimated from valuations and by comparison'. The resulting figures suggest 'the religious population of the country in 1500 was a little less than threequarters that of the maximum reached two centuries earlier'.

But some of the Houses for which direct evidence is available hardly bear this out; the Dominican Friaries for example, whose population can sometimes be got directly from the public records, seem to show a rather greater proportionate decline, which may of course be due to special causes. Perhaps it would be possible to balance the few cases where direct evidence is available against the more conjectural estimates, thus providing a valuable check, or perhaps this has been done already? Too much cannot be built on mere numbers in any case but it looks very much as though we may have to revise some of the received notions of later medieval history.

No work of this kind is ever finally closed, small pieces of evidence turn up from time to time and constant revision is required. I would suggest the following emendations. *Dominican Priory, Winchester*: There

is a reference to the establishment of the Dominicans here in some synodal statutes of Peter des Roches c. 1222-8 in *Bodl. Hatton MS.* 82 fo. 154 r. (and v. Cheney. *English Synodalia*, pp. 75-6). It is doubtful if Peter's intentions were carried out immediately but the reference is worth a mention. *Dominican Priory, Hereford*: An earlier reference is found on the Liberate Rolls, *Calendar*. 1245-51, p. 45. This advances the *terminus ante quem* by only a few months, but unlike the reference to the Close Rolls quoted by the authors, it has the advantage of being quite unambiguous. The authors do not include either the Franciscan or the Dominican houses at Berwick, presumably they are to be included in the Scottish volume. But Dr Little, *Franciscan Papers*, p. 22, points out that the Berwick Franciscans were established by 1231 and in the custody of Newcastle. Later political changes moved them to the vicarage of Scotland, but they have a better right to the English connexion and are so treated by Dr Little, v. *Studies*, p. 6, n.i. A Dominican house was established at Berwick before 1241. *Cal. Patent Rolls*, 1232-47, p. 262. The separation of Llanthony Prima from Llanthony Secunda (Augustinian Canons) in 1205 ought to be mentioned. v. *Cotton MS. Faustina B. i. fo. 23 v.*

It seems a pity that a compendium of facts should be issued with an *imprimatur* since this must cause scandal to many of the book's likely users.

Roman Gaul by Olwen Brogan. Pp. 250 + x (Bell) 21s.

THE author of this book has set out to give the general reader a concise account of Roman Gaul. The material for a comprehensive narrative history is lacking; much of the evidence is archæological, and thus from the nature of the case a popular, readable account of Roman Gaul is an almost insuperable task. The author cannot then be blamed too much if she has failed to do this. She has given us instead a sketchy political narrative, a little social and economic history and some useful information about what can still be seen of a number of the more interesting classical Gallic towns. It is surprising that no mention is made of the fascinating controversy over the chronology and causes of the decline of Roman Gaul. In general, the book is innocent of any serious attempt at historical explanation.

There is, however, a good deal of interesting information gathered together here, and the intending traveller in France will find much to help him see things he might otherwise have missed.

As a work of popular history, the book is manifestly inferior to Mr Turville-Petre's *Heroic Age of Scandinavia* and Mr Wallace-Hadrill's *Barbarian West*, both of which are published in Hutchinson's University Library and sell at less than half the cost of *Roman Gaul*. ERIC JOHN

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Some Thoughts on Beethoven's Choral Symphony and other Musical Subjects by Ralph Vaughan Williams. Pp. 172 (Oxford University Press) 5s.

It is a curious fact that many modern musicians feel little attraction towards one whom they unhesitatingly regard as one of the very greatest composers — Beethoven. Admiration there undoubtedly is for his towering genius, but admiration does not always lead to love. Dr Vaughan Williams is one of many to whom the early nineteenth-century idiom is naturally repugnant. His 'natural love', he tells us, 'is much more the Gothic-Teutonic idiom of J. S. Bach and his predecessors', so that it is, so to speak, in spite of himself that he has to acknowledge the supremacy of the Ninth Symphony. In fact he regards this work, together with the B Minor Mass and the St Matthew Passion, as the greatest of choral music. But, while admitting that this Symphony is an unapproachable masterpiece, he is not blind to its imperfections. Moreover, unlike the typical 'pious Beethovenite', who tends to deplore the choral finale, Dr Vaughan Williams believes it to be 'potentially the greatest of the four movements', though still by no means flawless.

The great merit of this fifty-page essay is that it attempts to explain precisely what it is in Beethoven's technical procedures that the author finds distasteful. In fairness to Dr Vaughan Williams the whole essay should be read; but if one were to select the main point against which he directs his criticism, it would seem to be Beethoven's too slavish adherence to conventional procedure in adding ornamental variation to his melodies:

'A great melody is for all time. When Beethoven, and often, Mozart, start ornamenting their melodies they seem at once to make them of their period and there they remain. Surely if a melody is to be ornamented at all the ornament should grow naturally out of the original thought, and not be mechanically added to it by a stereotyped process.

When Bach adds ornament to a melody I feel that this is the direct outcome of his overflowing emotion. When Haydn ornaments a melody it seems to me to be the natural childlike joy in a new plaything. But with Beethoven the ornament seems introduced by a conventional procedure. As soon as a melody has been stated simply it must be subjected to a process of appoggiature, turns and trills which are almost mechanical in their application' (p. 4).

After his introductory general criticisms, the author conducts us through the Symphony step by step, extolling its glories, deploring what he regards as its weaknesses, telling us quite frankly what he finds distasteful, but in the end leaving us in no doubt about its supreme greatness. That such tribute should come from one who is clearly not in sympathy with the composer adds enormously to its significance and indeed its interest.

There follows an almost haphazard collection of less important writings on various musical subjects, including tributes to Holst and Stanford,

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

discussions on the inadequacy of mere score-reading compared with living performance, on composing for the films and, perhaps most interesting of all, the author's musical autobiography. Dr Vaughan Williams confesses himself a great Bach lover, so that his essay on 'Bach the Great Bourgeois' ought to have been well worth reading. Unfortunately, however, it begins badly with an unconvincing tirade against those who prefer their Bach as Bach wrote it, and from this bad start the essay never really recovers. He describes the Bach oboe as 'one of those bagpipe instruments' and the Bach organ as a 'bubble-and-squeak type of instrument' (p. 123). As he does not hesitate to say of Bach that 'Homer occasionally nods', he will presumably not take it amiss if in this context we apply the phrase to himself.

Throughout the book the reader is constantly aware of the author's most noteworthy characteristic: his utter sincerity and freedom from cant. His aim is always to say, not what others want to hear, but what he himself really feels. Whether as composer or as author, there are for him 'no canons of art except that contained in the well-worn tag, "To thine own self be true"' (p. 141). This manifest personal sincerity is but the consequence of a deeply serious attitude towards his art. 'It was not so long ago', he tells us, 'that the *Encyclopædia Britannica* could define Art as an ornament on the fringe of life, and to this day *The Times* classifies a performance of Bach's Passion in a church under the heading of "entertainments". But the mass of the people have by this time realized that music is not only an "entertainment", not a mere luxury, but a necessity of the spiritual if not of the physical life, an opening of those magic casements through which we can catch a glimpse of that country, where ultimate reality will be found' (p. 120).

DOM GREGORY MURRAY

COMMENTARY

GERMAN REVIEWS

THE situation of the Austrian monasteries is the subject of an interesting article by Willy Lorenz in the November issue of *Wort und Wahrheit*. He is particularly concerned with the manner in which the running of parishes has interfered with the monastic life over the past hundred years. Reputable as is the source of the disturbance, such an abnormal situation cannot be accepted with equanimity and in fact there have been several attempts at reform but without much success. It is not a question of taking over one or two parishes in the immediate neighbourhood of the monastery, but of making parochial activity the predominant function of the monks. When some monasteries had as many as thirty parishes to administer, it is not surprising that in the 1920's the public office of Matins was restricted to the most important feasts. From the Reformation until the present-time, 'anyone who entered an Austrian monastery did so, not in order to become a monk or canon, *but to become a parish priest*' (author's italics). Not unnaturally such men strongly resisted attempts at a reform which would have imposed on them a life for which they never supposed they had a vocation. Of course the shortage of secular priests remains a problem, but it is not solved by effectively destroying the religious life over a large part of the country.

In a recent number of the *Clergy Review*, it was stated that Bernhard Bonkamp's *Die Psalmen nach dem hebräischen Grundtext* had been prohibited for use in Catholic institutions as not being in accordance with approved principles of interpretation. A review in the *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* (1953, No. 3), apparently written before the prohibition, suggests that this is a comparatively mild censure. The origin of the psalms is said to belong, almost without exception, to the period immediately before and after the Babylonian captivity; not a single psalm is attributed to the author named in the title; Psalm 44 is described as a marriage song for the nuptials of Achab with Jezebel, because Tyre is mentioned in v. 13.

Fr Lotz in the fourth issue of *Scholastik* for 1953 finds in Heraclitus of Ephesus an impressive anticipation of later thought on man as a hearer of God's word.

E.Q.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

DEAR SIR,

Mr Alasdair Macintyre, in his friendly review of *The Meaning of Existence*, has asked for certain clarifications, chiefly as regards my part of the book. For most of these — which open up the whole question of epistemological realism — I must refer him to other books by Dom Mark Pontifex or myself, but one may be offered here. Mr Macintyre asks what the proposition 'God exists' can mean if existence means 'things-as-related-to God'. I had tried to deal with this in various places, in particular on pp. 111 and 176. My contention was that there is a sense, implied by common speech, in which we *cannot* say 'God is'. In this sense we say 'so-and-so is', and we refer to so-and-so as part of a system which requires a source in order that it may be a system. I have not maintained that 'is' *must* be used in this sense; I have allowed that a phenomenalist may mean by it merely 'so-and-so is appearing to me'. This contention seems to me to have nothing to do with ghosts, prime numbers, logical techniques, and other pre-occupations of modern analysts in which Mr Macintyre is interested.

I may perhaps be allowed to add that 'a certain weakness in logical techniques' ought to mean, in my opinion, a certain illogicality, if it is to be relevant here. The only example of illogicality offered by Mr Macintyre, so far as I can see (apart from that just mentioned), is the expression 'the assertibility of objects', which, according to him, should be changed to the 'assertibility of propositions'. But that is tantamount to the suggestion that propositions cannot be shown to refer to objects, and brings us back to the epistemological issue. Without hoping to settle this to Mr Macintyre's satisfaction, I would remark that, unless the way in which (if we do think) we inevitably think reveals to us the way in which things are, we are condemned to an absolute scepticism; here, as with other questions which Mr Macintyre raises (including the question whether existence is a predicate), it seems to me that it all comes down, in the end, to an appeal to a metaphysical intuition and that one might as well say so at the beginning.

Yours, etc.,

DOM ILLTYD TRETHOWAN

DOWNSIDE NEWS

ON Saturday, 3rd October, Fr Abbot received the Solemn Vows of Dom Kevin Taggart. Dom Kevin was made a sub-deacon on Sunday, 18th October.

THE following received the Habit from Fr Abbot on Sunday, 27th September: John McCarthy (Br Anselm), Christopher Walter (Br Stephen), Franklin Kelley (Br Placid), Christopher Armstrong ('48-'53: Br Anthony).

IN our last number we made short reference to Mr Tolhurst's valuable gift to our library; his liturgical collection of printed books numbered about 2,000 items and of these he allowed us the choice of books not already at Downside, the rest, which includes a complete set of the Henry Bradshaw Society's Publications, many out of print, he has given to Worth Priory; our share has now been catalogued and it becomes possible to give some account of it.

These books are mainly liturgical, being almost equally divided between liturgical texts and books related in different degrees to the study of liturgy. Perhaps the most notable single volume is a little Cassinese Breviary of 1506 which carries the inscription:—

Hic Libellus est ad usum
Domini Gualteri Baldew(y or i)
Monasterii divi Thome
Martiris de Abirbrothok
Monachi

This is, as far as is known, the only surviving printed monastic office book from Scotland. The first and last letters of Dom Walter's surname have been variously read but the version given above is probably correct, for Walter Baldowy as a monk of Arbroath (Aberbrothock) signed a document on 25th July 1544 (Gordon, Ecclesiast. Chronicle of Scotland II, 531).

The earliest printed book in the collection is the Bamberg Breviary of 1501, which is the earliest edition for this diocese except for three uncunabula; other early sixteenth century Breviaries are the Roman editions of 1521 and 1522, Freising 1516 and Mercedarian 1503; this last in particularly fine condition with wide margins. There are also three editions of the Quignon Breviary.

Of Roman Missals our library had no early editions; it is now provided with editions of 1513 and 1515, the Lyons printed *Missale Romanum ad*

longum absque ulla requisitione of 1550 described in the B.M. Catalogue as 'A reformed Missal on the lines of the Quignon Breviary', and the first Tridentine edition printed at Venice in 1570. Other Missals are the unrecorded Rouen of 1585, Tours St Martin of which the Bibliothèque Nationale has the only recorded copy; Tournai of 1540 with the Canon on vellum and the wonderful facsimile of the Lund Missal of 1514 published at Malmo in 1946.

Of liturgical books other than Breviaries and Missals, which are naturally the most numerous, we must mention two Ceremonials, one Roman of 1516, the other (*Caeremoniale Episcoporum*) of 1600. Two Roman Pontificals of 1520 and 1674 and a Venice-printed Roman Processional of 1513. There are nine other Processionals, four of French Dioceses, the others of Religious Orders. We must also mention Leroquais, *Bréviaries* and his *Pontificaux*, ten volumes in a fine binding which complete our set of his *Manuscrits* [liturgiques] *des Bibliothèques publiques de France*.

There are also fine books other than liturgical, e.g. Gotch, *Architecture of the Renaissance in England* and Gout, *Le Mont-Saint-Michel* and finally we have the two collections of reprints *Bibliotheca Curiosa* and *Collectanea Adamantæa* with seventy items, and a number of pamphlets forming four stout volumes.

OBITUARY

DOM STEPHEN RAWLINSON

BERNARD RAWLINSON was born on 27th June 1865. His father had been a high church clergyman who became a Catholic in 1861. His mother's maiden name was Alexander, whose home was Dumcree in Co. Armagh. She entered the Church at the same time as her husband.

At the early age of 6 Bernard went to a preparatory school, his memories of which were not happy, proceeding thence to Downside in 1876. On the evening of his arrival he had to fight no less than three fights for the amusement of others. Being bullied seems to have been the common experience of the smaller boys.

In 1880 Sir Andrew Clark, one of the foremost doctors of the time, gave him but a year to live. He was sent home, but happily Sir Andrew's gloomy prognostications were not justified. Returning to Downside he remained till 1882, and then joined the firm of Messrs Lloyd and Hardy of the London Stock Exchange. During these years in London he met several of the most prominent people in the society of the day. The Duke of Cambridge, C-in-C. of the Army, Gladstone, Stanley, the great African explorer, Lecky the historian. The Prince of Wales, afterwards Edward VII, was also a visitor to his parents' house.

After a visit to Downside for Holy Week in 1884, Bernard Rawlinson decided to enter the religious life. Prior, afterwards Cardinal, Gasquet granted his request for admission and he proceeded to Belmont as a postulant on 17th April 1884, receiving the Habit from Abbot Raynal with nine others on 3rd September. A year later he was admitted to Simple Profession having previously taken the name Stephen in religion in honour of St Stephen Harding. His time at Belmont fell far short of the then customary four years, for a serious breakdown in health caused him to be sent home for a period of convalescence, after which he went to Rome where D. Wilfrid Corney presided over a small gathering of students in a flat in the Via Gregoriana. In January 1888 a Benedictine House of Studies was opened in the Piazza Scossa Cavalli presided over by Cardinal Dusmet, but the English members of this Community were authorized to reside at the Convent of the Blue Nuns in the Via San Sebastianello. Here Br Stephen remained till June 1888 when he returned to Downside taking up teaching in the School where, to use his own words, he 'taught almost every subject whether competent to do so or not, except Greek, though proficient therein'. Towards the end of 1889 the doctors again

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

became alarmed, diagnosing early symptoms of pthisis. A long sea voyage was prescribed and the patient went to Australia in a three masted clipper of 3,400 tons. Amongst his fellow travellers was Hugh Sweetman, an Old Gregorian.

After a voyage of ninety days the ship reached Sydney. Dom Stephen and a friend soon went up country on a shooting expedition, staying for some time with the parents of Dom Hugh Connolly and having plenty of riding, shooting and other sport, the best cure for diseases that threaten to develop. Francis and Hugh Connolly had been friends of his at Downside, and during this stay in Australia he met Mark Sheldon with whom he made a life-long friendship.

The return voyage from Sydney was made on the *Oroya*. Dom Stephen broke the journey at Naples wishing to visit Rome and Monte Cassino, and then having gone to see some of his old friends at Douai he returned to Downside where he was solemnly professed in March 1891. He was ordained sub-deacon and deacon during the same year and on 26th June 1892, he received the priesthood from Bishop Clifford, celebrating his first Mass the day following, all the members of his family being present.

Dom Aelred Kindersley resigned his post as Head Prefect of the School. Dom Clement Fowler who was then Prior appointed Dom Stephen to the vacant post with Dom Wilfrid New as Prefect of Studies who was called Head Master, that title being now used for the first time. Dom Stephen has left on record his chief aims after assuming charge.

1. To bring the School nearer to the standard of a Public School, giving the boys more freedom.
2. To get them to organize their own games and sports with a minimum of aid from the authorities.
3. To foster vocations for the religious life among the boys.

Dom Stephen, as all who knew him will appreciate, was anxious to promote all forms of games and athletics, particularly boxing, in which as a schoolboy he had won many laurels.

Considering how happy and fruitful was the time he spent in charge of the School, it may seem strange that he asked Prior Ford, who was now Superior to accept his resignation. This took place in July 1899.

Soon after came the South African War. Abbot Ford authorized Dom Stephen to apply for a chaplaincy in the Army. After a short period of preliminary service on Salisbury Plain, he, together with Dom Francis Sweetman, left Southampton on the SS. *Britannic* on 22nd May 1900 with a large number of troops on board.

Dom Stephen remained for the rest of the war in South Africa, finding that long and dreary campaign very different from the triumphant progress to Pretoria that almost everyone had expected and predicted. He went down with enteric after being in much heavy fighting, and witnessing the long and baffling guerrilla warfare against General De Wett. Dom Stephen was for practically all his time with the field force under Generals

OBITUARY

Clements and Paget, and was attached to the 18th Royal Irish Regiment with whose officers he formed many a lasting friendship and at whose annual reunions he was present almost till his last illness.

After the South African War, he returned to Downside for some months and then was asked by Abbot Ford to take over the Headmastership of St Charles' College, Bayswater, which had been founded by Cardinal Manning under the Oblates of St Charles Borromeo. This school was soon closed. There being no scope for it in the London of that time, and Dom Stephen went to the Philippine Islands where he spent some years as Secretary to Dr Hendricks, Bishop of Cebu.

The great work of his life now awaited him—the foundation of the Downside Settlement at Bermondsey. At this club for boys and young men he worked continuously till the outbreak of the 1914 War, helped by a number of devoted Catholic laymen without whose assistance this great work of charity could not have gone on for all those years. Many a chaplain during both world wars had reason to thank Dom Stephen and his henchmen for the harvest they then reaped.

The moment Germany declared war in August 1914, Dom Stephen volunteered for service. He went to France and was with the old regiment, the 18th Royal Irish, during the retreat from Mons, the Battle of the Marne and the advance to the Aisne.

Like every other unit in the Army the number of Chaplains had to be increased out of all proportion to anything previously known or needed. Dom Stephen was transferred to G.H.Q. in 1915, and with the able help of Dom Dominic Young as Secretary began the work of posting priests to every infantry brigade in the front line, to every base hospital, and many casualty clearing stations. This work entailed much travelling, and many contacts with members of the High Command, and the exercise of those gifts of charm, tact and wisdom, so conspicuous in Dom Stephen's character.

At the end of hostilities he returned to the work he had most at heart—his club at Bermondsey. Here he worked with unflagging zeal and energy till Dom Bruno Hicks was elected Abbot on the death of Abbot Chapman in November 1933. Abbot Hicks appointed Dom Stephen to succeed him in the office of Bursar, which he held till some time after the outbreak of the Second World War.

During his holding of this office he carried out many improvements in the monastery and school which Abbots Hicks and Trafford found necessary to introduce, endearing himself to all members of the staff and to everyone with whom he came in contact.

In 1940, being unable on account of his age to return as Chaplain to the Army, he went as a guest of the Commanding Officer, Commander G. R. Farie, R.N., to live in H.M.S. *Impregnable*, a Training Establishment at Devonport. There he rendered invaluable service by making himself responsible for the spiritual welfare of many hundreds of young

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

'hostilities only' ratings, who passed through the Establishment annually. As in the First World War in the Army, so now in the Royal Navy, he soon became a beloved figure, whose influence made itself felt amongst both officers and ratings, Catholic and non-Catholic alike.

After the Armistice he returned to Downside, but his health had become weak. In spite of this he continued to be one of the most active of the older members of the Community. Until his last illness he rose every morning at five, and was regular in attendance at choir and all the duties of conventual life. His constant companionship with the young, and keen interest in everything that concerned their welfare and happiness seemed to preserve in him something like perpetual youth.

During the winter of 1951, his heart became very weak and he was taken to St Augustine's Nursing Home at St Leonards-on-Sea. He lingered on there for many months tended with all the care that skill and science could afford, and frequently visited by members of the Community and his many friends. The end came in the evening of 7th September 1953, a few weeks after his 88th birthday.

Dom Stephen was a man of very fine presence with great charm of manner and winning address. His chief characteristic was his cheerful optimism. Nobody ever saw him dejected or morose. He did an immense service to the Church during the Boer War and the First World War, always fighting for the Catholic cause and the welfare of the Catholic men under his care.

He was broad minded and tolerant in the true sense of those now much abused terms. Kind and understanding towards human weakness, and yet firm and uncompromising where Christian principles are concerned.

He had a very simple faith and trust that all would be well in the end. During the crisis preceding both world wars he insisted till the very last moment that the policy of peace would prevail. The last time the present writer saw him some mention of a Third World War, with the Atom bomb, was made. 'That will not happen', he replied. 'No sparrow falleth from the house top'.

HAGUE

AND SON

A. J. PAYNE, F.B.O.A., F.S.M.C.

assisted by

N. MARSHALL, F.S.M.C.

D. H. BRIGNALL, F.B.O.A., F.S.M.C.

SIGHT TESTING & DISPENSING OPTICIANS

32 BROAD STREET BATH

•HOURS : 9 a.m.—6 p.m. Thurs. 9 a.m.—1 p.m.

Tel. 2423

for your book-token

THE HOLY SPIRIT IN CHRISTIAN LIFE

by Père Gardeil, O.P.

The studies published in this volume served as the theme of a retreat given in 1923 to the Little Sisters of the Poor; but although particularly adapted to the needs of men and women consecrated to God in the religious state, Père Gardeil's teachings on a doctrine of which he made himself a master are no less profitable to priests and layfolk aiming at a deeper spiritual life, and readers will find in these pages an inspiring and ardently written treatise on the Christian life.

9s. 6d. net.

BLACKFRIARS PUBLICATIONS

34 Bloomsbury Street

London, W.C.1

Francis Tucker and Company Limited

ESTABLISHED 1730

METALWORK
SILVERWARE
WOODWORK
STATIONS OF
THE CROSS



VESTMENTS
STATUARY
STAINED GLASS
INTERIOR CHURCH
DECORATION

price list available on request from
THE MANUFACTORY, CRICKLEWOOD LANE
LONDON, N.W.2

Tel : Speedwell 9717/8/9

NO. 4

VOL. X

WINTER 1953

THE EASTERN CHURCHES QUARTERLY

CONTENTS

A Marian Year

'Sobornost' or Papacy—IV

The 'Filioque' Dispute and its Importance

The Epistles, Gospels and Tones of the Byzantine Liturgical
Year—IV

Concelebration of the Holy Eucharist in East and West—II

News and Comments

Recent Publications

Fr G. Dejaifve, S.J.

Fr Vladimir Rodzianko

Fr Irmgard M. de Vries

Fr George Brianchaninoff

Single Copies 3/-

Yearly Subscription 12/-

Write to G. E. J. COLDWELL, Ltd., 17 Red Lion Square, London, W.C.1

FISH

Direct from the Coast

BEST QUALITY
FRESH FISH
SELECTED DRY
FISH
and
QUICK FROZEN
FISH

Inquiries Solicited

Haven Fisheries
LTD

GRIMSBY DOCKS & FLEETWOOD

Telephone

3809 Grimsby
8278 Fleetwood

Telegrams

"Haven" Grimsby
"Haven" Fleetwood

also an associate Company at Hull



Capital subscribed . £2,042,471

Capital paid up . £2,042,471

GUARDIAN Assurance Co. Ltd.

ESTABLISHED 1821

Head Office :

68 KING WILLIAM STREET
LONDON, E.C.4

Branches and Agents throughout the World

CHAIRMAN :

THE RT. HON. LORD BLACKFORD, D.S.O., D.L., J.P.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN : STANLEY J. ADAMS, ESQ.

VICE-CHAIRMAN : SIR ALEXANDER AIKMAN, C.I.E.

GENERAL MANAGER : F. R. NORTON, F.I.A.

THE COMPANY

*transacts all the principal classes of
Insurance Business
and acts as Trustee and Executor*

TOTAL INCOME : £16,191,000

TOTAL FUNDS : £42,793,000

